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                                               Abstract 
 
The common perception of Fiji, which is unique in the South Pacific, is that of an 
ethnically divided society with the indigenous and immigrant communities often at 
loggerheads. This perception was heightened by the military coups of 1987, which 
overthrew the democratically elected government of Dr. Timoci Bavadra because it 
was perceived as Indian-dominated. Again in 2000, the People’s Coalition 
Government headed by an Indian, Mahendra Chaudhry, was ousted in a civilian coup.  
 
Yet Fiji had been genuinely multiethnic for several decades (even centuries) before it 
became a colony in 1874. From then onwards, however, because of the policies of the 
colonial government, the society slowly became plural (in Furnivall’s classic sense) as 
the different races were separated in almost every walk of life. Until the 1920s there 
were hardly any conflicts between Fijians and Indians.  From the 1920s, however, the 
Fijians were taught to be wary of the Indians. 
 
After independence in 1970, the Alliance government under Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara 
followed a policy of “multiracialism” with the stated aim of bringing the different 
ethnic groups together in a society where people achieved some degree of integration 
in terms of a common national identity, while retaining their own separate traditions.  
But, more than thirty years later, Fiji still remains an ethnically divided society with 
hardly any integration. My research explores the reason for this failure. 
 
My thesis is that the failure arose from the kind of democratic system that the country 
adopted at independence. That is, the Westminster concept of government and 
opposition can be problematic in a multiethnic society if political parties are divided 
on ethnic lines rather than based on political ideologies. Ratu Mara was one Fiji 
leader who recognized this problem and had said that the confrontational Westminster 
system is not appropriate in a South Pacific island with a multiracial population.  
 
While Stephanie Lawson, Peter Larmour, Futa Helu and others have made some 
important contribution to this debate, my thesis will focus on an argument put forward 
by  Michael Goldsmith on the role of the opposition, making a distinction between 
two kinds of opposition, “confrontational” and “thoughtful”. This thesis contends that 
the Westminster system that Fiji adopted at independence failed to bring integration in 
part because the National Federation Party (NFP) degenerated over the years from a 
‘thoughtful’ and effective opposition to a ‘confrontational’, ethnic opposition.                                     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 iii
                                       
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to gratefully acknowledge the support I have had from several people and 
organizations without which this study would not have been possible. First of all, I 
wish to thank the University of Waikato for offering me a scholarship.  
 
I wish to thank Stephen Innes, the Special Collections’ Librarian at the Auckland 
University Library and his wonderful team for making me feel welcome as I spent 
several hours there, day in, day out, pouring through the Fiji Legislative 
Council/Parliamentary Debates. I also wish to thank the University of Waikato 
Library’s external borrowers’ section for promptly attending to my requests 
throughout my enrolment as an off-campus student.  
 
I am also grateful to the Waikato Centre in Auckland city where I often went and 
made use of the facilities. I also wish to thank the people in Fiji with whom I have had 
interaction for helping to clarify my doubts by answering my questions. While the 
policy of maintaining the confidentiality of the sources would not let me reveal their 
names, they know who they are.   
 
I also wish to thank the members of the Anthropology Department, the University of 
Waikato, where I have been an off-campus student, for their support in various ways 
whenever I came and spent a few days on campus. Last but most of all, I would like to 
thank my supervisors, Dr. Michael Goldsmith and Dr. Keith Barber, for their 
guidance and support throughout without which my thesis would have remained ‘an 
elusive dream’.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract                                                                                                                ii 
           
Acknowledgements                                                                                             iii 
         
 
Table of Contents                                                                                                iv  
 
Preface                                                                                                                 v 
           
 
Introduction                                                                                                         1  
 
Chapter 1                  Fiji: the Historical Background                                         16 
 
Chapter 2                  Governing a Multiethnic Country                                     36                                       
 
Chapter 3                  Education the Foundation                                                 65                                         
 
Chapter 4                  Worker Solidarities Emerge                                              93                                        
 
Chapter 5                   Sugar Politics                                                                   112                                       
 
Chapter 6                   Ethnicity in Politics                                                          131                                      
 
Chapter 7                   Leadership for Preserving Fiji Fijian                                166                                      
                                 
 
Conclusion                                                                                                           201 
 
References Cited                                                                                                  214                                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v
Preface 
 
When I first came to Fiji in 1966, I noticed that there were many similarities between 
the ethnic Fijians and the people of Kerala, the southernmost state in India, where I 
was born. These similarities included their food habits and way of dressing. So from 
the beginning I was shocked by the attitude of the Indians in Fiji to the indigenous 
people and their traditions.  They tended, for example, to dismiss them as the ways of 
the ‘jungle’. 
  
The common Indian perception of the Fijians  stemmed from a historical stereotype 
that probably points to a deep-seated cultural opposition between civilization and 
wildness. When the Indians started arriving in Fiji, from 1879 onwards, most of the 
land in Fiji had not been under cultivation, so they had the task of clearing the bush 
(‘jungle’ in their language) and planting mainly sugar cane. They had hardly any 
contact with the Fijian people but they knew that just two or three decades ago they 
were practising cannibalism. The stories they had heard about the Fijians, such as the 
one about Udre Udre (who was supposed to have been a notorious cannibal) 
confirmed the Indians’ belief that the local people were ‘junglees’ (people from the 
jungle). The Indians were wary of them until they got to know them in schools and 
work places.  
 
As an English teacher my interest in Fijian culture became stronger when in the 1970s 
the Ministry of Education in Fiji (and elsewhere in the South Pacific) successfully 
sought to add South Pacific/Fiji options to some of the subjects in the New Zealand 
School Certificate and University Entrance examinations to make them more relevant 
to the Pacific where students took these exams. In English it was decided to follow a 
thematic approach and every year certain themes were prescribed for study, with these 
themes featuring in the final examinations in essay topics, comprehension passages 
etc. One of the first themes to be chosen was Culture. 
 
So in class we studied Fijian and Indian cultures, the two dominant cultures in Fiji. 
There were no text books or other resources which could be used to facilitate the 
study of this theme. The Curriculum Development Unit of the Fiji Ministry of 
Education sent some material but this was never sufficient. So in the English 
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Department at Jasper Williams High School where I taught, we started looking for 
relevant material (mainly from the newspapers) and building up our own resource 
collection. It was a lot of hard work but at the same time very stimulating. It would 
not have succeeded without the active participation and commitment of all the 
members of the department. 
  
Jasper Williams High School was different from most of the other schools in Fiji at 
that time as it was more multiethnic and therefore more multicultural than most other 
schools. As a consequence studying ‘Culture’ became easier. We would often have 
discussions in class on the different practices of the two major communities and we 
were able to see a lot of similarities between the Fijian and Indian culture such as 
having extended families.  
 
In February 1987 I took leave and went to Perth to do postgraduate studies. Less than 
three months later the first military coup in the Pacific overthrew the one-month-old 
government of Dr. Timoci Bavadra. I was not surprised by the news as ever since the 
Fijian-dominated Alliance government was voted out I had expected some political 
upheaval.  
 
Perth at that time had very few students from Fiji, unlike the other Australian cities. 
Most of us knew each other and everyone was shaken by the political turmoil. I had 
the naivety to say to some of them, “What else did you expect? Call them ‘junglees’ 
and this is what you will get”. Most of them got annoyed with me and told me that the 
Indians had done nothing wrong. I quite agree with that claim and it was far from my 
intention to even remotely suggest otherwise.  
 
The point I was making was that while the Indian contribution to the welfare of Fiji 
and its people, including the Fijian people, has always been positive they had a wrong 
attitude towards the Fijians. Only one of them understood my point and he agreed 
with me and gave his own example. He said when he was at the University of the 
South Pacific (USP), languages were being offered and there was a choice between 
French and Fijian. He said he chose French because he said to himself, “Who would 
want to study that ‘junglee’ language?” He later realized that his attitude was wrong 
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and regretted it. Unfortunately there are very few who have the humility and courage 
to honestly admit that they were wrong.    
 
The attitude clearly persisted because it was passed down by the parents, who had 
little contact with the Fijians, to their children, who also had limited contact as 
schools remained predominantly monoracial. The leaders of the two communities had 
contact through the Legislative Council and the relationship had been cordial. For 
example, in the Legislative Council, the Fijian leader, Ratu Sukuna, and other Fijian 
members used to vote with the Indian members until the Indians boycotted the war 
efforts during the Second World War (Gillion, 1977, pp.174 -175). This was 
interpreted by the Fijian leaders as lacking commitment to their country of adoption.  
 
I would say that the Indian contribution even during the war was positive because the 
colony needed them only as farmers and not as soldiers. The sugar strike during the 
war may have been the first example of a leadership lapse but A.D. Patel, the Indian 
leader, when he realized his mistake, sought a meeting with Ratu Sukuna to explain 
his action. Later Patel did a similar thing, showing his willingness to admit mistakes 
and make amends, after the by-elections of 1968 (see Chapter 1). He also made a 
genuine effort in the 1960s to get more Fijian support for his party, the NFP, but after 
his death his successors went in the opposite direction, making the party more ethnic-
based than before. So the responsibility for the Indian perception of the Fijians not 
changing after independence, I would attribute to leadership failures rather than to the 
Indians’ personal prejudices. 
 
I was just embarking on my research when the coup took place. My area of interest 
was education and I started by looking at the history of education in Fiji, to see why a 
racially segregated system of schooling was established and maintained. As I 
progressed, I realized that the history of education was in many ways the history of 
the country itself. 
  
Formal education in the Western sense started in Fiji in 1835. This is an important 
date in the history of the nation because that was when the Christian missionaries 
landed in Lakeba in the Lau group and started the process of Christianising the 
islands. Education was their tool for conversion. Christianity changed the way of life 
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of the islanders. The orthodox accounts state that the Fijians abandoned many of their 
traditions such as cannibalism and human sacrifice as the missionaries taught them 
that they were ‘primitive’ and ‘barbaric’. One writer noted that “credit must …be 
given to the Fijian people as a whole, who turned  within a few short years from utter 
savagery to a peaceful and civilized life. Men who had been practising cannibals for 
years changed completely when at last they decided to embrace Christianity” (Burns, 
1963, p.62). 
  
From the beginning, education was closely linked to religion(s) in Fiji. Later, when 
the Indians arrived, their religious organizations established schools to counter the 
Christian influence on their children. Since the colonial government refused to assume 
responsibility for education and left it in the hands of the voluntary agencies, the 
influence of the various religious groups on the education system continued 
throughout the 20th century. 
 
Similarly, the trade union movement was closely involved in education as the Fiji 
Teachers’ Union was one of the first to emerge in the colony. It was first organized in 
1930, though registered only in 1947. Teachers’ unions also emphasized the 
separation of the major ethnic groups as a separate Fijian Teachers’ Association was 
established in 1960, while the nominally multiracial Fiji Teachers’ Union remained 
predominantly Indian. After independence the two teachers’ unions together formed 
the Fiji Teachers’ Confederation to give them more bargaining power. Moreover, it 
was the teachers’ strike called by the Fiji Teachers’ Confederation in 1985 that acted 
as a catalyst for the formation of the Fiji Labour Party which had had a decisive role 
in shaping events in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
So I realized that though my previous research had identified the main reason for the 
lack of integration in Fiji, which was the education system, there were other areas of 
life which had contributed to the present situation. This led me to doing further 
research and the result is this study. 
 
I had been planning to undertake this study ever since the publication of my book, 
Education and Race Relations in Fiji, 1835-1998 (1999). I had difficulty in finding a 
suitable supervisor who knew the area well and could provide me guidance. 
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Meanwhile the crisis of May 2000 took place. Three months later, in August 2000, I 
decided to move to New Zealand permanently. This proved to be a good move for my 
research as Dr. Michael Goldsmith agreed to be my supervisor and by the end of that 
year I had some hope of getting a scholarship from the University of Waikato. 
  
By the time my enrolment was finalized it was mid-2001 and Fiji was gearing up for 
the August general elections. Since the situation in Fiji was tense I had a lot of 
misgivings about the consequences of my research.  The questions that troubled me 
were these: 
If I loudly proclaimed my views (which are quite different from the views held by 
most people in Fiji, including scholars) would it in any way adversely affect the 
situation in Fiji? Would it be better for me to keep quiet and not make my views 
known?  
 
Finally, I came to the conclusion that, at least until the situation in Fiji became more 
stable/less volatile, the best course perhaps would be to record my findings and 
conclusions quietly and talk about them only with my supervisors and anyone else 
who might be interested rather than making my views widely known. My main 
concern was in ensuring that nothing I said would lead intentionally to an increase in 
tension in Fiji. 
  
I know many Indo-Fijians with whom I have had discussions see me as an outsider (as 
one not born and brought up in Fiji) with limited understanding of the situation. I can 
see their point and I respect their views but at the same time I do feel that since I have 
lived and worked in Fiji for most of my adult life I might be able to interpret the 
happenings in a different light which might be of some value. 
 
I have also discussed my concerns thoroughly with my supervisors before I decided to 
proceed with the research. Michael Goldsmith, in particular, though strongly 
disagreeing with some of my assertions, still agreed to be my chief supervisor, for 
which I am most grateful. Since I lacked an anthropology background Keith Barber, 
my second supervisor, helped me to gain a better understanding of the notions of 
‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ and related ideas. 
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I took it as a challenge to prove that my wild assertions had some validity. My 
supervisors, even when not agreeing with me, believe that I have a right to be heard, 
however ‘outrageous’ my views may be! 
 
Our conclusion was that if my views were recorded, it would give another dimension 
to the ethnic question in Fiji and it would serve historical purposes if nothing else. 
This was the main reason for my decision to go ahead with the study. 
 
Contribution to Knowledge: Many books have been written on the political problem 
in Fiji, especially after the military coups of 1987. Most writers see it as an ethnic 
problem, while a few see it as a class problem. So far no one has looked at it, with the 
possible exception of Stephanie Lawson, as a problem arising out of the kind of 
democratic system the country adopted at independence. This is the focus of my 
study.     
 
While Lawson (1991) claims that the failure of democratic politics in Fiji was largely 
due to the failure to accept constitutional opposition by the eastern chiefs of Fiji, who 
dominated the government after independence, my contention is that Fiji had no 
viable opposition which provided a choice for the electorates, except an ethnic choice. 
 
My thesis is that the Westminster system of government and opposition, which Fiji 
adopted, was one of the main reasons for the ethnic problems in Fiji as the political 
parties were divided on ethnic lines rather than on political ideology. I. F.  Helu 
(1994) has talked about the unsuitability of the Westminster system for small Pacific 
nations while Goldsmith (1993) believes that it needs to be applied with careful 
consideration of local needs and constraints.  This study looks at the Fiji situation as 
the direct result of the failure of the NFP, which was in opposition from 1970 to 1987, 
to provide a viable alternative government for the country. 
 
Limits of the Study:  The study, though it provides a brief overview of Fiji history 
since the beginnings of colonialism, focuses on a period of about twenty years, 
starting from the 1960s when Fiji became self-governing to 1987 when the 
democratically elected FLP/NFP coalition government was overthrown in the first 
ever military coup in the Pacific. In trying to identify the reasons for the political 
 xi
problems in Fiji I have looked at most areas that contributed to the maintenance of a 
plural society such as education, trade unions and political parties.  
 
One area I have not looked at in detail is sports. Sports can bring people of different 
walks of life together to pursue their common interest but in Fiji there were ethnic 
preferences even there. This, however, is not an area in which I can claim much 
knowledge or understanding so I have not attempted to study it in detail. Similarly, I 
have also not looked at the role of the army in Fiji and its contribution to the 
maintenance of a plural society though some observers feel that the military has had a 
decisive role in this. 
 
Definition of Terms: In this thesis many of the terms are used as they are commonly 
used and understood in Fiji. Hence an attempt is made to define them at the outset so 
that there is no confusion. For example, the term Fijian is used only for the 
indigenous people of the country while Indian refers to the descendants of the 
immigrants from the Indian sub-continent who settled down in the country during the 
colonial period. Later they came to be referred to as Fiji Indian. In recent times Indo-
Fijian is used in preference to Fiji Indian, though some sections of the Fijian 
leadership have expressed strong disapproval of the use of this term (Indo-Fijian) 
which is used mainly by scholars based at USP.  
 
During colonial days racial differences were emphasized to divide the population into 
three distinct groups which were Fijian, Indian and European. Later the last group 
started to include the descendants of the European settlers who were of mixed 
descent. When self government was introduced, for election purposes, European also 
included Chinese while Fijian included other Pacific Islanders as well. After 
independence, European was changed to General Elector. Today, the term that is 
used to describe this group is Other – that is, Fijian, Indian and Other (which 
includes everyone who does not come under the first two categories). 
 
European in colonial days consisted of three very different groups of people who had 
very little in common with one another. First of all, there were the missionaries, who 
were British and French, Methodists, Anglicans and other protestant denominations as 
well as Roman Catholics, whose sole aim in coming to the islands was to convert the 
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Fijians to Christianity. Secondly, there were those who had come, the majority of 
them from Australia, seeking their fortunes mainly as planters. In this thesis, the term 
vested interests is often used to distinguish this group from the other Europeans 
(although it must be stressed that after independence this group, that is, the European 
vested interests, was slowly replaced by a local business community which mainly 
comprised non-Europeans). Lastly, there were the colonial officials who were posted 
to the colony for a specified period of time and went back to Britain at the end of their 
terms to be replaced by other officials posted from the British Colonial Office. 
 
Today people use the term ethnicity in preference to race. Even then there are 
problems. For example, Indian refers to anyone whose ancestors came from the 
Indian sub-continent though they do not form a singular ethnic group. It includes 
people who follow different religions and speak different languages.  
 
Multiracialism was the official ideology of the Alliance government which was in 
power for seventeen years after independence. Later the term multiculturalism was 
also used. It was perhaps the officials of the Education Department who started using 
the latter term as they tried to put the official ideology of‘ multiracialism into practice 
at schools by focusing on the different cultures. The notion of multiracialism was thus 
amended to embrace/include multiculturalism.   
   
An Outline of the Thesis: The thesis begins, after the Introduction, with a quick 
historical survey of the major events leading up to the time of independence to see 
how a plural society was developed over the years, especially during the colonial 
period.  The first chapter ends with a discussion of the policy adopted by the 
government of independent Fiji for the future development of the country. This was 
one of ‘multiracialism’ and ‘multiculturalism’ to bring about integration.  
 
Chapter 2 is about governing ethnically divided societies and what kinds of 
governments are recommended by scholars as suitable for such countries.  It also 
looks at the attempts to build an integrated Fiji nation out of the plural society that 
existed at independence using consociational practices for avoiding conflict. It 
describes how the attempts failed because of the manipulation of primordial loyalties 
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by Fijian nationalist politicians while the Indian opposition failed to support 
government’s implementation of policies aimed at integration.  
 
The rest of the chapters look at how and why government’s policy of ‘multiracialism’ 
failed in different areas. I begin here with ‘Education’ (Chapter 3) which was to have 
laid the foundation for the new ‘multiracial’ society and why it failed to do so. The 
major reason for this was the persistence of the voluntary system (that is, the 
voluntary communal organizations which provided the majority of the schools rather 
than the state providing education) which contributed to communalism. The 
government had a policy for wiping out voluntarism but the opposition NFP failed to 
support policies for the removal of communalism from the education system. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on how worker solidarities emerged and brought the different 
ethnic groups together as they formed unions to fight for better pay and working 
conditions. This chapter ends with the workers’ decision to form their own political 
party because they believed the government was following unfair labour practices and 
there was no one to fight to change government policies because the opposition had 
become almost defunct. The idea of forming a political party, however, came from the 
‘labour aristocracy’ and many blue collar unions were not supportive of the idea of 
politicizing the union movement. Moreover, the newly formed Fiji Labour Party 
(FLP) went into a coalition with the predominantly Indian NFP and became reduced 
to another Indian dominated party. This adversely affected the union movement which 
had managed to develop without ethnic divisions after independence. 
 
Chapter 5 outlines how sugar became an important political issue after independence 
causing divisions as Indo-Fijian politicians in particular tried to manipulate the 
sugarcane farmers for their own political ends. The NFP opposition, which had been a 
‘thoughtful’ opposition under Patel, became more and more ‘confrontational’ as it 
made sugar into a ‘political football’. This, and the education policies advocated by 
the NFP, turned it into a predominantly Indian party. 
 
Chapter 6 outlines the formation of political parties and how most of them remained 
predominantly monoracial, though they claimed to be multiracial. Initially this was 
because the issues that affected the different communities were not the same, as they 
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had led their separate lives. But soon after independence, the NFP turned the national 
seats into an extension of the communal seats. Moreover, they like the Fijian 
nationalists, started appealing to ethnic interests hoping to secure more votes in the 
elections. This led to the polarization of the two major communities leading to the 
failure of the Westminster system. 
 
Chapter 7 looks at how leadership failures have contributed immensely to the 
prevalence of ethnic divisions in the country. The leaders of the 1960s, both Fijian 
and Indian, had the interests of the nation as the major priority.  After independence, 
the Indo-Fijians lacked a leader who was dedicated and farsighted like A.D. Patel who 
had died just before independence. Ratu Mara who continued as the leader of the 
country, still carried on with policies which were for the benefit of the nation rather 
than for any particular community while the opposition NFP concentrated on issues 
that only appealed to the Indian voters.  
 
I conclude by looking at the prospects for future peace and stability in the country.   
 
                                          Introduction  
 
Fiji has remained unique among the islands of the South Pacific in its cultural 
mixture. In pre-colonial times, it was neither overwhelmingly Polynesian, nor 
exclusively Melanesian1. With the arrival of Europeans and Chinese from the 
early 19th century and the indentured Indians from 1879 onwards it became even 
more diverse. When it became independent in 1970 this cultural diversity was 
promoted as an asset by its first Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, who 
called it ‘the richness in diversity’ of the new nation. He, moreover, tried to use it 
for building harmonious relations between the various communities, while 
developing a unique Fiji identity. Unfortunately, most other leaders did not share 
his vision and still clung to their narrow communal loyalties. Moreover, they also 
blocked his attempts to bring about gradual integration by openly attacking some 
of these policies while covertly working against some others. Thus diversity 
remained a source of conflict.  
 
My thesis is that Ratu Mara’s efforts at building harmonious relationships 
between the various ethnic groups and developing a unique national identity failed 
because the Indian leaders of the opposition became narrow in their outlook and 
failed to look at issues from a national perspective rather than a communal one. 
The result was that over the years the predominantly Indian National Federation 
Party (NFP), which was in opposition throughout the period looked at,  
degenerated from the ‘thoughtful’ opposition that it was in the 1960s and early 
1970s to a ‘confrontational’ one (terms to be defined shortly). Over the years the 
NFP became a predominantly ethnic  party not only in composition but also in its 
policies. This led to the failure of the Westminster system of government and 
opposition that Fiji had adopted at independence as the NFP which was initially 
effective as a ‘thoughtful’ opposition slowly became reduced to a nominal one.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Marshall Sahlins (1985)  places Fiji in Polynesia but the standard Polynesian/Melanesian 
distribution is still widely accepted. 
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Opposition and the Westminster System 
Scholars list an institutionalized opposition as a feature of the ‘Westminster 
model’ of government, stressing its existence “as an executive in waiting” 
(Rhodes and Weller, 2005, p.8, emphasis in original).  In this system of 
government and opposition, ‘Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition’, as it is 
respectfully referred to, enjoys a pride of place as the ‘alternative government’ or 
the ‘government in waiting’. Loyal Opposition is the concept that one can be 
opposed to the actions of the government or ruling party of the day without being 
opposed to the constitution or the political system. 
The Leader of the Opposition is invariably seen as the alternative Prime Minister 
and heads a rival alternative government known as the shadow cabinet. The 
opposition is therefore expected to present itself as a viable alternative 
government by having policies which are different from those of the government. 
It also has the important job of keeping the government on its toes by carefully 
studying its actions and attacking them wherever they are not considered to be in 
the best interests of the country. An effective leader of the opposition is one who 
would make the government accountable to the parliament and the public. 
 
Opposition can be of two kinds – ‘confrontational’ or ‘thoughtful’ (Goldsmith, 
1993). A ‘confrontational’ opposition opposes all government policies for the 
sake of opposing whereas a ‘thoughtful’ opposition is “characterised by consensus 
around the good and criticism of the bad; it justifies support where that is 
necessary or desirable, opposition where it is not” (Goldsmith, 1993).  
For the emergence of a ‘thoughtful’ opposition certain conditions are necessary. It 
could also depend on the strength or weakness of the opposition parties at a given 
point. It, moreover, depends on the personalities of the leaders. The Fiji example 
shows that the fear of imminent ethnic conflict and the strong desire by the leaders 
to avoid it could produce a ‘thoughtful’ opposition. Even under such extreme 
circumstances where there is the definite possibility of ethnic conflict, the 
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opposition may not change because in the final analysis it depends on the qualities 
of the leaders and how keen they are on avoiding conflict. While the opposition 
under A. D. Patel in 1968 became ‘thoughtful’ when ethnic tensions threatened 
the continuation of peaceful coexistence, Patel’s successors went back to the 
‘confrontational’ style leading to conflicts. This shows the importance of having 
leaders of a certain type for the success of democracy, Westminster type or 
otherwise, in a Pacific country (especially a multiethnic one like Fiji). Scholars 
who have studied ethnically divided societies such as Arend Lijphart (1977) and 
Donald Horowitz (1991) have pointed out the importance of sound leadership for 
having stable democratic government in such countries. 
      
C. J. Lynch believes that in the Pacific because of the “lack of political 
sophistication in the ‘western’ sense” (1982, p.149)2  the Westminster system 
needs to be adapted  emphasising the consensus method of decision making which 
involves consultation, discussion and compromise. This calls for a ‘thoughtful’ 
opposition rather than a ‘confrontational’ one. Goldsmith points out that the 
problem with thoughtful opposition is that it does not fit the reality of the party 
system in any society (Goldsmith, 1993). It seems to become more akin to 
consociationalism (see Chapter 2, p.?) than to the Westminster system. 
 
In Fiji, when the Westminster system started in 1966, the Opposition under A. D. 
Patel was adversarial but Patel’s confrontation was with the colonial rulers who he 
thought were leading the Fijian chiefs from the back. He called the Alliance Party 
the ‘white colonialist Alliance’. Patel thought the Fijians were just being led by 
the European vested interests rather than having any strong opinions of their own. 
This may have been a patronizing view regarding the Fijian people but Patel 
sincerely believed that the Fijians were being manipulated by the European vested 
interests. There was some truth behind this belief (see Chapter 1, p.9 ?) though 
Patel was perhaps mistaken in his understanding of the Fijian people and their 
                                                 
2  This, however, is a patronizing judgement of politicians in the Pacific but it is relevant because 
in the island nations, for most of the common people, democracy was a concept that they were not 
familiar with and (therefore?) not interested in. 
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relationship with their chiefs. Patel believed that the Fijian commoners were being 
exploited by their chiefs and they (the common people) wanted an end to 
colonialism as well as the rule by the chiefs.  This was not so because the Fijian 
people wanted colonialism and the chiefly rule to continue for fear that otherwise 
the country might be overrun by the immigrant Indians.  
 
Patel’s attitude to the Fijian chiefs and the Fijian people as a whole changed after 
the by-elections of 1968 (more on this in Chapter 1, p.14?). After that the 
opposition became a ‘thoughtful’ opposition, co-operating with the Fijian chiefly-
led Alliance government on policies which the NFP considered to be for the 
benefit of the country. The NFP leaders also started openly showing respect to 
Fijian culture and traditions. An example was the motion to restore the chiefly 
island of Bau as a national monument because of its historical significance (see 
Chapter 1, pp.14-15?).    
 
Ratu Mara and Patel, who were at loggerheads during most of their political 
career seemed to have been very similar in their outlooks and attitudes. They both 
were against colonialism and exploitation, especially by the European vested 
interests. The main difference was that Ratu Mara, like most Fijians, remained a 
loyal subject of the British crown, making a distinction between the British 
monarchy and white colonialism while Patel could not see any such difference. 
The reason for this difference in their perception of colonialism and the British 
crown was that Patel was born and brought up in India during the freedom 
struggle under Mahatma Gandhi whereas Ratu Mara was born in a chiefly family 
in  Fiji which was ceded to Queen Victoria by the Fijian chiefs with a promise to 
look after Fijian interests. The British did safeguard Fijian interests to some extent 
(see Chapter 1, p.15?) so their loyalty to the crown was not completely misplaced. 
 
Sometimes the aim of the government and the opposition may be the same but the 
difference may be in the methods they have for achieving it. This was the position 
of Fiji in the 1960s. The government and the opposition wanted to integrate the 
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people of different communities as citizens of the nation with a common loyalty. 
Patel believed this could be done only through a common roll electoral system, 
but the Fijian leaders and some Indian leaders (for example, those who belonged 
to the Indian Alliance) disagreed. They believed integration could be brought 
about through education, by everyone attending the same schools and learning 
each other’s language.  They also believed in a gradual change in the electoral 
system by introducing limited common roll through the ‘cross-voting’ system (see 
Chapter 2, pp.6-7 ?) and then extending it further if it were found to work in the 
best interests of the country.   
 
Koya and the Fijians 
 
After Patel’s death in 1969 Siddiq Koya, who became the Leader of the 
Opposition, seemed to have continued as a ‘thoughtful’ leader as he was willing to 
bend over backwards to accommodate Fijian demands. This was something that 
everyone found difficult to understand as he had been most aggressive until then 
and was not particularly sensitive to Fijian feelings. Fijian leaders did not consider 
him a friend of the Fijians until then. In fact, he was considered anti- Fijian.  
 
Two Fijian members in the Legislative Council, Semesa Sikivou and Joshua 
Rabukawaqa, both found Koya’s attitude to the Fijians arrogant and impudent. 
They also found him insincere. While pretending to champion the common Fijian 
people (who he thought were not well represented by the Fijian leaders, who were 
mainly the chiefs) Koya talked against them to his Indian followers. Rabukawaqa 
claimed that he (Koya) told the Indian cane farmers not to engage Fijians on their 
farms because they might learn cane farming and displace the Indians. 
Rabukawaqa warned: “… this is the type of representative we should watch out 
for” (LC Debates, 24 May 1966, p.92).   
 
Both Sikivou and Rabukawaqa also noted that the majority of the Indian people 
did not have a similar attitude to that of Koya towards the Fijians. Many of them 
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were tolerant and supported the Fijian belief that change should come gradually 
but Koya interjected that they were behind the time. Rabukawaqa believed that 
Koya was trying to put a wedge between the Fijian chiefs and the common people 
while Sikivou remarked that their watch word should be “evolution rather than 
revolution”. The Fijian leaders also believed that the change must come from 
within themselves and they did not want it thrust down their throats by someone 
they knew who had “no interest whatsoever in the welfare of our race” (LC 
Debates, 25 May, 1966, p.108).   
 
At the time of independence though Koya seemed to have been leading a 
‘thoughtful’ opposition, as Patel had done in his last year or so, there was a major 
difference between the two leaders. Patel looked at each issue carefully and then 
decided whether to support the government or attack it. Koya in his early years 
(up to the 1972 general elections) showed restraint and did not attack any 
government policies in Parliament though later he attacked the same policies 
outside mainly at election times. In doing that he did not consider what was best 
for the country as a whole in the long run as his only concern seemed to have been 
what would bring him more Indian votes. The best examples were his education 
policies (see Chapter 3).  
 
Thus the Opposition started becoming less and less thoughtful from 1972 onwards 
until by 1977 it became completely confrontational (see Chapters 3 and 5). 
Though later in 1977 Koya was replaced by Jai Ram Reddy as the Leader of the 
Opposition, the NFP continued to be confrontational, while concentrating only on 
issues that affected the Indian population (see Chapter 6). In doing that Reddy 
also overlooked the importance of maintaining the ethnic balance until the country 
became integrated.  
 
Fiji’s “relative ethnic peace” after independence was attributed to the maintenance 
of the balance between its major ethnic communities (see also Chapter 2).  In 
order to maintain the balance and the resultant ethnic peace “Indians and 
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Europeans [were] expected to restrain their use of economic power to seize 
political control” (Premdas, 1986, p.134).  When the difference between the two 
major parties became reduced to ethnicity rather than political ideology there was 
the threat of the loss of the ethnic balance that had prevailed for a decade after 
independence. This also affected the effective functioning of the Westminster 
system as the Opposition National Federation Party slowly turned into an ethnic 
Indian party not only in composition but also in policies. This finally  led to the 
failure of the Westminster model of government in Fiji because the ethnic balance 
that held the nation together was lost. 
 
The 1997 Constitution and the Opposition 
 
To support this hypothesis I look at the period from 1966, when the Westminster 
system (of government and opposition) was first introduced, to 1987 when the 
democratically elected government of Doctor Timoci Bavadra was overthrown in 
a military coup a month after it was elected to rule the country. This also marked 
the temporary end of democracy in Fiji with the country not having an elected 
government for the next five years. From 1987 to 1992 there was only an interim 
government appointed by the President while a new constitution was being 
prepared to replace the 1970 constitution which was abrogated in 1987. 
 
Democracy was partially restored in 1992 with an elected government under a 
new constitution. The 1990 constitution, however, was openly racist, blatantly 
discriminating against one half of the country’s population. Bowing to 
international pressures the Fiji government agreed to revise the 1990 constitution 
and the 1997 constitution was the result. Democracy was fully restored in the 
country after the 1999 general elections which saw the emergence of the People’s 
Coalition government under an ethnic Indian, Mahendra Chaudhry. However, the 
new constitution introduced the multiparty system of government which made the 
role of the opposition negligible. This was later identified as one of the main 
weaknesses of the new constitution.  
 8
 
This problem with the opposition became apparent soon after the 1999 general 
elections when the question of appointing members to the Senate arose. The Fiji 
Senate is a wholly nominated body, with senators being chosen by the Prime 
Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Great Council of Chiefs who 
submit their lists of nominees to the President who then makes the appointments. 
 
The Fijian Association Party, led by Adi Kuini Speed, had joined the multiparty 
government. When Chaudhry was working on his list of nominees for the Senate, 
Adi Kuini gave him a few names for inclusion. Chaudhry did not include any of 
those recommended by Adi Kuini. It was explained that though Adi Kuini was in 
the cabinet, her nominees to the Senate would come from the Leader of the 
Opposition’s quota. When the Leader of the Opposition, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, 
gave his list of nominations to the Senate, the President did not appoint all of them 
as he included some from Adi Kuini’s list. Incensed, Ratu Inoke threatened to take 
the President to court. The President also sought legal opinion to clear the issue. 
 
It turned out that the President’s action was constitutionally correct. Though Adi 
Kuini would be in the multiparty cabinet, her appointees to the senate would be 
part of the opposition senators. There seems to have been a deliberate attempt to 
weaken the concept of opposition in the 1997 constitution. A constitutionally 
enforced multiparty government later proved unworkable, as Laisenia Qarase had 
been claiming from the time he was elected to lead the country in 2001. Even 
Chaudhry seemed to concede its impracticality when after demanding to be part of 
the government for three years (after the 2001 general elections) he finally agreed 
to be the Leader of the Opposition3.   
 
                                                 
3 Now after the latest elections (May 2006) Prime Minister Qarase has invited Chaudhry to form a 
multiparty government which Chaudhry has accepted. Its success will depend on the willingness 
of the leaders to compromise. The Fiji Times has warned in an editorial: “Mahendra Chaudhry will 
certainly not play second fiddle to anyone and Mr. Qarase will not take lightly any attempts to 
sabotage his authority” (21 May, 2006). It is for Chaudhry and Qarase to prove that they can rise 
above their narrow personal preferences for the good of the nation. 
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Sir Vijay Singh, a former Speaker and cabinet minister in the Alliance 
government in the 1970s, however, pointed out that this multiparty government 
was not the recommendation of the Reeves Commission which was responsible 
for the 1997 constitution. Reeves had rejected the proposal for an enforced union 
of the main political parties into a government. Singh blamed “the political leaders 
and their loyal supporters of 1997” who “rejected Reeves’ realistic and principled 
advice and unanimously introduced the provision that has bedeviled us since” 
(Fiji Times, 19 January, 2005). 
 
Singh seemed to be referring to Sitiveni Rabuka and Jai Ram Reddy (and their 
supporters) who were the leaders in 1997. A scholar has noted that “the provision 
for a multi-party government was adopted in a context of extraordinary personal 
co-operation between former coup leader Rabuka and the leader of the Indian-
dominated National Federation Party, Jai Ram Reddy” (Palmer, 2005, p.212). The 
multiparty system could work well if there are no policy differences between the 
major parties. The Rabuka-led SVT and the NFP in the 1990s were ethnic parties 
fighting for the rights of the communities they represented. So the multiparty 
government could have worked as it would have been similar to a consociational 
government (see Chapter 2) which Lijphart (1977) recommends for multiethnic 
countries.  
 
The architects of the 1997 constitution were advised to give priority to improving 
race relations. Perhaps it was believed that the idea of opposition was not 
compatible with the aim of avoiding conflict. So the constitution had to be 
subordinated to that end (of improving race relations) as the possibility of order in 
Fiji was thought to depend on harmonious relations between indigenous Fijians 
and Indo-Fijians (Larmour, 2001, p.8). That could have been the reason for trying 
to deliberately weaken the opposition. So from 1987 to the present there has been 
no effective opposition in Fiji because the constitutional provision for a multiparty 
cabinet weakened “the likelihood of a strong opposition that could form a credible 
alternative government”(Palmer, 2005, p.214). This study, therefore, concentrates 
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on the period from 1966 to 1987 (though it refers to the period from 1987 to the 
present wherever it is relevant) when the opposition was an important part of 
government and looks at the slow change that came over the NFP turning it from 
a ‘thoughtful’ opposition to a ‘confrontational’ one.   
 
Westminster in the Pacific 
 
According to Peter Larmour, a distinguishing feature of the Westminster system is 
the selection of ministers from the legislature (2001, p.2). While Fiji did not have 
any difficulty in adhering to this principle, it had some of the other problems 
listed by Larmour. These included the fact that:  
(1)  the rule of law is often challenged by the claims of custom, or personal and 
clan ties because the separation of powers is often difficult;  
(2)  property rights are often unprotected against the claims of traditional owners; 
and  
(3)  some human rights do not have much popular support.  
These problems highlight the difficulty of having any kind of democratic 
government in the South Pacific, let alone the Westminster model. 
  
Lynch argues that the Westminster system can be made to work in the Pacific by 
adapting it and developing government systems that are based on local practices 
and traditions (Lynch, 1982, p.149). This seems to have happened in Fiji as the 
Native Administration4 developed by the colonial government continues today as 
the Fijian Administration under the Fijian Affairs Act. The Fijian Administration, 
which includes the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) and provincial councils, wields 
significant political power. “Its continuing influence represents a blending of 
Western democratic principles with ‘traditional’ authority structures” (Palmer, 
2005, p.207).  
 
                                                 
4 During the colonial period there was ‘indirect rule’ for the indigenous Fijians as they continued 
to live in the villages under their chiefs.  
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One problem Lynch anticipates arising out of the conflict between traditions and 
the Westminster system is the role of the Speaker who might have to deal with a 
minister of a higher traditional standing. Tomasi Vakatora who was the Speaker of 
Fiji in the 1980s illustrates this problem from his own experience. He describes 
how the House was debating a motion one morning and because the debate was so 
“intense” he had ruled that some matters raised should not be brought up again. 
Prime Minister Ratu Mara who came in the afternoon and did not know about the 
ruling wanted to go back to the earlier debate but the Speaker stopped him. “I had 
to summon a lot of courage to do that. He was my party leader, and he was my 
Chief”, Vakatora confessed (Vakatora, 1997, p.7). 
 
The Westminster system could work in Fiji for seventeen years because in this 
and other cases Ratu Mara accepted the ruling and therefore the traditions of the 
Westminster system. This, however, was not the case with the Leader of the 
Opposition, Jai Ram Reddy, who refused to accept Vakatora’s ruling5 by walking 
out and boycotting parliament and eventually resigning. This again shows the 
importance of leadership and how the system can only work if leaders accept the 
rules and play by them. One scholar, Yash Ghai, has emphasized “the desirability 
of an effective leader of the opposition to meet the objective of honest government 
accountable to the parliament and the public” (Palmer, 2005, p.211).Unfortunately 
Fiji lacked such a leader after Patel’s death in 1969.  
 
A major change Lynch recommends while accepting the general principles of the 
Westminster system is to be centred on the notion of consensus which involves an 
active avoidance of polarization. This could be done by reaching a generally 
agreed solution through consultation, discussion and compromise. This technique 
(which Lynch describes as part of the ‘Pacific Way’6) is markedly different from 
                                                 
5 This was on 15 December, 1983 when Reddy refused to stand while objecting to a ruling made 
by Vakatora and an angry clash followed (see V  Lal, 1990, p.165). 
6 The Pacific Way is an ideology Ratu Mara introduced in the early 1970s to promote regional 
solidarity. Ron Crocombe  who seemed to have helped Mara define this ideology has himself 
admitted that it was an ideal and not a reality, giving the example of the ‘hard work’ that Mara 
stressed as part of the Pacific Way (Crocombe, 1976 p.24).   
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the ‘confrontational’ technique that is common to the Westminster system and 
resembles the consociational system, as mentioned earlier.  
         
While Lynch believes that the opposition is not essential in the Pacific situation, 
Michael Goldsmith, who draws the distinction between the two kinds of 
opposition, seems to think that the distinction is important. The system of 
government and opposition may work in a small Pacific country if the opposition 
is ‘thoughtful’. The ‘thoughtful’ opposition looks at every issue from the point of 
view of how it would benefit the people and the country. If it feels it is for the 
good of the country, it supports the government, and opposes only those policies 
which it does not regard as in the best interests of the nation. Its prime 
consideration in making its decisions would be what it sees as good for the 
country. (It is an ideal type but the Fiji opposition under Patel seems to have come 
close to the ideal.) ‘Confrontational’ opposition, on the other hand, opposes all 
government policies for the sake of opposing.  Its principle is ‘we oppose what 
you propose’.   
 
Having a ‘thoughtful’ opposition seems to be all the more important in a 
multiethnic country like Fiji where there is the tendency to look at every issue 
from an ethnic perspective, leading to ethnic polarisation. This is where Stephanie 
Lawson’s interpretation of democracy becomes problematic, especially if political 
parties are mainly ethnic based. Lawson asserts that foremost among the widely 
accepted principles and practices of democracy is the idea that any political 
opposition may, through the constitutional process adopted by the state, succeed 
legitimately to government (1991, p.vi). While she is right in stressing the 
importance of the opposition in a democracy, her conclusion that there was no 
democracy in Fiji from 1970 to 1987 because there was no alternation of 
government seems far fetched7.  
                                                 
7 In India, for example, there was no change of government for over two decades after 
independence. The Congress Party under Nehru was in power for 17 years from the time of 
independence in 1947 until Nehru’s death in 1964. Even after that the Congress continued to be in 
power. Moreover, a little over a year after Nehru’s death, his daughter Indira Gandhi became the 
Prime Minister.    
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Palmer who also sees the 1987 (and 2000) coups as “a rejection of the idea of a 
loyal opposition” (2005, p.208), however, fails to note the reason for this rejection 
which was the degeneration of the NFP into an ethnic party.  Under such 
circumstances, as Palmer herself noted, “victory by one political party is 
perceived as the victory of one ethnic group over another” (2005, p.216).  
 
According to Lawson and Michael Howard (1991), the eastern chiefs who were in 
power after independence (meaning Ratu Mara and Ratu Penaia Ganilau) wanted 
to stay on, establishing themselves as an ‘oligarchy’ which these scholars see as 
the reason for not having a change of government from 1970 to 1987.  But K.C. 
Ramrakha, who used to be the opposition whip in Fiji until 1977 has a different 
view of the chiefs. In 1987 he talked of “the Chiefs who have yielded so much 
power, and had made Fiji what it is today” (Fiji Sun, 13 April, 1987, quoted in 
V.Lal, 1990, p.186). Though this was written before the military coups of 1987 
there seems to be some truth in the statement.  
 
Ratu Sukuna who was the leading chief until the 1950s “resisted the extension of 
voting to indigenous Fijians” (Palmer, 2005, p.208). Ratu Mara, who was the 
most nationally important among the four paramount chiefs (‘The Big Four’ as 
they were popularly known) who succeeded Ratu Sukuna, was prepared to extend 
the franchise to all ethnic Fijians and finally they were given the right to vote for 
the first time in 1963. This showed that Ratu Mara and his fellow chiefs were 
prepared to share power not only with the immigrant Indians but also with the 
Fijian commoners rather than just preserving the rights of the chiefs. But they 
wanted a gradual change as more and more Fijians received higher education and 
accepted democracy as the best form of government. Paradoxically, at the time of 
independence in 1970, the Fijian commoners did not seem to have wanted 
democracy with equal rights as they wanted the country to be given back to the 
chiefs who had ceded it to Queen Victoria in 1874 (see Chapter 1, pp.16-17 ?).     
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The main reason for not having a change of government from 1970 to 1987 was 
that the opposition NFP failed to get enough votes (especially non-Indian votes) to 
get elected. This was because the opposition did not provide the electorate with 
choices and alternatives except the choice of which ethnic group should dominate 
in government. Lawson admits that democracy can be legitimately adapted to suit 
particular circumstances but insists that “there are limits to its elasticity” (1996, 
p.30). The fact in Fiji was that the NFP opposition in the 1980s did not promote 
views contrary to the philosophies, policies and actions of the government of the 
day  which, according to Lawson, is what an opposition is expected to do (1991, 
p.16) as it became reduced to an ethnic party, concentrating only on issues that 
were of concern to the Indian community.  
 
In the 1960s though the two major political parties in Fiji, the Alliance and the 
NFP, were predominantly ethnic based, they had policies which were broad based 
with general relevance to the country rather than meant for any particular section. 
These policies were for improving the social and economic welfare of the nation 
as a whole and not meant to benefit only one particular community. The NFP 
supported the workers and their fight for justice while the Alliance believed in a 
slow change without suddenly upsetting the privileges of the vested interests. A 
leading scholar on Fiji politics and history, Brij Lal, has noted how the NFP 
became reduced to a shadow of the Alliance from the late 1970s and how 
ideologically the Alliance government no longer had any opposition (Lal, 1986, 
pp.94-95).  
 
From 1972 onwards the NFP opposition started concentrating only on issues that 
were of interest to the Indian community. Education and sugar (and everything 
associated with the sugar industry such as land, marketing of sugar etc.) became 
the two areas that the NFP concentrated on and they looked at these only from the 
point of view of how the policies would benefit the Indians and not what was best 
for the country (see Chapters 3 and 5). So the NFP could not compete for office 
presenting itself as an alternative government because it had become reduced to 
an ethnic party. 
 15
 
In doing that, the party changed from a ‘thoughtful’ opposition to a 
‘confrontational’ one. Unlike Patel who changed from a ‘confrontational’ leader 
to a ‘thoughtful’ one, his successors, Koya and Reddy, initially gave the 
impression that they were ‘thoughtful’ leaders but later proved to be 
‘confrontational’ (see Chapters 5 and 6). This is where leadership played an 
important role in the failure of the Westminster system in Fiji. 
 
I. F. Helu (1994) is one Pacific scholar who sees leadership as very important if 
democracy is to succeed in the island nations. He suggests that leaders of the 
Pacific should follow Socrates, who believed the main aim of leaders should be 
community service, rather than going for personal power as the Sophists did. Helu 
believes that this could perhaps be achieved by making people who become 
national leaders give up some of their traditional privileges. Being a ‘thoughtful’ 
opposition also calls for following the Socratic tradition because the welfare of the 
nation would be the main priority of such an opposition. 
 
This thesis argues that the change of the Fiji opposition from a ‘thoughtful’ one at 
the time of independence to a ‘confrontational’ one after independence adversely 
affected the efforts of the government to develop a unique Fiji identity with a 
common loyalty to the country.  The failure of the opposition leadership to 
support government efforts in this crucial matter resulted in the country not 
becoming integrated. Fiji therefore failed to become a nation because it lacked the 
important prerequisites for achieving this – a “shared national identity” (Palmer, 
2005, p.223) and a common loyalty. Therefore it continued to be a plural society, 
and ‘multiracial’ harmony remained an elusive dream. 
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                                                CHAPTER 1  
                                  Fiji: the Historical Background                     
 
Most scholars agree that the first settlers to the islands of Fiji arrived more than 
3000 years ago from South East Asia through Vanuatu. These pioneers were 
Austronesian people who also brought with them some physical and cultural 
features of the “pre-Austronesian peoples of western Melanesia with whom 
Austronesian populations had long been in contact” (Norton, 1990, p.18). 
 
Successive waves of migrants followed these original settlers, and the people who 
reached Fiji about 2500 years ago, that is, about a thousand years after it was first 
inhabited, ventured past these islands and went further beyond Fiji and settled in 
most of the islands which lie in what is now known as the Polynesian triangle. 
 
Not only was Fiji the point of dispersal for the Polynesian people but for centuries 
after that it was a region of “contact and mixture” between Pacific people 
(Crocombe, 1977, p.20). From the earliest times, the people who went and settled 
down in Tonga travelled back and forth to Fiji, especially to the eastern islands. 
The early contacts were of a political and social nature but the later visits were 
mainly for trade as the Tongans began to appreciate the superior quality of Fijian 
products, especially of the Fijian double canoe (Derrick, 1957, p.126). 
 
Very little is known about the history of Fiji between its first settlement in the pre-
Christian era and its first “discovery” by Europeans a little over two hundred years 
ago. So there are considerable gaps in our knowledge of the country in the period 
between the first peopling of the islands and the time of European contact.  
 
European explorers had been passing through Fiji waters since the 17th century. 
But it was only from the 19th century, when sandalwood trade was at its peak, 
that American and European vessels started coming regularly to the ports of Fiji. 
The missionaries came next followed by the planters. A new era in the Pacific, of 
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annexation and colonisation, was quickly being ushered in. Thanks to its central 
location, Fiji played a prominent role again during this period. 
 
After Fiji became a British colony in 1874, Britain also established the High 
Commission for the Western Pacific in Fiji, which was responsible for the 
administration of the British Solomon Islands, British New Hebrides, the 
Kingdom of Tonga and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. The Governor of Fiji was 
also the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific. Suva, the capital of Fiji, 
soon became the unofficial capital of the British South Pacific. 
 
During the colonial days many of the region’s institutions were established in Fiji. 
The first was probably the Central Medical School (later known as the Fiji School 
of Medicine) which, with a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation in 1928, started 
training students from most of the Pacific Islands. Following this, throughout the 
20th century many other regional institutions were established, the most important 
ones being the University of the South Pacific in 1968 and the Pacific Islands 
Forum (originally known as the South Pacific Forum) Secretariat in 1972 to 
encourage economic and political co-operation between its member countries 
(which were the independent nations in the South Pacific). One obvious result of 
this development was that Fiji always had people from other islands in the Pacific. 
 
During the Second World War, American and New Zealand military established 
bases in Fiji. Nadi airport became an important refuelling stop for military as well 
as commercial planes so most of the major airlines passed through Fiji. To fly to 
the other island countries in the Western Pacific, until the last decades of the 20th 
century, one invariably had to pass through Nadi Airport, which became the 
principal international airport in the region. 
 
Until the time of cession, although there were several ethnically different groups 
living together in Fiji, there was no official segregation along ethnic lines. For 
example, apart from Fijians, there were Pacific Islanders from Tonga, Samoa, the 
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New Hebrides (Vanuatu), and the Solomon Islands, as well as Chinese and 
Europeans. Fiji had been multiethnic and multicultural for a long time but there 
was social cohesion to some extent as the different groups lived together with 
some degree of integration. A proof of this was the growing number of people of 
mixed descent which consisted mainly part-Europeans and part-Chinese (see for 
example 1909 Education Commission, pp.50-53). Fiji was a melting pot with all 
the different people who came becoming part of Fiji and adapting to the 
established way of life. 
 
With the start of colonial rule in Fiji racial segregation became an accepted policy.  
There were few opportunities for ethnic mixing, leading to the separate 
development of the different ethnic groups. This turned Fiji, which had been a 
multiethnic and multicultural society, into a ‘plural society’ of a quite specific 
nature (see Chapter 2). 
 
The Colonial Legacy 
 
During the 96 years of colonial rule in Fiji, there were two policy factors that 
affected the social composition of the population. The first was the decision in 
1879 to bring Indian labourers to Fiji to work in the sugarcane plantations. In the 
following decades their numbers increased until in 1946 Indians had become the 
majority ethnic group. 
 
The second factor was the colonial administrators’ practice of keeping a social 
distance from the ruled. This meant policies of segregation in schools, churches, 
and at places of work and recreation. The result was that the country at 
independence was not a ‘nation’ in its true sense, where the majority had a 
common national outlook with a common loyalty to the country, but a ‘plural 
society’ where the various groups had different aspirations and loyalties. 
 
Even when the question of independence arose, there was division, with Fijians 
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wanting the colonial rule to continue, while Indians pressed for independence. 
This was partly because the impact of colonialism was mild on the Fijians 
compared to its effects on the other Pacific islanders such as Papua New 
Guineans, New Hebrideans (ni Vanuatu), Solomon Islanders and most of all the 
Indians in Fiji. The Fijians had limited contact with the Europeans. This was 
because the British imposed a system of ‘indirect rule’. 
 
A separate administration for Fijians was created by the first Governor, Sir Arthur 
Gordon, including a Council of Chiefs. Thus the majority of the Fijians continued 
to live in their villages under the village chiefs. The presence of the Indians, who 
comprised the bulk of the labour force on the sugar plantations allowed them to 
carry on their lives in the villages, undisturbed by the changes that were taking 
place around them. The colonial officials dealt with matters concerning the Fijians 
through the chiefs. On the whole, the colonial experience was not directly 
oppressive for Fijians because it was so indirect. 
 
With the Indians it was a different story. They were in close contact with the 
Europeans, especially the officers of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR) 
and the colonial officials. Their relationship with Europeans was “superficially 
amicable” but based on the colonisers’ assumption of white superiority. “It was 
the tolerance of master and servant” (Gillion, 1977, p. 17). 
 
With the end of indenture in 1920, the unquestioning acceptance of white 
superiority ended. The Indians wanted to fight against discrimination and 
exploitation by the European business interests and the colonial government, but 
they lacked leadership as most of them were illiterate. Manilal Doctor, a lawyer 
who came from India, assumed leadership of the Indians and helped to give 
expression to their discontent. This led to a strike by the Indian workers in 1920 
but the strike failed and Manilal was banished from Fiji (Gillion, 1977, pp.33-34). 
 
Some discriminatory practices were stopped after the 1920 strike such as 
 20
“discrimination in admittance to the Suva Race8 Club” (Gillion, 1977, p.39). 
Indian dissatisfaction continued, however, and culminated in another strike in 
1921. The leader this time was Sadhu Bashishth Muni, who was more anti-British 
than Manilal. He too was soon deported (Gillion, 1977, p.58). 
 
The major consequence of the strikes was that the European planters and 
businessmen, who so far had paid little attention to the Fijians after cession, 
started using them against the Indians. In 1920 two hundred Lauans were recruited 
to form an auxiliary force (Gillion, 1977, p.28). During the 1921 strike the CSR 
recruited Fijian labourers “at higher wages than it paid to Indians even though 
they were less efficient” (Gillion, 1977, p.60). Two hundred and fifty Bauans 
were enrolled as special constables and posted to the strike area (Gillion, 1977, 
p.60).  
 
Europeans now realised that the Indians were the ones who posed the greatest 
threat to their hegemony. Thus began “an explicit accord between the Europeans 
and the Fijians before the advancing Indians” (Gillion, 1977, p.61). Some 
European agitators deliberately tried to stir up the Fijians. Rumours were spread 
that Britain would let the Indians become the rulers of Fiji and take the Fijians’ 
land away. One European, J. J. Ragg, wrote to the Roko Tui Tailevu in 
November, 1921, suggesting that he “endeavour to permeate the whole of the 
Fijian race with the fixed idea that the granting of the franchise and equal status to 
the Indians in Fiji would mean the ultimate loss of their lands and rights and later 
their final extinction from the face of the earth” (quoted in Gillion, 1977, p.74). 
 
Fijians became increasingly receptive to such warnings. Although there had been 
little open hostility between Fijians and Indians, because of the limited contact, 
there were no bridges of understanding in times of crisis. The Fiji Times played a 
major role in spreading anti-Indian propaganda. There were daily attacks on the 
                                                 
8  It is highly unusual for a Racing Club to be called a Race Club but perhaps it was 
unintentionally appropriate.  
 21
Indians in the pages of the newspaper. A letter to the Editor under the heading “A 
White Fiji” was typical. It read: “I would venture to say that 99 per cent of the 
Europeans in Fiji and the Fijians are loyalists and the handing over of Fiji to evil-
smelling, treacherous, non-educated, garlic eating Indians would be one of the 
major crimes in the history of the British Empire” (quoted in Gillion, 1977, p.81). 
 
Indians and Europeans both realised that, more than anything else, what would 
make the former equal to the latter, was education. So the Europeans vehemently 
denied them educational opportunities while the Indians equally vigorously made 
their own efforts to educate their children. The policies of discrimination in 
education were equally against the Fijians but for various reasons the Fijians did 
not feel their effects as much as the Indians. Fijians too were not allowed to attend 
European schools, but it did not matter to them much, as they had their own 
mission and government schools. There were schools for Fijians established by 
the missionaries in all the villages even before Fiji became a colony. The colonial 
government had also established a few schools for Fijian children, so they were 
not lacking in facilities. With the Indians it was a different story, they had hardly 
any schools at all. 
 
What the European business interests succeeded in doing, as far as Fijian 
education was concerned, was in making sure that the standards remained low 
(Legislative Council Debates, 12 November, 1918, pp.180-181) and provision for 
secondary educational facilities in Fiji for Fijians was vigorously opposed by the 
local European leaders (Legislative Council Debates, 21 November, 1917, pp.261-
263; also see Gaunder, 1999, pp.58-59; and 104-105).  The Fijians valued literacy 
but because of the hierarchical system they were happy to leave higher education 
to the chiefs. The colonial government made provision for educating the sons of 
chiefs abroad.  So the Fijians did not quite realise what was being done to block 
opportunities for higher education for them by the European settlers and fell 
victim to their propaganda. They saw the Europeans as their friends and the 
Indians as their enemies. 
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Indians had been demanding an end to colonialism whereas the majority of the 
Fijians wanted the colonial rule to continue for fear that the Indians might 
dominate once the British withdrew from the country. This fear had been 
heightened by calls for a common roll in elections by the Federation Party leader, 
A.D. Patel, from the 1930s, calls which were rejected by the Europeans and the 
Fijians as an attempt by the Indians to assume control. Patel tried to explain that 
what he wanted was equality and not domination.9 
 
The steady increase in the Indian population until, in the 1940s, it overtook the 
Fijian population, lent weight to the fear of the Fijians who continued to reject 
common roll. A Fijian member of the Legislative Council, Joshua Rabukawaqa, 
for example, said in 1965, “not everybody wanted equality, nor was it possible or 
desirable” (quoted in Lal,1997, p.206). Fijian leaders had said that asking for 
common roll in this context was like putting the cart before the horse. Before 
common roll Fiji should achieve common grounds, common language, common 
beliefs and common culture, Rabukawaqa went on to explain.  
 
In the same debate Patel responded by saying that political integration should 
precede racial integration and he cited the examples of Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States. But Indian Alliance member in the Legislative Council, 
Vijay R. Singh, condemned Patel’s call: “He has this idea of common roll and 
with this idea he is in search of guinea pigs. But the Alliance is not willing to 
allow the people of this country to be made guinea pigs so that his ideas may be 
experimented with” (quoted in Lal, 1997, p.230). 
 
The Federation Party claimed to be defending the victims of colonialism (the 
common people, both Indian and Fijian) against its beneficiaries (expatriate 
                                                 
9 The attitude Patel displayed may have been sincere but it was also somewhat naïve. Brij Lal 
characterises this view generally, without referring to Patel specifically, as a belief that common 
roll would ‘by some magic power unite and integrate the different peoples of Fiji’ (Lal, 1998, 
p.146).  
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colonial officers, European capitalists and Fijian chiefs). Patel failed to realise that 
the Fijian commoners did not see themselves as victims as they had hardly felt 
colonialism as oppression. Indigenous Fijian protest against the colonial rule, 
though it did occur, was a rare event in the history of the crown colony of Fiji. 
 
The most important protest movement against the European establishment was led 
by Apolosi R. Nawai between 1914 and 1917 (see also chapter 4). As he was a 
commoner, it was also seen as a challenge to the chiefly system. He formed the 
Viti Company to buy bananas and sell them without European middlemen. He had 
singular support from the Fijian community who resented the activities of the 
European commercial enterprises. “[T]he anxiety of Fijian landowners was after 
all based on a correct reading of the desire of most of the European colonists to 
see Fiji become an advanced British colony on the lines of Australia and New 
Zealand with the crown assuming control of the bulk of the lands and offering 
them on easy terms to new settlers” (Scarr, 1979, p.178). The movement was 
suppressed and Apolosi was deported to Rotuma. The first organised Indian 
protest followed a few years later in 1920 (the strike previously referred to). After 
that Europeans started deliberately turning Fijians against Indians to maintain 
their own dominance under the pretext of safeguarding the Fijians. 
 
The colonial experience had not been an unhappy one for the majority of the 
Fijians. They were proud to be British subjects and they had remained 
overwhelmingly pro-British, considering the British monarchy to be an extension 
of their chiefly system. Similarly the British administration had a special regard 
for Fiji as it was ceded by the chiefs of Fiji to Queen Victoria for protection with a 
promise to safeguard Fijian interests. As late as 1965 Ratu Mara declared: “… 
independence is not our goal because we have never found any sound or valid 
reason to attenuate let alone abandon our historical and happy association with the 
United Kingdom” (quoted in Lal, 1997, p.198). 
 
There was, however, mounting pressure from the United Nations to grant 
 24
independence to colonial territories and Britain had already started introducing 
some degree of self-government by 1964 when it introduced a membership system 
conferring ministerial responsibilities on Ratu Mara (representing Fijians), John 
Falvey (representing Europeans), and A.D. Patel (representing Indians). 
According to Mara, the membership system, which lasted for two years, was a 
successful one (LC Debates, 27 July, 1966, p.845). Siddiq Koya, an elected Indian 
member of the Legislative Council, also praised the membership system a year 
after it was introduced saying that with the system the government was prepared 
to listen to the voice of the taxpayers (Legislative Council Debates, 24 March, 
1965, p.62). Looking back, Mara described it as “an embryo government of 
national unity” (Mara, 1997, p.71) as the three members worked well together, co-
operating with each other for the good of the country. 
 
When the colonial government indicated its plans to hold a constitutional 
conference in London in 1965, the Fijian paramount chiefs recognised the 
inevitability of self-government. They had formed the Fijian Association in 1956 
to counter Indian demands and safeguard Fijian interests but now they reorganized 
it as the main base of the Alliance Party. While these Fijian chiefs, who were the 
top leaders of the Alliance Party, were prepared to share power with the other 
ethnic groups and give them equal rights, their main concern was to protect 
“Fijian interests which were not to be compromised for short-term political gain” 
(Lasaqa, 1979, pp.182-183). 
 
Before the constitutional conference in London in 1965, Fijians held meetings to 
express their views. At one such meeting held in Nausori, under the chairmanship 
of Ratu Edward Cakobau, “Fijians resolved that if independence did come Indians 
must leave. In London, the Fijian and European leaders held fast to the principle 
that the pace of political development must be set by Fijians and won” (Scarr, 
1984, p.170). ‘Be calm, the victory is ours’ Mara reassured the Fijian people in a 
message from London which was broadcast in Fiji. The Alliance plan was for 
internal self-government from about 1970 with full independence much later 
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(Scarr, 1984, p.170). 
    
Following the constitutional conference, elections were held in 1966, which saw 
for the first time the emergence of competitive party politics. The Alliance Party 
under Mara won the elections and formed the Government, and the Federation 
Party became the Opposition with its leader, A.D. Patel, becoming the first Leader 
of the Opposition. This was the beginning of the Westminster system of 
Government and Opposition in the country. The nine opposition members were all 
Indians, elected through communal franchise, while the government benches, in 
addition to Fijians, had Europeans and three Indians who were elected through 
cross voting where the eligible voters of all ethnic groups in the constituency 
voted. 
 
The government formed in 1966 was not a purely Alliance government, nor was it 
wholly elected. There was only partial self government with some elected 
members holding certain specified portfolios while colonial officials still 
controlled the major areas of administration. Mara, who was the head of the 
government, became the Leader of Government Business. A year later, in 
September 1967, the colonial government decided to introduce a ministerial 
system with Mara becoming the Chief Minister. Patel complained that the 
Federation Party had not been consulted about the introduction of the ministerial 
system.  
 
Patel further claimed that “the same old pattern of racial imbalance existed. In the 
Council of Ministers, there were nine Europeans, two Fijians and only one Indian” 
(Lal, 1997, p.228). There were in fact six Europeans, three Fijians and one Indian.  
Out of the six European members three were colonial officials and the other three 
were elected members of the Legislative Council. So there was an equal number 
of European and Fijian elected members. Patel was, however, right in claiming 
that there was an imbalance as there was only one Indian member.  
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In September 1967, Patel led a walkout of the members of the Federation Party, 
who were all Indians, from the Legislative Council, protesting against communal 
franchise, demanding a common electoral roll, and precipitating  by-elections. To 
allay the fears of Indian domination, Patel tried to attract more Fijians to the 
Federation Party to make it more multiethnic. He launched “Operation Taukei” to 
recruit more Fijian members. Prominent Fijians who joined the party included 
Ratu Mosese Tuisawau, Ratu Julian Toganivalu, Apisai Tora who had come into 
prominence as a trade union leader and Isikeli Nadalo. Tora’s National 
Democratic Party merged with the Federation to make it the National Federation 
Party (La1, 1997, p. 232). 
.  
Though it managed to win some high profile individuals to its side, still the 
grassroots Fijians did not support the party in any large numbers. Ratu Mosese’s 
and Tora’s motives in joining hands with Patel were debatable. Ratu Mosese had 
emphasized earlier that in the event of self government Fijian dominance should 
be ensured, while Tora had called for the deportation of Indians.  
 
The ethnic Fijians who joined the National Federation Party included both chiefs 
and commoners. Ratu Mosese and Ratu Julian both resigned from government 
jobs to work for the NFP. Ratu Julian had been a district officer in the colonial 
government. He became the organising secretary of the NFP. Ratu Mosese 
became the editor of the Pacific Review, a newspaper that was published by 
Indian leaders from Nadi. 
 
Campaigning for the 1968 by-elections “was marked by a more aggressive 
criticism of the chiefs” (Norton,1990, pp.94-98). After victory in the by-elections, 
the NFP held a public celebration claiming that the elections had demonstrated a 
desire for equal rights and independence. In fact, since the elections were only for 
the Indian communal seats, non-Indian participation was limited to the Fijian 
members of the Alliance Party and the NFP campaigning for their respective 
candidates. The Alliance candidates were all soundly defeated with the NFP 
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increasing its majority of votes. A. D. Patel called the Alliance Party the ‘white 
colonialist Alliance’, claiming that its leaders were stooges for Australian 
businesses. The Fijians rejected “Patel’s rhetoric and showed active hostility to his 
party” (Scarr,1984, p.170). They organised rallies and marches. Fiji came as close 
to the brink of ethnic conflict as it ever had (Lal, 1997, p.237). 
 
Ethnic conflict did not erupt in violence, however, because the chiefs were able to 
contain it, emphasising to the people the need for accommodating other groups. 
The menacing Fijian protest, though it reaffirmed the reality of ethnic conflict, 
also confirmed the national role of the chiefs as buffers and conciliators (Norton, 
1990, p.102). 
 
Patel’s biographer, Brij Lal, admits that “Patel did not sufficiently recognise the 
depth of the feeling against the Indian community among powerful sections of the 
European and Fijian community” (Lal, 1997, p.232). The NFP also miscalculated 
in trying to divide the Fijians from their chiefs and challenging their positions. 
Viliame Saulekaleka of Ra was expressing the feelings of many Fijian commoners 
when he asked: “Why hate our Ratus? Don’t other people know that they are still 
our law?” (quoted in Lal, 1997, p.236). Chief Minister Mara warned: “Let there be 
no violence but let it be clearly understood that the Fijian people have spoken in 
no uncertain terms and they cannot and must not be ignored” (quoted in Lal, 1997, 
p.238). 
 
From an Ethnically Divided Society to an Integrated Nation? 
 
Patel now recognised the strength of the Fijian chiefly system in Fijian culture. He 
had been critical of the Council of Chiefs and had declined invitations as an 
observer to its meetings before. But after the by-elections Patel understood the 
importance of the chiefly system not only to the ethnic Fijians but to the whole of 
Fiji. This led him to move a motion in the Legislative Council to restore the 
chiefly island of Bau as a national monument, a motion that was seconded by 
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Mara. “It was a symbolic gesture of reconciliation and helped to heal wounds” 
(Lal, 1997, p.287). 
 
Patel was received as a guest at Bau and was invited to the Queen Victoria 
School, the premier Fijian school, as a guest of honour. He had always accepted 
the necessity for the paramountcy of the Fijians in their own country (“first among 
equals”). What he was fighting against was the dominance of the Europeans. Patel 
had claimed that the Fijian representatives at the London Constitutional 
Conference were led by the Europeans. This clearly angered the Fijian members 
of the Legislative Council, with Sikivou asking if Patel was “purposely trying to 
be insulting”. Mara informed the council that “the papers presented at the 
Conference were prepared by me and by me alone” (Legislative Council Debates, 
15 December, 1965, p.638). Before the by-elections Patel had believed that Fijian 
chiefs were just the front men for the European establishment. His attitude to the 
paramount chiefs now changed. 
 
It was for good reasons that the Fijian chiefly establishment sided with the 
colonial rulers. It was an “acknowledgement that colonialism was far from 
oppressive to the Fijians. They had been left with more than enough land for their 
needs and their culture had been respected and honoured even though altered and 
standardised as the approved ‘Fijian way of life’” (Gillion, 1977, pp.175-176).  
 
During the 1968 by-elections, when the possibility of communal violence became 
real and imminent, Mara and Patel both realised the need for more dialogue for 
easing tensions and building racial harmony. Mara noted in his Memoirs that it 
became clear to him after the by-elections that if they were to move forward with 
any hope of a peaceful transition to independence, there would need to be some 
hard thinking, discussion and conciliation. According to Mara, “Just at that point 
one afternoon, A D Patel poked his head round the corner of my office door and 
asked if he could have a word. It turned out that he too had read the signs and that 
was the beginning of discussions between us that would lead to the 1970 
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Constitution” (Mara,1997, p.85). 
 
The governor also encouraged both Mara and Patel to talk among themselves and 
develop a common agenda for self government. They had their first meeting in 
August 1969 under the chairmanship of Ratu Edward Cakobau. It was a 
confidential meeting attended also by Vijay R. Singh, K.S. Reddy, H.W. Yee, 
David Toganivalu, W.M. Barrett and S.M. Koya.  
 
Patel wanted complete independence while Mara wanted full internal self 
government (Lal, 1997, p.240). Patel wanted Fiji to be a Republic with a Fijian 
chief as the head but later this view was modified to the extent that, as a first step 
in constitutional change, dominion status on the lines of New Zealand and 
Australia was agreed to by both sides, in deference to the Fijian people’s wish to 
preserve ties with Britain (Mara, 1997, p.96). Patel was still adamant about 
common roll and, though the gulf between the two sides still remained, the 
meeting was a cordial one and it was agreed that they would meet again soon. But 
before this could happen Patel died in October 1969 and Siddiq Koya became the 
NFP leader. 
 
According to Mara, Patel’s death, “sad as it was and a great loss to the Indian 
community, made negotiations for independence much easier” because with Koya 
as the opposition leader “there was more give and take” (Mara, 1997, p.97). Thus 
there was a reconciliation between Fijian and Indian leaders which was the 
“outstanding feature of Fiji at independence” as their “acrimonious rivalry had 
threatened racial violence scarcely a year before” (Norton, 1990, p.107).  
 
Even though negotiations for independence became easier, the fundamental 
structure of society did not change and at independence there was still limited 
contact between the two major ethnic groups. Moreover, the two communities had 
different aspirations. While Indians wanted independence with equal rights, many 
Fijians were not for democracy as they wanted the country to be given back to the 
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chiefs who had ceded it in 1874. What they wanted perhaps was a kind of 
democracy where the elites were in charge (see LC Debates, 16 December, 1965, 
p.662). Many of them also wanted the Indians sent away (Scarr, 1984, p.170). 
 
Adi Losalini Dovi, the nominee of the Great Council of Chiefs in the Legislative 
Council made the feelings of the Fijian people before and after the 1970 London 
Constitutional Conference abundantly clear. She said that the opinion “aired most 
strongly, and I repeat most strongly, by the Fijians at various meetings before the 
London Constitutional Conference … [was] that in the event of independence for 
Fiji … we Fijians get the control of our land” (Legislative Council Debates, 18 
June, 1970, p.242)10.  
 
She further said that after the conference the Fijian members of the Legislative 
Council had various meetings “throughout the length and breadth of the country”, 
trying to explain the constitutional conference and the agreements reached and 
“although there were fears and disquiet aired at these meetings we were able to 
dispel them successfully” Adi  Losalini said one of the questions asked at these 
various meetings was, “why should we not get our land back when our chiefs 
ceded it to Great Britain?” What the Fijians wanted was not just their land, which 
they have always had, but control of the government also rather than a democratic 
government with all the communities having equal rights. As noted earlier, many 
of them expressed the wish that Indians would be sent away.  
 
The answer the Fijian leaders gave was that “we have now a multiracial society in 
our midst with which we must live, and live happily. We have enjoyed their 
contribution to the social and economic development of this country and we on 
our part have welcomed them. The people accepted this explanation in good faith 
and with implicit trust in our elected representatives … particularly our leaders at 
the present moment. They realize that the measures designed are for the benefit of 
us all, including the Fijians”, Adi Losalini concluded.      
                                                 
10 Same source for the quotes in the next two paragraphs. 
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Ratu Mara and his fellow chiefs were able to persuade the indigenous Fijians to 
accept democracy when the opposition NFP agreed to special provisions to 
safeguard their rights as the original settlers. It was only the strength of the chiefly 
system that made the Fijian people accept democracy.  So it was important for the 
Indian opposition to tread cautiously without causing any fear or suspicion in the 
minds of the Fijians commoners.  It was also important for the Indian leaders to 
work to achieve more integration and to maintain the ethnic balance11 until the 
country became integrated. The hope was that meanwhile democracy would 
become accepted by all the groups as the best form of government for the country. 
Hence the leaders of independent Fiji faced the mammoth task of transforming an 
ethnically divided country into an integrated nation where people had similar 
outlooks on national issues and lived in relative harmony. 
 
Independence and the Multiracial Ideology 
 
In the early years of independence Fiji was fortunate to have had an able leader 
with vision in its first Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, who recognised 
the dangers inherent in a system where different groups led their separate lives 
with little interaction among them. He advised the people of Fiji against doing or 
saying anything that would cause discord. Even in 1970, when everyone seemed 
to be basking in the euphoria of independence, the Prime Minister sounded a stern 
note of warning to his fellow Parliamentarians. Quoting from Arthur Lewis and 
giving examples of countries where there was no political stability or harmony 
because of antagonism between the indigenous and immigrant peoples, Ratu Mara 
said:  
“The story began in Burma where shortly after independence all the Indians were driven out, being 
forced to leave most of their belongings behind …. The Indians in East Africa are clearly doomed, 
the only question being how many will be killed before they are all driven out”. He concluded that 
genocide was the favourite crime of the century, “what with Turks and Armenians, Germans and 
                                                 
11 At the time of independence if the Fijians were dominating in politics and owned most of the 
land, the Indians were leading in education and business so there was a kind of balance that held 
the country together.   
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Jews, Russians and Ukrainians, Hindus and Muslims, Arabs and Jews — it is a melancholy tale. 
Any decent country is bound to wish to avoid such happenings” (Parliamentary Debates, 15 
December 1970, p.285). 
 
Mara hoped that Fiji would be able to avoid bloodshed but this could only be done 
by understanding and tolerance which he said he had preached “time and time 
again” because he saw fully the dangers that lay ahead. When people came and 
talked in Parliament about not caring for the political climate, he wished they 
could go to some of these countries and live in them to see for themselves what 
happened when there was no understanding or tolerance (Parliamentary Debates, 
15 December, 1970). 
 
Mara suggested “multiracialism” as the way forward for Fiji for building an 
integrated nation. The “multiracialism” that Mara proposed for national 
integration was one characterised by a deep and undivided sense of loyalty to Fiji 
as a nation12; respect for the rule of law; a commitment to uphold human rights 
and basic freedoms;13 and an awareness of and respect for the differences in the 
traditions of other ethnic groups while maintaining one’s own culture. 
 
To give recognition to other cultures public holidays were declared for Diwali, the 
Hindu Festival of Lights, and the Muslim Prophet Mohammed’s birthday14, as 
well as giving holidays for the major Christian festivals. The Hindu and Muslim 
communities involved organised public celebrations of these festivals and often a 
Fijian leader was invited as the chief guest. This created an awareness and 
                                                 
12  For example, at independence it was decided that Fiji would not allow any of its citizens to 
have dual citizenship. People had to decide whether they wanted to be Fiji citizens, in which case 
they had to renounce their foreign citizenship. This rule still continues. 
13 One writer noted: “The 1970 Constitution embraces all the conceptual protections for human 
rights and dignity that can be conceived to prevent man doing evil unto man, , and it is entirely 
proper for Ratu Mara to take credit for being one of its principal intellectual architects” (Bain, 
1988, p.134).  
14 Jacqeline Leckie describes Ratu Mara’s acknowledgement of Indian culture in Fiji in 1999 as a 
great surprise (2002, p.254) but Mara had always given recognition to all cultures found in Fiji. As 
Prime Minister he not only granted holidays for Indian festivals but also included inter-faith 
services at all important occasions. He also wanted to make Fijian and Hindi compulsory 
languages in schools but did not get the support of the voluntary agencies that ran the schools (see 
Chapter 3).   
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appreciation of other cultures. 
 
Schools were to be the centres for the dissemination of this “multiracial” ideology. 
The Mara government envisaged the use of education as a means for laying the 
foundation for a new “multiracial” Fiji. The idea was to use education as an 
instrument of indoctrination so that the children of Fiji, although belonging to 
different ethnic groups, grew up as loyal citizens of the nation, with a common 
outlook on national issues, attending the same schools and learning each other’s 
language.  
 
Before schools could promote nationalism and a national identity, they themselves 
had to get away from their communal set-up. That was why it was important to 
take over communal schools and provide, if not state schools, at the very least 
non-communal ones like area or district schools, managed by local committees. 
The government had a plan to wipe out communalism from schools but the 
opposition, especially its leader, Siddiq Koya, was not supportive of it and the 
government was reluctant to act and implement these policies without the full 
support of the opposition as it was a highly sensitive issue (see Chapter 3).  
 
The seeds of “multiracialism” were sown with a great deal of good will but it 
would require careful nurturing for them to flourish. The opposition National 
Federation Party, while it agreed in principle with the government’s policy, failed 
in its support when it came to translating this policy into action.  
 
The government had policies for bringing about more integration by removing the 
disparities that existed between the two major ethnic groups. This was part of its 
policy of “multiracialism” as it believed that there could be no genuine 
“multiracialism” as long as such disparities remained. If “multiracialism” meant 
the two ethnic groups being given equal opportunities, then they had to be on an 
even field to make use of these opportunities. This was something the NFP leaders 
failed to grasp. Their limited understanding of “multiracialism” led them to take it 
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to mean merely the elimination of segregation.  
 
The opposition’s idea of “multiracialism” diverged even further from Mara’s after 
1977, with the NFP leader, Jai Ram Reddy, taking it to mean ethnically dominated 
parties, with each in turn allowed to rule the country, as long as it had some 
support from another party  (see Daily Post, 25 July, 1992).  This was first shown 
by his attempt to topple the Alliance government in 1982 by going into an alliance 
with the exclusively Fijian Western United Front Party. In 1987 he did a similar 
thing by getting the NFP to go into a coalition with the multiracial Fiji Labour 
Party and succeeded in his aim of defeating Ratu Mara’s Alliance Party.   
 
In 1992 Jai Ram Reddy openly revealed his narrow view of “multiracialism” 
when he elaborated in Parliament: “ … you can have multiracialism in two ways. 
You can …have multiracial parties … That kind of multiracialism is, maybe, a bit 
premature for Fiji; perhaps we are not ready for it … There is another kind of 
multiracialism …Let us each be in our separate racial compartments … Let 
communal solidarity prevail … Let everyone be united, but from our respective 
positions of unity, let us accept that we must co-exist and work together … It may 
be … that that is a more realistic approach” (Parliamentary Debates, 24 July, 
1992, pp.730-731, quoted in Fraenkel, 2000). 
  
This was not multiracialism at all. It was a return to pluralism of the type 
described by Furnivall, but without an overriding colonial power. Or perhaps 
Reddy was anticipating Fiji becoming a plural society of Lijphart’s definition 
where the various ethnic groups were segmented and had little ‘criss-crossing’ 
(Varshney, 2002, p.37).  
                                                                          
While Mara could foresee the dangers that lay ahead if the country did not achieve 
some degree of integration, most others, in particular the Indian leaders, could not. 
Though they accepted the “multiracial” policy advocated by the Prime Minister, 
they did not support the endeavours of his government to implement many of its 
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measures for bringing “multiracialism” about. Implementation of these policies 
would have helped to transform the country from an ethnically divided society 
into an integrated nation. Unfortunately this did not happen as the predominantly 
Indian NFP, which had been a ‘thoughtful’ opposition under Patel in the 1960s, 
started to become a ‘confrontational’ one. This made the Westminster system 
become unworkable in multiethnic Fiji as party politics became reduced to ethnic 
politics. That was the tragedy of Fiji after independence in 1970. 
 
. 
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                                                      Chapter 2 
 
                                      Governing a Multiethnic Country 
                                                    
                                                                    
In an ethnically divided society, if political parties are based on ethnicity, it is not 
only difficult to maintain a stable democratic government; but avoiding ethnic 
conflict also becomes a major concern. This was the situation of Fiji from the time 
it became self-governing in 1966. 
The first scholar to discuss the difficulties in governing a multiethnic country 
probably was John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century. He believed that “for a 
democracy to function a nation must exist by which he meant common loyalty to 
a political center” (Varshney, 2002, p.36). Fiji at independence lacked this 
important prerequisite for the functioning of a democratic government as people 
identified with their ethnic groups and not with the country, so it was a plural 
society of J. S. Furnivall’s description.  
Furnivall described a plural society as: “It is in the strictest sense a medley [of 
people], for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, 
its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, 
but only in the market-place, in buying and selling … with different sections of 
the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. 
[and] in the economic sphere … a division of labour along racial lines” (Furnivall, 
1956, p.304). 
 
 
The Plural Society 
 
Furnivall, the first to distinguish the ‘plural society’ as a separate form of society, 
was an economist and he coined the term to describe the economic relations that 
he noticed in South East Asian colonies such as Burma. There he perceived a 
“dual economy comprising two distinct economic systems, capitalist and pre-
 37
capitalist” (Furnivall, 1956, p.304). Furthermore, he saw this economic pluralism 
as an aspect of the social pluralism as there were wide differences between the 
social standards of the “tropical peoples” and those of the “modern West” with the 
“western superstructure of business and administration rising above the native 
world” (Furnivall, 1956,  p.304). 
 
According to Furnivall (1956), a plural society was one composed of groups 
which were socially and culturally discrete, but integrated through economic 
interdependence and dominated by one group, a colonial power. They were 
differentiated socially and culturally. There were no shared values. It was only the 
coercive force of the colonial administration, which had the police and the army at 
its disposal that held the groups together. Furnivall saw these societies as deeply 
divided (Eriksen, 1993, p.49). 
 
M. G. Smith (1965), a later theorist of plural societies, argues that social pluralism 
is correlated to cultural pluralism (Smith, 1965, p.89). He defines such a society 
as “a unit of disparate parts which owes its existence to external factors and lacks 
a common social will” (Smith, 1965, vii). But he notes that “[r]ace differences are 
stressed in contexts of social and cultural pluralism” (Smith, 1965, p.89). Smith 
sees these societies as notoriously unstable. 
 
One major problem, identified by Smith as facing an emerging nation with a 
recent colonial past, is that of transforming it from pluralism to heterogeneity, 
which he saw as a necessary first step for its transformation into a cohesive 
national unit. In a heterogeneous society, all the groups enjoy equality with no 
group dominating. Each group also enjoys the freedom to follow its own culture. 
To transform a plural society into a heterogeneous nation (leading to integration) 
is no easy task. Smith identifies the following conditions as necessary for 
achieving it: 
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(1) effective institutionalisation of uniform conditions of civil and political 
equality throughout the country; this especially involves the elimination of 
elite, sectional or ethnic privileges in the public sphere;  
 
(2) provision of equal, appropriate and uniform educational, occupational and 
economic opportunities to all cultural sections of the society and the principled 
recruitment of active participation in appropriately equivalent ratios from all 
the major ethnic groups; 
 
(3) public enforcement of the fundamental freedoms of worship, speech, 
movement, association and work (Smith, 1969, p.60).   
 
Smith further notes that in these non-national states it remains necessary to pursue 
policies that eliminate sectional barriers, identities and fears among the 
collectivities that comprise them (Smith, 1969, p.449). In a heterogeneous society 
with cultural differences prevailing without social divisions, individuals 
participate in a common collective life under uniform conditions. Cultural 
differences would then be individually optional, functional alternatives, restricted 
to the private domain and to secondary institutional spheres (Smith, 1969, p.445).   
 
It is noted that for the nation state to “be secure despite cultural diversity … 
civism must prevail over pluralism [and] the state must have an integrated culture 
and structure”. This common culture is then called “the culture of the state” 
(Bullivant, 1984, pp.105-106). 
 
The most important characteristics of a nation state would be a deep sense of 
primary loyalty to the country as a nation rather than to any communal groups; 
and an awareness of and respect for the differences in the traditions of the other 
ethnic groups while maintaining one’s own culture. 
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From Pluralism to Multiracialism 
 
Furnivall’s description of a plural society. fitted colonial Fiji where there was not 
only both economic and social pluralism but cultural pluralism as well. Furnivall 
noticed that the economic activities of the people in a plural society differed 
according to their ‘race’. This was true of Fiji. The colonial government 
recognised three major ‘races’, Fijian, Indian and European, who were expected to 
play different roles in the economy.  
 
In the economic sphere, the indigenous Fijians were the land owners and the 
Indians were the labourers, with Europeans being the entrepreneurs who made use 
of both Fijian land and Indian labour. 
 
Socially, indigenous Fijian society was organised under the village chiefs and the 
villagers shared all resources, especially land, which belonged to the ‘mataqali’ or 
the extended kinship group. This was different not only from the western way of 
life but also from the Indian who lived in extended families but not communally.  
 
From the mid 1960s, Fiji became internally self governing, as Britain started 
slowly passing on the reins of government to elected representatives. It started 
with a membership system in 1964. Then in 1966 elections were held for the first 
time on a party basis. Though the parties were formed on communal lines, they 
tried to appeal to all communities. Thus the Fijian Association, which was 
originally formed to safeguard Fijian rights, soon became the ‘multiracial’ 
Alliance Party as it incorporated the General Electors (Europeans and anyone else 
who was not Fijian or Indian). An Indian Alliance was also formed as part of the 
Alliance Party. 
 
Ratu Mara, who became the Chief Minister after his Alliance Party won the first 
party-based elections in 1966, realised the importance of bringing the 
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communities together in friendly co-operation. His efforts were mainly directed 
towards removing communal separation and turning the country into a culturally 
heterogeneous nation. The first step was to remove all segregation. Schools like 
Suva Grammar School, which was exclusively for European children, started 
accepting non-Europeans. Similarly, social clubs, which used to have only 
Europeans, started admitting non-Europeans who applied for membership. 
Moreover, the government started repealing laws which applied to only one 
community because the new constitution looked with “disfavour on 
discriminatory legislation”, the Minister for Fijian Affairs and Local Government, 
Ratu Penaia Ganilau, said (Legislative Council Debates, 2 April, 1968, p.95).    
    
 
At the time of independence in 1970, Fiji was still a plural society with limited 
contact between the two major communities though there was no longer any 
official segregation. Ratu Mara who became Prime Minister offered a policy of 
‘multiracialism’ to bring the communities closer together. What he meant by 
multiracialism was, in fact, heterogeneity, as defined by Smith. That is, there 
would be cultural diversity without any social divisions. Fiji was making steady 
progress towards this goal. By 1970 many of the features of a plural society that it 
had before had disappeared and Fiji at independence was a plural society in 
transition.  
 
There was no longer any domination by a colonial power. Nor was there a power 
imbalance between constituent communal groups. Instead there was a kind of 
power sharing. Political power was mostly with the Fijians, who also owned most 
of the land in the country, while the Indians were leading in the professions and 
fast catching up with the Europeans in the economic sphere, especially in the 
retail sector, whereas in colonial Fiji, the Europeans had held both political and 
economic power. The major problem facing the country was the unequal 
development of the two main groups in education which could lead to 
inequalities.    
 41
 
Ratu Mara stressed that ‘race’ was a fact of life in Fiji which should be recognised 
and acknowledged. After independence, though no communal group was in a 
dominant position, the Fijians were lagging behind economically and in 
educational achievement.  
 
The government felt that they had to be helped to come up to be on a par with the 
other communal groups. For that it was necessary to recognise the reality of 
communal divisions and try to remove inequalities which could breed resentment. 
There could be no genuine ‘multiracialism’ (or heterogeneity in Smith’s terms) if 
one group was far behind the other major group in educational attainment. 
 
The policy of ‘multiracialism’ followed by the independent government of Fiji 
was characterised by the removal of all kinds of segregation; the giving of equal 
rights/opportunities to all communities though certain preferential policies were 
introduced for the sake of equity;15 creating an understanding of and respect for all 
cultures (ethnic groups) found in the country.  
 
Multiculturalism 
To complement policies of de-segregation, a multicultural approach was taken, to 
recognise cultural differences. So multicultural activities were emphasized and 
promoted throughout the country. 
 
Culture includes language, religion, philosophies, patterns of thought and actions 
of a given population.  In colonial Fiji, there was cultural diversity but not 
multiculturalism, but independent Fiji followed a policy of 
multiracialism/multiculturalism. Multiculturalism in Fiji meant accepting and 
                                                 
15 The 1969 Education Commission had noted that it was important to bridge the gap between the 
Indian and Fijian educational achievement for national integration. 
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officially recognising the diversity of cultures that existed and trying to 
understand and be tolerant while giving all of them equal importance. 
 
A practical example of giving recognition to all cultures was the declaration of 
public holidays for Hindu and Muslim festivals after Fiji became independent. 
Another was the practice of having inter-faith services at most national functions. 
Then there was the adoption of the “three language formula” – that is, recognising 
Fijian and Hindi as official languages as well as English.  
 
The vital role of language in uniting people was seen in Fiji when the Methodist 
Church made the Bauan dialect the standard Fijian and in less than a century all 
the Fijians became more homogeneous as a community, overshadowing tribal and 
regional differences. Similarly, the Fiji Indians who came from different parts of 
India and spoke various languages became integrated because of the common 
language, Hindi, that the colonial administration decided would be the official 
language for the Indians, as well as for instruction in Indian schools.   
 
In schools, as part of multiculturalism, cross-cultural studies were introduced as 
recommended by the 1969 Education Commission. As part of this policy, cross-
cultural language learning of Fijian and Hindi had been planned with English 
remaining the medium of instruction. However, after the 1977 elections, 
communalism became more pronounced and school committees started 
demanding their vernacular languages like Tamil, Telugu and Urdu. This put an 
end to the policy of all children learning Fijian and Hindi as additional languages 
with everyone becoming trilingual. Since there was no state system of schooling, 
the government was not able to impose its policies in schools, most of which were 
run by voluntary agencies. This prevented the achievement of genuine 
multiculturalism in schools. 
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Transcending Ethnic Divisions in Politics 
 
Fiji followed the Westminster system of government and opposition with two 
major political parties which were initially divided on ideologies and were 
multiethnic in their appeal. Each was, however, supported predominantly by one 
ethnic group. In elections it also used the first-past-the-post system. But the 1970 
constitution gave the two major ethnic groups equal number of seats in Parliament 
with the communal representation being continued even after independence. This 
was supposed to be a temporary arrangement until the country became more 
integrated. 
 
To transcend communal cleavages and wipe out communalism in politics the 
government introduced a limited degree of ‘common roll’ voting in elections. 
After 1970, while more than half the members of Parliament were elected on a 
communal basis, a significant number were elected on a common roll through 
what was known as national seats. National seats were communally allocated but 
all the voters in the constituency voted for them without ethnic distinction – hence 
the system came to be known as ‘cross voting’ (Ghai, 2000, p.35).  
 
The national seats were allocated along ethnic lines – ten each for the two major 
ethnic groups and five for the minority groups. So even though everyone in the 
constituency voted for these candidates, they were from three different ethnic 
groups. The idea was to make people think on national terms rather than on 
communal lines as they had done so far. Political parties in Fiji were organised on 
ethnic lines but “the system of national seats was to be the catalyst by which 
communal politics and communal parties would be transcended” (Ghai, 2000, 
p.29). The Fijian leaders wanted a gradual change, assessing voter behaviour in 
national constituencies to determine if the population was ready for a common 
electoral roll. Meanwhile they agreed to the introduction of common roll for 
municipal (local government) elections to see how it worked.  
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Some scholars claim that ethnic separation had been encouraged by communal 
seats but even for national seats people normally voted on communal lines – 
Indians voting for the NFP and Fijians voting for the Alliance.16  In casting their 
votes the electorate did not seem to consider the calibre of the candidate or his/her 
achievements and more importantly what  contribution he/she could make in the 
future for the progress of the nation. A very good example was Ratu Penaia 
Ganilau, one of the high chiefs, who had distinguished himself as a soldier and 
administrator. He was often praised by the Opposition members in Parliament, but 
was defeated through Indian votes, by a little known Fijian commoner, who stood 
on an NFP ticket, in the 1972 general elections.   
 
The government of independent Fiji had various policies for bringing about 
genuine integration in the country and transforming it from a plural society to a 
heterogeneous nation. The most important of these were the education policies. 
Unfortunately, the government did not get the support of the opposition in 
implementing these policies. One reason for the opposition not actively 
supporting government’s policies seemed to have been its limited understanding 
of what ‘multiracialism’ meant. The NFP leaders in the 1970s equated it simply 
with the removal of segregation.  
 
The NFP leaders, who had been advocating a common roll, also showed 
inconsistency between their words and actions as none of their leading candidates 
stood for a national seat, which was to be the first step to a common roll as it had 
voters from all the communities, preferring the safety of the communal rolls. This 
was in sharp contrast to the leading Alliance candidates, most of whom stood for 
national seats.17 The NFP under Koya had accepted the system of national seats at 
                                                 
16 “A study of electoral results in Fiji will show that the vast majority of the people have always 
voted along communal or racial lines” (Lal, 1998, p.146). 
17 Alexander Mamak, who studied pluralism in Fiji and observed the 1972 general elections (the 
first after independence) found this (the NFP leaders’ failure to stand on national rolls) very 
puzzling. (Mamak, 1978, p.165).  
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the 1970 constitutional conference as the first step towards a common roll system 
but they did not try to make it work in the way it was intended to work.  
 
The need to contest national seats compelled the parties to extend their appeal 
beyond the community they principally represented but for the most part this was 
not successful. National seats were decided principally by communal votes. “In 
this way cross voting seats became an extension of communal seats” (Ghai, 2000, 
p.35)18. Ghai, however, noted an exception to this trend. The Alliance Party, in the 
years immediately after independence, attracted a significant percentage of Indo-
Fijian votes, often over 20 per cent.19  “By way of contrast, the NFP commonly 
gained less than 5 per cent of indigenous Fijian votes” (Ghai, 2000, pp.35-36).   
 
The 1972 voting pattern for the national seats indicated that a large number of 
people were moving away from rigid adherence to ethnic allegiances and making 
informed choices when it came to electing their leaders. The Alliance Party, for 
example, though predominantly Fijian, got the support of more than a third of the 
Indian voters in some constituencies (Lal, 1986, p.90).  If the trend had continued, 
with both the major political parties having policies which were relevant to all the 
ethnic groups, Fiji would soon have become a heterogeneous society. But by 1977 
Indian voters started flocking to the NFP en masse, leaving the Alliance behind, 
because they found the multiracial policies of the Alliance government, especially 
in education, benefiting the Fijians more. The Indians withdrawing their support 
for the Alliance and the split in the Fijian votes caused by the Fijian Nationalists 
led to the narrow defeat of the Alliance Party in the first general elections in 1977. 
 
                                                 
18 Other scholars (eg. Prasad, 1988) disagree with this view and the Suva national seats in 1987 are 
given as an example. But Hagan has noted that it was the general electors who seemed to have 
brought about  the change in  results in 1987 rather than the two major ethnic communities.   
 
19In the 1966 elections it came as an unpleasant shock to the Federation Party that the Alliance 
attracted the level of Indian support that it did in the cross voting constituencies (Alley, 1986, 
p.47). In the 1972 general elections, the Indian support for the Alliance was 24.1% but in some 
constituencies in the western division, it attracted over 35% of Indian votes (Lal, 1986, p.90). 
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When a minority government led by Ratu Mara was appointed after the elections 
in 1977, the opposition leader, Siddiq Koya, was accused of “deliberately 
whipping up Indian sympathy by charging that Ratu Mara’s and the Alliance’s 
acceptance to form a minority government was because they did not want an 
Indian Prime Minister in Fiji” (V. Lal, 1990, p.58). Koya further said that their 
decision was an “insult to the Indian community and its self-respect”. According 
to one writer Koya was “deliberately whipping up Indian sympathy” by distorting 
facts (V. Lal, 1990, p.58).  
 
The degeneration of Fiji politics to ethnic politics continued into the 1980s 
causing ethnic tensions especially during elections. Ralph Premdas noted: 
“Politics in Fiji is fraught with tension and racial animosity” (1986, p.107). 
Premdas believed that Fiji needed a system of government that was not 
confrontational as the Westminster system was. The two leading scholars who 
have been discussing the kinds of democratic systems suitable for multiethnic 
countries are Arend Lijphart and Donald Horowitz. Lijphart advocated a system 
which he called consociationalism. 
 
Consociational Democracy  
 
While agreeing with the well-established proposition in political science that it is 
difficult to achieve and maintain a stable democratic government in a plural 
society, Lijphart sees it as “difficult but … not at all impossible” (Lijphart, 1977, 
p.1). He notes that several plural societies in Europe have achieved stable 
democracy by consociational methods. 
 
According to Lijphart consociational democracy entails the co-operation of 
segmental leaders despite the deep cleavages that might separate the segments. 
This is possible only if the leaders feel at least some commitment to maintaining 
the unity of the country. At the same time they must also be committed to 
democratic practices. Consociationalism is possible only if there is a basic 
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willingness by leaders of different segments to engage in co-operative efforts in a 
spirit of moderation and compromise. 
 
The most important requirement of a consociational democracy, therefore, is co-
operation between the political leaders of all important segments of the plural 
society. Another significant feature is proportionality in political representation 
and civil service appointments. 
 
Leaders in a consociational democracy need to be willing to make concessions 
and compromises to accommodate the other groups, unlike in the British model 
where the leaders are often at loggerheads. This is due to the realization that 
political stakes are often high in plural societies and adversarial leadership could 
threaten the very fabric of the nation state. It had been noted that when people are 
basically homogeneous they could safely afford to bicker, but in plural societies 
with clearly separate and potentially hostile population segments, the Westminster 
type democracy with strict majority rule places a strain on the unity and peace of 
the system.      
 
Even in homogeneous societies, at a time of great crisis, a grand coalition cabinet 
may be installed as a temporary measure. Lijphart gives the examples of Great 
Britain and Sweden, both of which resorted to grand coalition cabinets during the 
Second World War.    
 
In plural societies, it is the nature of the society itself that constitutes the “crisis”, 
so it is more than a temporary emergency and requires a longer term grand 
coalition or consociationalism until the country is able to construct, however 
provisionally, a national identity that overshadows the segmental loyalties of the 
citizens.  A grand coalition is only possible if the leaders have a moderate attitude 
and a willingness to compromise. Lijphart has noted that if the political leaders 
engage in “coalescent rather than adversarial decision making” (Lijphart, 1977, 
p.99) then the plural societies may enjoy stable government. He concludes: “For 
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many of the plural societies of the non-western world, therefore, the realistic 
choice is not between the British normative model of democracy and the 
consociational model, but between consociational democracy and no democracy 
at all” (Lijphart, 1977, p. 238). 
 
Electoral Engineering 
 
Horowitz, the other main scholar who has written about the problem of 
maintaining a stable democratic government in an ethnically divided country, is of 
the view that consociational arrangements will not work because they depend on 
leaders being enlightened, so that they realize that confrontation would lead to 
mutual destruction. He argues that “if such leadership could be counted upon 
consistently, consociational arrangements would be much less necessary in the 
first place” (1991, pp.142-143). He believes that without incentives 
“statesmanship will be in short supply” (1991, p.176). 
 
According to Horowitz, if the aim is moderation on divisive issues to ameliorate 
inter-group conflicts, it could be achieved through a different electoral system 
from the Anglo-American system of first-past-the-post which Arthur Lewis had 
described as the surest way to kill the idea of democracy in a plural society 
(Horowitz, 1991, pp.164-165). 
 
Horowitz recommends the alternative voting (AV) system as the most suitable 
form of electoral system for an ethnically divided society because in this system 
ethnically based political parties have to appeal to voters from other ethnic groups 
to win. His idea is to use the electoral system to induce changes in the behaviour 
of ethnically based or racially based parties. He calls it “electoral engineering” 
(1991, p.177). He believes that the challenge is to take an environment conducive 
to ethnic and racial allegiances in the party system and create incentives for 
parties to bid for floating votes “who would otherwise vote their group identity” 
(sic) (1991, p.203). Echoing Lijphart, he concludes: “From what we know of the 
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politics of severely divided societies, the choice may well be to see voters floating 
in the political system or floating in the air” (1991, p.203).  
 
Consociationalism in Fiji 
 
The first scholar to suggest that consociationalism would be the best form of 
government for Fiji was R. S. Milne (1975) and he gave the example of the period 
immediately prior to and after independence. The government that Fiji had during 
that period could be described as consociational as it exhibited both co-operation 
between leaders and proportionality. After independence Prime Minister Ratu 
Mara twice offered to have a government of national unity but both times the offer 
was turned down by the opposition NFP. The second offer in 1980, according to 
one scholar, had clear elements of consociationalism (Hagan, 1987, p. 132). 
 
In the 1960s, before the introduction of self-government, a membership system 
existed that was described as “an embryo government of national unity” (Mara, 
1997, p.71). From all accounts it seemed to have been a success (see Chapter 1).  
 
The co-operative working relationship that Mara and Patel had developed as 
colleagues in the government continued even after the Membership system came 
to an end in 1966, when the former became the Leader of Government Business 
and the latter the Leader of the Opposition, until the walk-out by the opposition in 
1967. Mara and Patel both realised the importance of dialogue after the 1968 by-
elections took the country to the verge of violence (see Chapter 1). The NFP 
opposition then became (at least temporarily) a more thoughtful opposition rather 
than an adversarial one. This situation continued as long as Patel was the leader.  
 
The NFP had some very able members in the Legislative Council who were good 
orators and brilliant debaters. They looked at every issue thoroughly and 
questioned the government, but if it was felt that it was for the good of the country 
the opposition supported the government. According to Milne, consociationalism 
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became stronger after Patel’s death when Siddiq Koya became the Opposition 
Leader (Milne, 1975)20. So Fiji had a smooth transition to independence. 
 
It is questionable, however, whether the cordial relationship that developed 
between Koya and Mara can be described as consociationalism. Koya became 
close to Mara on a personal level and not as the leader of one segment of the 
country, because he seemed to have no clear policies for the group he represented. 
Mamak was the first to point out this problem. In the 1972 general elections the 
NFP lacked an ideology of its own and borrowed the Alliance slogan of ‘Peace, 
Progress and Prosperity’ (Mamak, 1978, p.165). Mamak also noted that the NFP 
failed to secure Fijian candidates for many of the national seats, let alone the 
Fijian communal seats. After independence Koya was also not willing to make 
concessions and compromises to accommodate the other group, especially in 
education (see Chapter 3). 
 
After the 1972 elections Koya led a walk-out of the opposition members 
protesting against the Chief Justice, a move which was condemned by most 
government members. This seemed to have marked the turning point as after that 
the opposition slowly changed from being a thoughtful one to a confrontational 
one. According to Milne consultations between Prime Minister Mara and Koya 
continued until early 1975 (Milne, 1975) but this was not true, because though 
Mara continued to write to Koya on a number of matters where he was required to 
consult the leader of the opposition Koya did not acknowledge any of his letters 
from 1974 (Fiji Times, 1 June, 1977). The situation deteriorated further when 
Sakeasi Butadroka began a nationalist appeal to the primordial loyalties of the 
Fijian people. The country which had been moving towards heterogeneity took a 
backward step and became ethnically polarized. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Milne, however, makes a factual error when he names Koya as the opposition member who 
moved the motion to restore the chiefly island of Bau, which brought the two sides closer together, 
when in fact it was Patel (see Chapter 1).  
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Primordial Loyalties, a Barrier to Nation Building 
 
The notion of ‘primordial loyalties’ originated with the American anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz (1973) who describes a primordial attachment as “one that stems 
from the ‘givens’ of social existence”. This includes, apart from one’s family and 
relatives, “the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious 
community, speaking a particular language or even a dialect of a language, and 
following particular social practices”. He further states: “One is bound to one’s 
kinsman, one’s neighbour, one’s fellow believer …as the result not merely of 
personal affection, practical necessity, common interest or incurred obligation, but 
at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to 
the very tie itself”. Some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural 
affinity than from social interaction (1973, p.259). 
 
Geertz argues that primordial ties stand in the way of nation building.  As Nehru, 
the first Prime Minister of India, found out to his horror in 1948: “The work of 60 
years of the Indian National Congress was standing before us, face to face with 
centuries old India of narrow loyalties, petty jealousies and ignorant prejudices 
engaged in mortal conflict and we were simply horrified to see how thin was the 
ice upon which we were skating” (quoted in Geertz, 1973, p.256).  He was 
referring to the reorganisation of the states on linguistic lines. 
 
Many observers wondered whether that country’s political unity would survive 
these primordial divisions. It did because the decades of struggle for independence 
led by the Indian National Congress bound the people together and developed in 
them a commitment to nationhood. In contrast, there was no struggle for 
independence in Fiji.  
The threat of primordial ties to political stability is that they can often be 
politically manipulated to promote parochial interests. On the other hand, they can 
be overcome by appealing to national interests, which is what the process of 
nation building is all about. Often the anti-colonial struggle overcomes, or at least 
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temporarily suppresses, primordial attachments, but because there was no unifying 
anti-colonial struggle in Fiji a national consciousness did not develop, and 
primordial attachments remained which could be appealed to and manipulated 
politically.  
 
The major communities in Fiji had led their separate lives when suddenly they 
had to come together to build a nation. Mara offered ‘multiracialism’ as the way 
forward for achieving this but his efforts to develop a peaceful, integrated society 
have been described by Sitiveni Rabuka, leader of the military coups in 1987, and 
later Prime Minister, as trying to achieve “something  that was impossible” 
(Lawson, 1996, pp.43-44). It was indeed impossible without the full co-operation 
and commitment of all groups in the country. 
 
In the early years of independence, everyone did seem to co-operate, except for an 
odd discordant note coming mainly from the Fiji Times. This was in sharp 
contrast to the contribution of the press in India to nation building. There, though 
fiercely independent and ruthlessly critical, the press practised (and still does) self 
censorship when it comes to issues of national unity. 
 
For the majority of communities in India, nationalism takes precedence over other 
narrower loyalties because the struggle for nationhood bound them together. In 
Fiji nation building started only after independence. The government of 
independent Fiji decided to use schools to promote a national consciousness by 
providing integrated schools and introducing multiple language learning. Every 
child was to learn to speak in Fijian and Hindi, but the policy did not take off (see 
Chapter 3) and the attempt to forge a unique Fiji identity was thwarted. Fiji 
Indians and indigenous Fijians remained linguistically different, which was one of 
the factors that stood in the way of nation building.  
 
Then from 1973, Sakeasi Butadroka started directly appealing to the primordial 
loyalties of Fijians and preaching Fijian nationalism.  His main slogan was “Fiji 
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for the Fijians” and his professed aim was to send the Indians away from Fiji.  But 
the target of his campaign was Prime Minister Mara who he claimed was ‘selling’ 
Fiji to the Indians.  
 
Manipulating Regional Differences 
 
Butadroka also accused Mara of promoting policies which benefited only one 
region in Fiji, that is, Lau. Mara was the high chief of Lau, the eastern group of 
islands, which was different from the rest of Fiji because of its strong Tongan 
influence. Lauans were more “Polynesian” than the rest of the group. Lau was 
also where the missionaries first landed, so from the early days it had been ahead 
of the rest of the group in formal western education. Lau Provincial School was 
the only provincial school which used English as a medium of instruction from 
the very early days and in the early 1900s it had an Oxford graduate, A. M. Hocart 
(who later became anthropologically significant), as its headmaster (1909 
Education Commission). 
 
Butadroka worked on existing anti-Lauan sentiment. He complained that all the 
aid was going to the Prime Minister’s province of Lau. Then he complained that 
Lakeba, the Prime Minister’s island, had an air strip. Later he extended his 
criticism to include other paramount chiefs of eastern Fiji, claiming that the 
western division was under-represented in the government. He said: “It is a 
Tovata [confederacy] government”(Parliamentary Debates, 26 May, 1977, p.117). 
Butadroka reiterated the theme in 1982 on the retirement of Ratu George Cakobau 
as Governor-General, urging that Burebasaga confederacy chief, Ratu Mosese, 
should be appointed as the successor (Fiji Times, 4 November, 1982). 
 
Butadroka also accused Mara of not implementing policies for the benefit of 
Fijians. He gave the example of the Fiji Institute Bill which George Cakobau, the 
highest chief of Fiji, when he was the Minister for Fijian Affairs wanted, but Mara 
did not approve. While attacking Mara, Butadroka praised Cakobau and tried to 
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suggest that the latter had the welfare of the Fijians at heart. Butadroka was again 
trying to manipulate the ancient rivalries between the chiefs of Bau and Lau.  
 
Mara explained the reasons for rejecting the Fiji Institute Bill which was based on 
the Malaysian MARA Institute (which was for promoting indigenous Malay 
interests) the disastrous effect of the Institute was a riot in Malaysia.  
 
In the early years, the NFP leaders seemed to have been sympathetic towards 
Butadroka’s outbursts. Vijay Parmanandam, an NFP member, said in Parliament 
that there was a lot of truth in what Butadroka was saying. A few years later, in 
1977, there were widespread rumours that the NFP collaborated with Butadroka’s 
Nationalists against the Alliance Party during the first general elections of that 
year (see Chapter 3).  
 
More than a decade later, Timoci Bavadra, the Fiji Labour Party leader, followed 
a similar line in his attack on Mara. He promised that under a Labour government 
national resources would be more rationally divided, adding that “the government 
resources poured into Lakeba are derived from wealth produced by others 
elsewhere in the country” (Scarr, 1988, p.33). This was “raising of inter-Fijian 
tribal issues to an unusually high level of public discord” (Scarr, 1988, p.33).  
 
Where Mara had been trying to integrate Butadroka and later Bavadra tried to 
divide. Bavadra talked of the dominance of the eastern region and how the rest of 
Fiji had to serve the interests of a few centres in the east (Scarr,1988, p.33).  
 
There seemed to have been a genuine neglect of the Western Division until the 
membership system in the 1960s. In 1965 Semesa Sikivou found it “very 
encouraging” that “there is a large sum of money to be spent in the western 
constituency next year”. He noted: “This, to me, is something entirely new” (LC 
Debates, 8 December, 1965, pp.478-479).    This neglect of the Western Division 
changed from the time Fiji became self governing. Similarly there seems to have 
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been increased budgetary allocation for the outer islands (which included Mara’s 
home province of Lau) in 1965 to correct past disparities. 
 
In the early years of self government some of “the most expensive capital 
projects”, such as the Lautoka Hospital, went to the western region (LC Debates, 
4 and 5 December, 1967, pp.674, 692, 712 and 783). Apart from hospitals, 
nursing stations and health centres, and the Lautoka Teachers’ College, there were 
other developments undertaken by the Housing Authority in Lautoka (1 
December, 1969, p.1595).  
 
Twenty years later, Dr. Bavadra, by pitting the western region against the eastern 
provinces, further contributed to ethnic divisions. Michael Howard had noted that 
when Bavadra became the Prime Minister, the Fijian ceremonies that were 
performed to celebrate the occasion were all done in the western dialect rather 
than in standard Fijian which is the Bauan dialect (Howard, 1988, p. 232).  In 
doing that Bavadra was again emphasizing regional differences. It was also a 
departure from the customary norm of using the Bauan dialect at the national 
level. 
  
Policies such as these were leading to divisions in the Fijian community rather 
than integrating all the communities in Fiji into a Fiji nation.  
 
From Ethnic Politics to Ethnic Conflict 
 
Stephanie Lawson has noted that political organization in Fiji had always been 
based on ethnicity (1996, p.57). From the very beginning members were elected 
or nominated to the Legislative Council on an ethnic basis and so the members 
saw their duty as championing the interests of the community they represented 
rather than looking at issues from a wider perspective.  
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When the two major political parties, the National Federation Party and the 
Alliance, were formed, however, their membership was open to anyone without 
any ethnic distinctions. They also tried to project a national outlook by promoting 
policies that benefited all ethnic groups. Thus the NFP was fighting against 
colonialism and exploitation while the Alliance believed in a gradual change by 
raising the living standards of the masses without suddenly abolishing the 
privileges of those who were in dominant positions, be they the Fijian chiefs or 
the mainly European commercial enterprises (the vested interests). 
 
The 1970 constitution gave the Fijians and Indo-Fijians equal representation. 
Although it gave the minority Europeans and other communities (which formed 
the third group known first as ‘General Electors’ and later as ‘Others’) 
representation in excess of their numbers, both the main political parties agreed to 
it because the Europeans controlled the economy of the country and they could act 
as a buffer between the two major communities, helping to maintain the balance.   
  
The first singularly ethnic party to be formed which made no pretensions to 
‘multiracialism’ at all was the Fijian Nationalist Party in 1974. It was formed to 
fight for Fijian rights and to get rid of the ‘Indian threat’ by seeking to repatriate 
the Indians from Fiji. 
 
The NFP from the beginning had very little Fijian support but almost a quarter of 
Indians used to support the Alliance in the 1960s and early 1970s. In 1977, when 
the USP quota system was made into a major election issue by the NFP, the 
Indians became a solid voting block under the NFP (for more on this see Chapter 
3). This marked the real beginning of ethnic politics in Fiji, with a significant 
minority of ethnic Fijians lending their support to the Fijian Nationalist Party. 
Indians feared that the Alliance policies would adversely affect their future 
prospects and they saw the NFP as the only hope for their survival (Alley, 1977, 
p.287). This ethnic polarization led to ethnic tensions especially during general 
elections.    
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One scholar advocated consociational democracy as a short term answer to 
counter the problem of communal politics in Fiji until a heterogeneous society 
emerged (Premdas, 1986, p.107). The government that Fiji had between 1968 and 
1974 had many features of consociationalism although the term ‘consociational’ 
was hardly used. So the call by Premdas was for the leaders to get back to 
consociationalism as Fiji started drifting back to pluralism and it was clear to both 
Fijian and Indian leaders that “conflict and confrontation would eventually lead to 
violence” (Premdas, 1986, p.108).  
 
Mara called for a government of national unity in 1980 to avert a disaster 
(Premdas, 1986, p.108). The Leader of the Opposition, Jai Ram Reddy, 
questioned the sincerity of the Prime Minister as he accused the latter of 
“practising racial discrimination while espousing a policy of multiracialism” 
(Premdas, 1986, p.109).  
 
This criticism was far from valid because the “Alliance Government, although 
Fijian dominated, had generally respected Indian rights and interests” (Premdas, 
1986, p.115). Unlike Patel, who initiated discussions with Ratu Mara when he 
realized the country was drifting towards ethnic conflict, Reddy turned down 
Mara’s approach for dialogue. A major problem was Reddy’s idea of 
multiracialism.  
 
When Mara talked of ‘multiracialism’, he meant the country getting away from 
pluralism and becoming a heterogeneous nation. When Reddy talked of 
‘multiracialism’ what he meant was ‘pluralism’ in Smith’s/Furnivall’s sense . 
Reddy lamented that the architects of the 1970 constitution made certain 
assumptions and calculations. They should have made it clear, he said, that the 
Indian side was not supposed to ever be in power (Daily Post, 25 July, 1992). His 
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idea of ‘multiracialism’ in politics seemed to have been having a Fijian side and 
an Indian side as long as each one could be in power in turn21.  
 
Kind of Democracy for the Pacific/Problems for Democracy in the Pacific 
  
C. J. Lynch (1982) suggested that the Westminster model needs adaptation to 
make it suitable for the Pacific. He stressed the importance of having a consensual 
approach to decision making which, according to him, is a part of the ‘Pacific 
Way’ (Lynch,1982, p.140, see also Introduction). Consultation, discussion and 
compromise are characteristics of consensual decision making. Lynch further 
believed that political parties and an institutionalized opposition are not essential 
or even desirable for small Pacific countries (1982, p.139).  
 
I. F. Helu (1994) also believes that party politics is not needed in the Pacific 
because of the small populations while Michael Goldsmith (1993) is of the view 
that a ‘confrontational’ opposition, which is a common feature of the Westminster 
system, could be problematic in some contexts. Instead he recommends a 
‘thoughtful’ opposition. Adopting a consensual approach could lead to having a 
‘thoughtful’ opposition.  
 
Helu and Goldsmith also consider leadership as important for maintaining 
stability. Helu believes leaders should follow Socrates and serve the people rather 
than be Sophists who want personal power. To make sure that the country has the 
right kind of leaders Helu recommends that those who aspire to be national 
leaders should be required to give up some of their personal privileges.  
 
                                                 
21 Stephanie Lawson (1991) asserts that foremost among the widely accepted principles and 
practices of democracy is the idea that any political opposition may, through the constitutional 
process adopted by the state, succeed legitimately to government (p.vi). However, it is widely seen 
in plural societies that ethnic politics (that is if political parties are based on ethnic lines) lead to 
ethnic conflict. If a change of government would only lead to conflict, it is pointless to have a 
change just for the sake of change.    
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Goldsmith recommends a ‘thoughtful’ Opposition rather than a ‘confrontational’ 
one which is the characteristic of the Westminster model. A ‘thoughtful’ 
Opposition would co-operate with the government on national issues for the 
benefit of the country and at the same time keep the government on its toes all the 
time. This again emphasizes the importance of leadership as leaders with foresight 
are the ones who give priority to what is good for the nation.  
 
Leadership thus seems the most important prerequisite for the good governance of 
a Pacific Island nation following a democratic system of government to ensure 
stability and harmony. Fiji had such leaders in Ratu Mara and A. D. Patel. Fiji’s 
ethnic problems seemed to have been partly caused by the absence of such a 
leader among the Opposition to take the place of Patel after his death.  The 
Opposition also made concerted efforts, from the early 1980s, to get rid of Ratu 
Mara. This was unfortunate because a leader like Mara was needed to integrate 
the people of the country and turn Fiji into a nation since a  national identity that 
takes precedence over all other loyalties is most important for the survival of a 
multiethnic country.         
 
Multiparty Government 
 
While many scholars stress the importance of good leadership for a stable 
democracy in a multiethnic nation, Horowitz is one scholar who has warned that 
good leadership is hard to come by without incentives. He suggests electoral 
engineering as the answer to achieve this (see p. 12). The makers of the 1970 Fiji 
Constitution followed a similar strategy in the ‘cross voting’ system for the 
national seats that it had. Unfortunately, the system did not work the way it was 
intended as it was reduced to an extension of the communal seats (see pp.7-9) 
 
The 1997 Constitution again tried ‘electoral engineering’ through the preferential 
voting system which replaced the ‘first-past-the-post’ system that the 1970 
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Constitution had. The first elections under this system in 1999 resulted in an 
outright win for the FLP.  
 
The 1997 Constitution also introduced the multiparty system of government. 
According to this provision, even if a party had an overall majority to form the 
government, other parties which secured a certain number of seats were required 
to be invited to join the government. This enforced union of political parties 
proved unworkable from the beginning. 
 
In 1999 while the multiracial FLP won the elections, other Fijian parties like 
Fijian Association Party (FAP) and the Soqosoqo na Vakavulewa na Taukei 
(SVT) had passed the threshold for inclusion in the government. While FAP had 
no problem in joining the FLP as they had similar policies, FLP found it difficult 
to include the SVT in the government. SVT demanded specific portfolios for it in 
cabinet (for example, it wanted Jim Ah Koy,who was the Finance Minister in the 
previous SVT Government to continue in the same position) which the FLP was 
not willing to concede. Finally the SVT was forced to remain as the Opposition.  
 
Similarly in 2001 the SDL party under Laisenia Qarase, which did not have an 
outright majority, was able to form a multiparty government by seeking the 
support of other Fijian parties which had won a few seats. But it refused to include 
the FLP which had the second largest number of seats in Parliament. Qarase 
insisted that his government would not be able to work with the FLP because of 
the difference in policies between the two parties. Multiparty government may 
work if the parties involved are ethnic parties working for the benefit of the 
groups they represent while making compromises for the national good. That 
again emphasizes the importance of leadership as co-operation between the 
leaders is important for its success. 
    
David Robie has argued that unlike in developed countries, where individuals 
come and go while the political and economic systems are intact, in developing 
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countries, where issues are centred  around individuals, toppling a leader can 
bring about anarchy (Robie, 1994, p.12). This was what seemed to have happened 
in Fiji. For twenty years, Ratu Mara dominated the political landscape of the 
country and those who made concerted efforts to get rid of him before the country 
became integrated failed to realize the disastrous consequences that would follow 
if they succeeded. Defeating the government of Ratu Mara seemed to have 
signalled the end of democracy and equal rights for the people as the majority of 
indigenous Fijians were not willing to accept the change 
 
When Fiji became independent Fijians did not want democracy for fear of Indian 
domination (see Fiji Legislative Council Debates, June, 1970). The chiefs were 
able to persuade them to accept democracy with equal rights for everyone (see 
Chapter 1). A few years later Butadroka started his anti-Indian rhetoric and the 
Fijian fears re-surfaced.  As long as the chiefly-led Alliance was in power the 
Fijian discontent was held in check. Once that was gone the over 90% of the 
Fijians who had not voted for Bavadra’s coalition (and many who had voted for 
him but had not expected him to win government, only to provide strong 
opposition) were not happy with the turn of events. Moreover, the FLP/NFP 
coalition was voted in with fewer votes (47.1 per cent) than the ruling Alliance 
Party which was voted out although it received more (49.5 per cent) votes 
(Fraenkel, 2000, p.105). 
 
When the democratically elected Bavadra government was overthrown the vast 
majority of indigenous Fijians supported the action of the Fiji military forces and 
rejoiced at the turn of events. Fiji was fortunate to have had an elected 
government again within a short period and full democracy in twelve years but 
because the country was not integrated it was easy to destabilize it once more and 
overthrow the democratically elected government for a second time in 2000. This 
time it was done by the vested interests and there was no overwhelming popular 
support for the illegal action unlike in 1987. The event, however, once again 
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emphasized the importance of having a common loyalty with a national identity 
for a nation state to survive.    
 
In Fiji, as in most other countries with a multiethnic population, ethnic conflict 
seems to have been deliberately caused by politicians for their own ends. There 
was racial harmony at the time of independence and the two communities were 
beginning to come together when Butadroka started his attack on Ratu Mara and 
the Indians who were given equal rights. This rekindled suspicion of the Indians 
and the fear of being marginalized in the minds of many Fijians, a fear which 
made them stop supporting Mara and his multiracial policies.  
 
On the other hand, the NFP leaders started accusing Mara of being anti-Indian and 
practising discrimination against them under the pretext of ‘multiracialism’.This 
heightened the Indians’ sense of insecurity as they became suspicious of Mara and 
his government. Indian leaders were doing this because after the death of Patel, 
the NFP lost direction and had no policies of its own.  The NFP leaders found the 
only way they could survive was by playing ethnic politics. What was lacking in 
Fiji was the commitment to nation building by all which was necessary to turn the 
plural society into an integrated nation.  Such commitment was lacking from the 
beginning although during the 1960s when Patel was the leader of the opposition 
with Mara as the leader of the government, there was the mutual commitment to 
the nation at least by the leaders, which took priority over other issues. 
Unfortunately, Patel died before this idea could infiltrate the common masses and 
develop a Fiji nation.   
 
The Fiji Labour Party that was formed in 1985 was initially ‘multiracial’ but by 
forming a coalition with the NFP, just before the general elections in 1987, the 
coalition became predominantly Indian. The coalition won the elections but it 
managed to get less than ten per cent of ethnic Fijian votes. Predictably, 
confrontation became a reality which was given as the justification for the military 
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coups that followed soon after. The 1970 constitution was abrogated and the new 
constitution that was introduced in 1990 was blatantly discriminatory.  
 
Miraculously, ten years after the coup, the country seemed to get back to the right 
course again in 1997 with a new constitution that promised equality to all. The 
1997 constitution introduced the alternate voting system instead of the first-past-
the-post that Fiji had so far followed. But Fiji still lacked the most important 
ingredient for the successful functioning of a democratic government in a 
multiethnic country which was ‘a common loyalty’ to the nation that all its people 
felt. That was why the new government had to tread carefully without upsetting 
any group as they worked for acceptance of the return of democratic rule which 
many had rejected only a few years ago.  
 
Mahendra Chaudhry, the first Indo-Fijian to become the Prime Minister of the 
country, though following multiracial policies, showed lack of sensitivity to Fijian 
feelings. His style of leadership helped to aggravate the Fijian perception, that 
Indo-Fijians were threatening their rights in the country where they (the ethnic 
Fijians) were the original settlers. This helped the vested interests to exploit the 
Fijian fears by destabilizing the country and finally overthrowing the elected 
government in 2000, in order to maintain status quo. They also had the support of 
the Fiji Times which now turned its usual anti-Indian propaganda to concentrate 
on every lapse of Chaudhry, the ethnic Indian Prime Minister, and made it seem 
like a plot by Chaudhry to steal the Fijian heritage and Indianise the country.  
 
A whole groundswell of Fijians was “convinced, by those with other agendas, that 
Chaudhry’s master plan for Fiji was ‘a little India’”(Connew, 2001, p. 79; see also 
Keith-Reid, 2000). The task to overthrow the government became easy because 
the population had not integrated and Chaudhry’s style of leadership, which was 
often seen as dictatorial, created suspicion in the minds of many ethnic Fijians 
(see also Chapters 7).  
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Ethnic tensions in Fiji seemed to have been caused by politicians. The inability of 
Indian politicians to pursue multiracial solutions and the ability of a few Fijian 
nationalist politicians to exploit the ethnic divisions initially caused the ethnic 
problems in independent Fiji. Later these politicians were joined in by some 
business people and other vested interests who hoped to gain by destabilizing the 
Labour-led People’s Coalition Government. Some of Chaudhry’s actions helped 
the rebels to exploit the gullible masses for their own ends. Leadership, or rather 
the lack of sound leadership, had again played a major role in the crisis that 
engulfed Fiji in 2000. 
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                                          CHAPTER 3 
                                    Education the Foundation 
 
It is widely accepted that one of the reasons for the perpetuation of a plural society 
in Fiji was the segregated education system that the colonial government 
maintained during most of its rule. As a result, at independence, Fiji was an 
ethnically divided country. So the major challenge facing the new government 
was transforming Fiji into an integrated nation. It was believed that education had 
a major role to play in achieving this aim. Ratu Mara, who became Prime Minister 
at independence, considered education as “the chosen instrument of nation 
building” (Legislative Council Debates, 2 December, 1969, p.1099). 
 
Throughout the colonial period schools had been the major instrument for 
maintaining segregation. Government schools like Suva Grammar, Queen 
Victoria and Ratu Kadavulevu were among the most ethnically exclusive schools 
in the colony. When the colonial government failed to open any schools for the 
Indians the Indian community started establishing their own schools to educate 
their children, getting teachers from India, as they were reluctant to send their 
children to Christian schools for fear that they might be converted. Finally when 
the government established one or two schools for Indian children they were 
separate schools so there were separate schools for Europeans, Fijians and 
Indians.   
 
The Indian population had gone to great trouble in educating their children with 
the major aim of improving their material status. Indians knew that education 
would enable them to hold their own against the Europeans who had been 
exploiting their ignorance and blocking their progress. Until the 1940s, the Fijians 
were leading the Indians in education or perhaps even after that. According to a 
leading former parliamentarian, K. C. Ramrakha, Fijians were ahead in education 
until the 1960s - 99 per cent of Fijians were literate at that time as against 30 per 
cent of the Indians (personal communication, 2005).. But the Indo-Fijians started 
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forging ahead from the 1950s through their own efforts. Fijian education could 
not keep pace because of the colonial policy of not providing higher education for 
Fijian children in Fiji. In the following decades the Fijian achievement in 
education fell far behind that of the other ethnic groups. The 1969 Education 
Commission noted that correcting this disparity was imperative for building an 
integrated nation. 
 
The argument I put forward in this chapter is that education failed to integrate the 
major ethnic groups and contribute to nation building because the opposition NFP 
politicized it, making it into an election issue in the 1972 and 1977 general 
elections. In doing that the NFP showed that it had begun to change from the 
‘thoughtful’ opposition that it was under its founding leader, A.D. Patel. In this 
chapter I elaborate the actions of the NFP which showed that it was becoming less 
and less ‘thoughtful’. 
 
The 1969 Education Commission 
 
In 1969, on the eve of independence, an Education Commission was appointed to 
look into the system of education and to advise the government on the direction 
education should take in independent Fiji. Both Fijian and Indian leaders had been 
asking for such a commission but for different reasons. The Fijian Affairs Board 
and the Council of Chiefs had wanted a commission to look into the problems of 
Fijian education, while the Opposition National Federation Party called for a 
commission to study the question of free education. The Government decided to 
appoint a commission with “wide terms of reference to review the whole of the 
system of education in Fiji and to make recommendations” on all aspects 
(Legislative Council Debates, 29 January, 1969, pp.82-83).  
 
The Education Commission made a thorough study of the country’s education 
system and submitted its report which was tabled in the Legislative Council in 
March 1970, a few months before the country became independent. However, it 
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generated little interest and there was no debate and hardly any comments on its 
recommendations. But during the debate on Fiji’s Sixth Development Plan 
(DPVI) the Minister for Social Services talked about the commission and its 
recommendations. The education policy outlined in DPVI was mainly based on 
those recommendations. The government accepted most of the recommendations 
of the Commission and used these as a guideline for formulating its policies.  
 
DPVI, which was introduced in Parliament a month after the country became 
independent, represented a statement of the government’s economic and social 
policies. One of its aims was to build a ‘multiracial’ society where everyone had 
equal rights and equal opportunities. The 1969 Education Commission believed 
that education had an important role to play in helping to achieve this aim and it 
outlined three major steps to achieve this. These were: multiracial schools; cross-
cultural studies; and specific measures to improve Fijian education so that there 
would be no disparity in achievement between Fijians and others (Report of the 
Education Commission, 1969; see also Gaunder, 1999, p. 138). 
 
Multiracialism in Schools 
 
From the 1930s Indians had been asking for multiracial schooling but both Fijians 
and Europeans rejected it for different reasons. Europeans wanted segregated 
schooling to continue as a way of maintaining their control of the status quo while 
Fijians wanted their separate schools for fear that otherwise they would be 
dominated by other races and eventually lose their culture. This fear was 
heightened by the fact that they had become a minority in the 1940s and 
comprised a little over 40 per cent of the population at the time of independence in 
1970. 
 
By the last decade of colonial rule, the policies of segregation started being 
abolished with schools like Suva Grammar (which had been exclusively for 
European children) becoming multiracial. Exclusively Fijian schools like Queen 
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Victoria School were slower to change.  In 1964 A. D. Patel, the member for 
Social Services, a portfolio which had responsibility for education, wanted to 
promote multiracial education but the Fijians rejected it.  
 
In my book, ‘Education and Race Relations in Fiji, 1835-1998’ (Gaunder, 1999), I 
have explained how the government wanted to implement the recommendations 
of the 1969 Education Commission but did not get the support and co-operation of 
the opposition NFP in their efforts to do so, even though the opposition had not 
attacked these policies in Parliament and had given their silent consent. So I have 
suggested that one of the major reasons for the country not becoming integrated 
was the opposition’s response to the educational policies put forward by the 
government. The NFP, while it had no concrete policies to offer, attacked 
government’s education policies and made them into election issues in the first  
(1972) and second (1977) general elections after independence.   
 
I know that many of the academics in Fiji do not agree with this view, but so far I 
am not aware of any written rebuttal of my arguments.  Now, after the death of 
Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, there is a reassessment of his contribution and I feel it 
may be an appropriate time to express my views in more detail than I have done 
so far. So in this chapter I elaborate how education failed to lay the foundation for 
a new multiracial society partly because the opposition NFP did not support the 
government policies to bring in more integration in schools in order to make them 
the basis for a new ‘multiracial’ nation. 
 
To repeat, in not supporting the government in its endeavours to wipe out 
communalism from the education system and provide integrated schooling to the 
growing generation the NFP opposition showed that it had begun to change from 
the ‘thoughtful’ opposition that it was before independence.  
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Problems of Voluntarism in Education  
 
The 1969 Education Commission identified the voluntary system as the main 
reason for the persistence of communal divisions in schools. Voluntarism in 
education meant leaving the responsibility for opening and running schools to 
voluntary agencies rather than the state providing schools. Even before Fiji 
became a colony, there were schools established in almost all the villages by the 
Christian missionaries so the elementary education of Fijian children was taken 
care of. The Methodist Mission, which ran most of these schools, wanted to 
relinquish their control of the village schools in the late 1920s and early 1930s and 
the initial plan was for the government to take over these schools.   
 
James Russell, who was the Director of Education at that time, did not favour 
such a policy so many of these schools were handed over to local committees 
(Hopkin, 1977, p.86; also see Gaunder, 1999, pp. 89-91).  The Education 
Department, moreover, neglected to exert effective control over them and most of 
these schools deteriorated in quality, and standards became low (Hopkin, 1977, 
p.91).  
 
Then there was the growing number of Indian children in the colony for whom 
there were hardly any schools at all for over three decades (since the arrival of the 
first Indians in 1879). The only Indian schools in the early 1900s were a couple of 
schools established by the Methodist Mission and the few run by Indian religious 
organizations like the Arya Samaj and the Islamic Associations.  
 
The colonial government followed a laissez faire policy in education, so private  
(voluntary) committees were left to run both Indian and Fijian schools. The main 
difference was that in the case of Indian schools, they were mostly run by Indian 
cultural and religious organizations, while the Fijian schools were run by local 
committees.  
 70
 
So first and foremost, the phasing out of the voluntary system was considered 
important for making schools multiracial. Having state schools was also important 
for the government to have an effective control over the education system. 
Children of different ethnic origins could be brought together from an early age by 
phasing out the committee system and encouraging schools to amalgamate 
wherever there was duplication, the Commission had said. 
 
During the debate on DPVI, the Minister for Social Services explained what was 
being done to make schools multiracial and to improve Fijian education. It still 
did not generate much interest and the policies were accepted with hardly any 
debate or criticism.     
 
The majority of the schools in the country were (and still are) run by Indian 
religious and cultural organizations or Fijian village committees. Indians had 
made great sacrifices to establish their own schools, so they were justly proud of 
what they had achieved. This was despite the various obstacles placed before them 
by the vested interests who did not want the Indian children educated as that 
would put an end to their chief source of cheap labour. With independence, 
however, these voluntary agencies who ran the schools had outlived their use, 
which was evident from some of the problems highlighted by the Indian leaders 
themselves.  
 
One major problem was duplication of facilities in certain areas and the resulting 
wastage of scarce resources while some other areas lacked facilities for education. 
Often in one area there would be three small schools close to one another. There 
would be one Fijian school and two Indian schools – one run by a Hindu 
organization and the other by a Muslim association. Amalgamating them would 
have not only brought more integration but it would also have been more cost 
effective and resulted in better standards because there was a shortage of qualified 
teachers. Many of these committee schools employed untrained people to teach.  
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Several Indian opposition members had pointed out these problems even before 
independence. Some of them had tried successfully to amalgamate schools in their 
areas.  For example, the Bua Indian School and the Bua District School were 
amalgamated by the NFP Member of the Legislative Council under whose 
constituency the schools came (LC Debates, 28 November, 1966, p.950). Three 
years later, another opposition member gave the example of the Tagitagi area in 
Tavua where there were two schools opposite each other which he thought could 
be amalgamated (LC Debates, 29 January, 1969, p.98).  
 
Such problems continued after independence. In November, 1972, Karam 
Ramrakha, a leading member of the Opposition, said in Parliament that there was 
a lot of duplication of schools because of the segregated system that was in force. 
If these schools were reorganized, he said, it would save costs and remove racial 
barriers (Parliamentary Debates, 8 November, 1972, p.1609).   
     
Another sign that the voluntary agencies which ran schools had outlived their use 
was that until the 1950s the Indians were contributing to the costs of running the 
schools but with increased grants from the government for various purposes there 
were already signs that misuse of funds had started. This was highlighted by 
various members of the opposition such as James Madhavan, Chirag Ali Shah and 
Karam Ramrakha (Legislativ e Council Debates, 1969).  
 
Ramrakha, who was also the president of the Fiji Teachers Union, was concerned 
that the committees might not pay the teachers the full salary grant that they 
received from the government and keep some of the money for other purposes 
(LC Debates, 25 April, 1969, p. 647). Similarly, another opposition member 
pointed out that the committees might not pay the parents of needy children the 
remission of fees that the government paid for them (LC Debates, 25 April, 1969, 
p.648). It would have been wise to nip these misuses in the bud and the best way 
would have been to take over at least some of the schools if not all.    
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For ensuring that teachers received their pay in full, Government later started 
paying the teachers directly and slowly absorbed most of them into the civil 
service. The majority of them continued to teach in committee schools even 
though employed by the Government. The system still continues.    
 
Opposition members also complained about the growth of school fees collected in 
various ways, such as building grants. Government had increased grants to the 
voluntary agencies hoping that there would be a corresponding reduction in school 
fees but this had not happened (Legislative Council Debates, 22 March, 1967, 
pp.155-156 and 29 January, 1969, p.102).  This was a clear indication that as long 
as the voluntary system continued, costs would not come down.  
 
Significantly, the one opposition member who spoke in support of these voluntary 
agencies which ran schools, rather than criticizing them, was Siddiq Koya, 
although earlier he also had spoken in favour of government running all the 
schools (LC Debates, 22 July, 1966, p.71). Vijay Singh, the Minister for Social 
Services in 1967, pointed this out. In agreeing with the opposition’s criticism of 
the committees that ran schools, Singh said that they were only stating the obvious 
but he did not know what the Opposition expected the Government to do because 
earlier the Indian member for Lautoka (Koya) had emphatically stated that “the 
committees are masters of their own schools, they would manage it (sic) and levy 
building funds and admit students to their schools as they desired” (Legislative 
Council Debates, 22 March, 1967, p.172).   
 
Members of the Opposition other than Koya continued to highlight the problems 
in committee schools. Koya became the Leader of the Opposition towards the end 
of 1969. In spite of that it would have been an ideal time for starting to take over 
some of the committee schools as there was implicit support for such a move from 
many members of the opposition.  This was also the recommendation of the 1969 
Education Commission.  
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The Education Commission offered as the solution to the various problems found 
in the committee schools the ending of the voluntary system and providing state 
schools. This would also have brought about more integration and reduced 
communalism as well as costs of education for the parents. It would have further 
resulted in better standards. To begin with, the Commission recommended the 
phasing out of the voluntary system in primary schools and amalgamating schools 
wherever there was duplication.  
 
The major recommendation for promoting multiracial education at the secondary 
level was the establishment of Government Junior Secondary Schools of high 
quality in carefully selected rural areas. At the same time, the Commission hoped 
that the Education Department would discourage the further proliferation of poor 
quality committee schools.   
 
The government’s long-term aim was to assume responsibility for committee 
schools if and when their managers sought integration into a state system. The 
Minister in charge of Education, Jonati Mavoa, agreed that eventually the 
government should aim at a wholly state system of primary education but he was 
conscious of the fact that some of the private organisations might very well be 
reluctant to hand over their schools to a central government (Parliamentary 
Debates, November, 1970, p.209).   
 
The Opposition accepted without criticism the educational policies outlined by the 
minister. Speaking on the benefits of multiracial schools, one member of the 
Opposition pointed out that such schools would not only bring the children of 
various races together but they would also be more cost effective, as it would 
avoid duplication, while another stressed the importance of multiracial schools for 
nation building. Adi Losalini Dovi, a nominee of the Council of Chiefs, agreed 
with the opposition on the importance of such schools which she strongly believed 
was the answer to the problems in Fiji. 
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Unfortunately, Siddiq Koya, the new Opposition leader, seemed uninterested in 
abolishing the committee system and putting an end to communalism in schools. 
His priority in education seemed to be to concentrate on policies which would 
bring more electoral support. He obviously did not think taking over committee 
schools would prove popular with the different religious and cultural 
organizations that ran these schools. On the other hand, free education was an 
issue which had popular support, especially among the Indians, so he decided to 
champion that in the 1972 general elections (the first after independence). “Free, 
compulsory, primary education straight away. This is the only thing the party 
[NFP] advocated officially in the last election,” Koya declared after the election 
(Parliamentary Debates, 2 June 1972, p.712). 
 
Free Education 
 
The Opposition had brought up the question of free education in the Legislative 
Council even before independence. In January, 1969 Mrs. Narayan, a leading 
member, introduced a motion calling for the immediate introduction of free and 
compulsory education (Legislative Council Debates, January, 1969). It is not clear 
what prompted her to bring that motion up because a few days before that the 
Minister for Social Services had announced in the media the decision to appoint 
an Education Advisory Commission. 
 
In introducing the motion, Mrs. Narayan talked of the importance of multiracial 
schools where children would learn tolerance from an early age. She seemed to 
believe that free and compulsory education would make schools multiracial. What 
was needed for that was a wiping out of the voluntary system which fostered 
communalism. That would have also saved costs. Mrs. Narayan’s motion, 
moreover, revealed the complete lack of understanding of the Indian leaders of the 
Fijian educational problems. The major difficulty for Fijian people was not fees 
because many Fijian schools did not charge fees as was pointed out during the 
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debate by the Fijian members. In contrast, there was hardly any Indian school 
which provided free education.  
 
The Minister for Social Services said that many of the Fijian schools, especially in 
the rural areas, did not charge fees. Mr. Yarrow, a backbencher, gave the example 
of a Fijian school in Tavua, Nadelei Catholic Mission School, which charged only 
nominal fees where almost half its students and half its staff were Indians. The 
school committee was predominantly Fijian but Indian parents/guardians were 
invited to attend its meetings. Most of the money was raised by communal village 
effort. “To the best of my knowledge no one has been turned away from Nadelei 
School because of the inability to pay fees and I think this would apply to almost 
every Fijian school using the same system” (Legislative Council Debates, 1 
December, 1969, pp.1508-1509).         
 
The problem for Fijians was access, as many Fijian villages were isolated. Often 
geographical features like mountains and rivers also made accessibility difficult. 
However, the question that was worrying the Fijian leaders most was the under-
achievement of Fijian children and they wanted the Education Commission to 
make that its main focus. The NFP leaders were either unaware of or did not 
consider these issues (accessibility and under-achievement) important. The poor 
performance of Fijian children, however, was a serious national problem as it had 
the potential to cause resentment and ethnic tension.  If after independence the 
Indians started occupying most of the important positions in the country because 
of their higher educational qualifications that was sure to create resentment among 
the Fijian people. On the other hand, if the Fijians with lower qualifications were 
accepted for positions to keep the racial balance in the civil service and other 
areas of national life, Indians were sure to resent it. Mrs. Narayan, a teacher, 
seemed completely ignorant of this major educational problem which was 
worrying Fijian leaders. This was an indication of the gulf between the two 
communities that existed in colonial Fiji. 
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It had also been pointed out that although many Fijian schools had free education 
it was impossible to have compulsory education because of the geographical 
isolation of some of the villages and the associated difficulties the children faced 
in remote areas in getting to school. Many parents were reluctant to send their 
young children to school because of these problems which resulted in many Fijian 
children starting school at an older age than others.       
 
Alliance Minister Vijay Singh (who was the Minister for Social Services before a 
reshuffle of the cabinet) pointed out that when A.D. Patel, the NFP leader, was the 
Member for Social Services his priorities in education were universal (not 
compulsory) education and reducing the cost of education. Universal education 
seemed to have continued as the priority with the Alliance Government because in 
1968, K. S. Reddy, the Assistant Minister for Social Services, talked about how 
the Government was working towards achieving this aim by 1972 (Legislative 
Council Debates, 3 December, 1968, p.352). Incidentally, Mr. Reddy was the 
person who called for the appointment of an education advisory commission to 
make recommendations “to remedy the ills” which might be in the existing 
education system, particularly in Fijian education. 
 
Significantly, Patel did not speak on the motion and the Opposition accepted the 
amendment moved by the Minister for Social Services: “that this Council notes 
with pleasure government’s intention to appoint an Education Advisory 
Commission to make recommendations about the development of Fiji’s education 
system and recommends that the possible introduction of free and compulsory 
primary education at an appropriate date be included in the terms of reference” 
(Legislative Council Debates, 29 January, 1969, p.91). Vijay Singh congratulated 
Patel and Mrs. Narayan for accepting the amendment (Legislative Council 
Debates, 29 January, 1969, p.100). 
 
Unfortunately, the Opposition decided to make free education an election issue in 
1972. Education and land were the two most sensitive issues in Fiji at the time of 
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independence and it would have been wise to solve these through negotiation 
rather than causing open controversy, But by then A. D. Patel had died and S. M. 
Koya had become the new leader (of the NFP as well as of the Opposition) and 
this change in leadership adversely affected the performance of the Opposition.  
 
The issue of free education was again raised by the Opposition soon after the 1972 
elections, in November, 1972, when it again introduced a motion calling for free 
and compulsory education. In moving the motion, Ramrakha, a leading 
Opposition member, referred to the Education Commission and what it had to say 
“on this important question” (Parliamentary Debates, 8 November, 1972, p.1606). 
The Commission said it could not recommend that primary education be made 
free or compulsory immediately because of the “lack of suitably qualified 
teachers” (Parliamentary Debates, 8 November, 1972, p.1606). But Ramrakha 
believed (perhaps rightly) that the problem of shortage of teachers could be 
overcome by reorganizing the schools as there was a lot of duplication. 
 
Ramrakha did not, however, make it clear how they should be reorganised. The 
Education Commission had also recommended a reorganisation by taking over 
committee schools and amalgamating them wherever there was duplication. 
 
Ramrakha further noted that education was an issue with which the country could 
not afford to play politics but admitted that “in the last election this did become a 
severe issue between the two major political parties – the Alliance and the NFP” 
(Parliamentary Debates, 8 November, 1972, p.1607). Understandably, he did not 
say that it was the Opposition who made it into an election issue. 
 
The other major reason given by the Commission against the introduction of free 
education immediately was that “the considerable additional cost to government 
(about $2.5 million per annum) would inevitably divert funds from other 
educational needs of even greater urgency” (Parliamentary Debates, 8 November, 
1972, p.1606). Ramrakha pointed out that the Leader of the Opposition had 
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indicated a solution to this, which was “greater taxation on the larger companies” 
like the Carpenters, which were making, by their own admission, “incredible 
profits” (Parliamentary Debates, 8 November, 1972, p.1607).   
 
In 1969, the Minister for Social Services, Jonati Mavoa, had said that the 
Government had accepted in principle that primary education should be free and it 
was working towards that end. It was, however, clear that cost of education would 
not come down as long as the schools were run by private organizations 
(Legislative Council Debates, 29 January, 1969, pp.89-90). So what was 
important was having government schools to actually reduce the cost of 
education.   
 
In December 1970 the Minister for Social Services had stated in Parliament that 
free education was something that newly independent countries tried to have but 
he believed it did not really help the needy or benefit the country. It was only done 
to catch votes (Parliamentary Debates, 21 December, 1970, p.438). Giving 
examples of African, Middle Eastern and Asian countries which introduced free 
education, he showed that it had not really benefited the people because in these 
countries less than fifty per cent of the school age population attended schools.  
 
The Minister thought what had happened was that they catered more for the 
children in the cities and towns, forgetting the rural population. “Now this is not 
what we want to do in Fiji and our efforts should be directed more to helping the 
poor children first … Not that we think those in cities should not be assisted; we 
think we should help first those in need of help most and then as we can afford it, 
extend the help to others” (Parliamentary Debates, 21 December, 1970, p.439). 
 
In Fiji also the Opposition’s demand for free education seemed only a vote-
catching device and not for really helping the people in need. This was evident 
from the fact that one of their members admitted that primary education did not 
cost much, particularly in the government schools, but in the case of certain 
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private schools costs were going up and people were finding it difficult to pay 
(Parliamentary Debates, 8 November, 1972, p.1622). The problem was that there 
were very few Government schools. So if the Opposition were genuinely 
concerned about helping the poor parents, supporting the Education 
Commission’s recommendation for a state system of schools would have been the 
answer to this problem. 
 
Harish Sharma of the Opposition stressed that multiracial schools were as 
important as free and compulsory education. He noted that “if one were to analyse 
the racial composition of various schools, one would find that our schools are far 
from multiracial in character … whilst the government … is considering the 
provision of free and compulsory education, it should at the same time take 
positive steps to implement the question of multiracial education in schools” 
(Parliamentary Debates, 8 November, 1972, p.1622).   
 
The Education Commission had a practical plan for reducing costs and at the same 
time promoting multiracialism in schools by the state providing primary schools. 
In due course they were to be made free but it did not consider it an immediate 
priority because of other more urgent needs such as wiping out communalism 
from schools and promoting more integration.  Meanwhile it had recommended a 
progressive increase in the funds made available for remission of fees of indigent 
children.  
 
In DPVI, which covered the first five years of independence, the government had 
expressed its willingness eventually to take over all schools run by voluntary 
agencies if they so wished. The policy was dropped from DPVII. No reason was 
given (more importantly, no questions were asked by the Opposition), but the 
Minister for Education had since admitted that phasing out the voluntary system 
would have meant long delays in the introduction of fee free education 
(Whitehead, 1986, p.6). 
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When free education became a political issue the government decided to introduce 
it gradually from 1973, resulting in the indefinite shelving of the policy of taking 
over of committee schools. The Opposition’s suggestion of increasing taxation on 
larger companies perhaps was not taken for fear that it may send wrong signals to 
investors. 
 
Fee-free education, which took priority over the introduction of a state system of 
schools, had mass appeal and could win (or lose) votes, but in reality provided 
minimal financial relief to the poorer sections of the community. As the voluntary 
system continued the committees found ways of getting money out of the parents 
as had been predicted. The costs did not in any way come down and duplication 
and wastage continued which also affected standards. 
 
The Alliance Government made the grave mistake of introducing ‘free’ education 
rather than providing a state system of schools. The issue had not attracted many 
voters to the NFP in the 1972 general elections and the Alliance had a comfortable 
majority. This was an ideal time to take over schools as many opposition members 
(though not its leader, Koya) had also spoken of the problems of the voluntary 
system. The failure of the government to act entrenched communalism in schools 
rather than their becoming multiracial as had been planned. I would say that this 
was the biggest mistake made by the government of Ratu Mara in its seventeen 
years’ rule after independence. 
 
Moreover, government did not have ultimate control over the schools to 
implement its policies such as cross-cultural studies. The committees were still in 
control and they were not interested in these policies. In clamoring for free 
education after independence, the Opposition NFP ignored other more important 
educational issues such as integration and cross-cultural language learning. 
Having a state system of schools would have not only helped to wipe out 
communalism by making schools multiracial in areas where there was a 
 81
multiracial population; it would also have helped to implement the policies, such 
as cross-cultural language learning, for developing a distinct national identity.  
 
Jone Naisara, who became the Minister for Education after the 1972 elections, had 
said: “Government’s declared policy [is] set out in DPVI   … and we will stick to 
it” (Parliamentary Debates, 8 November 1972, p.1610). Unfortunately, 
government did not stick to it. In this connection, Whitehead had noted that unlike 
a colonial government, “a popularly elected Government had to be far more 
sensitive to the force of public opinion” (Whitehead, 1986, p.6). By not 
supporting the policies of the government, which were based on the sound advice 
given by the Education Commission, the Opposition contributed (perhaps 
inadvertently) to the maintenance of communalism in schools.  
 
One Fijian scholar blames “the post-Independence leadership [which] lacked that 
decisive commitment to break from the shackles of the colonial education order, 
which was an important prerequisite for the creation of a genuine multi-ethnic 
order” (Baba, 1988, p.18). It is true that ultimately the fault lay with the 
government for not sticking to the sound policy it originally had based on the 
recommendations of the Education Commission.  
 
Government and Opposition should have explained to their supporters that the 
priorities in education were universal education and reducing the cost of 
education, both of which could have been better achieved by having state schools. 
Abolishing fees, moreover, did not mean that education became free. It had been 
pointed out by the opposition members themselves that the cost of education 
would keep going up as long as private committees ran the schools. Instead of 
explaining its position and sticking to it the government also allowed itself to be 
influenced by the opposition in this vital area which was the reason for the 
continuation of communalism in schools. It is, moreover, believed that “[had] 
there been sound education structures ensuring that children of all races were 
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educated together at an early age, multi-racialism would not have floundered so 
easily” (Baba, 1988, p.18).   
 
Cross-Cultural Studies 
 
Since building a nation was seen as the main aim of education, the Commission 
recommended the teaching of a basic Fijian language course to non-Fijian 
students so that they would be able to understand and speak the language. This 
was to help to integrate the population by developing a distinct Fiji identity and 
creating a national feeling in the children. The Commission also recommended 
cross-cultural studies to promote integration and pointed out that school subjects 
such as History and Geography should be used to foster a sense of national pride 
and promote national unity.  
 
The Alliance Government, following its ‘multiracial’ policy, went a step ahead 
and decided to teach not only Fijian but Hindi as well to all children. The aim was 
to make the growing generation trilingual, with everyone able to converse in 
Fijian and Hindi with English remaining the medium of instruction. Thus a 
distinct Fiji identity was hoped to be developed. This would have gone a long way 
in integrating the young population. Government, however, could not implement 
its policies satisfactorily because the voluntary system persisted.   
 
Indian religious and cultural organizations that ran most of the schools were not 
interested in such a programme as they were more interested in promoting their 
own vernaculars. Apart from Hindi (for their own students, and not cross-
culturally) some organizations, like Sangam and the Muslim League, wanted 
languages like Tamil, Telugu and Urdu re-introduced ( this is explained later in 
this chapter) in their schools. Neither did the parents nor the teachers show an 
interest in cross-cultural language learning as they concentrated on examinations 
and examination results.  
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The only concern was expressed by Adi Losalini Dovi, the Government Whip, 
who raised the issue in Parliament: “I have often wondered whether we as a 
Government responsible for this country are really sincere in our efforts of 
bringing together a closer understanding of the races in this country”. She asked 
the Minister of Education when the language policy would be implemented 
because she felt that “if we overcome the language barrier, then a lot more could 
be achieved in that way” (Parliamentary Debates, 10 December, 1973, p.2026). K. 
S. Reddy of the Alliance agreed with her: “Language, sir, will play a great role in 
moulding our multiracial society” (Parliamentary Debates, 10 December, 1973, 
p.2059). But only one opposition member, K. K. Singh, spoke in support of her 
(Parliamentary Debates, 11 December, 1973, p.2122).   
 
It was a criticism of the Government by none other than its own Whip, and one 
would have expected the Opposition to pounce on that opportunity but it was not 
to be. This showed the low priority it gave to cross-cultural language learning. 
The Minister said the Curriculum Development and Advisory Section was 
preparing suitable course material and trying it out in selected pilot (primary) 
schools.  The Minister further said that two types of language courses were being 
developed in Fijian and Hindi at secondary levels, “a mother tongue course for 
those who speak the language and a second language course for those who do 
not”. It was hoped that the second language courses would promote better 
understanding among the various communities in Fiji. The Curriculum Advisory 
Board which had opposition MPs, senators and others with the Minister as the 
Chairman would discuss the matter at its next meeting, the Minister maintained 
(Parliamentary Debates, 14 December, 1973, p.2256).   
 
A year later, the Minister for Education, Jone Naisara, again referred to “the plea 
made by the honourable Government Whip,” for cross-cultural language learning 
and said: “I would like to emphasize that government is committed to a policy of 
better understanding among the various communities”. But he went on: “It should 
be appreciated, Mr. Speaker, Sir, that making the teaching of any vernacular 
 84
language compulsory to children of another mother tongue can be [a] highly 
contentious, complex and sensitive issue in a multiracial society like ours” 
(Parliamentary Debates, 2 December, 1974, p.1660). That was why it was 
important to have the co-operation of the Opposition to make it acceptable to all 
the communities.     
 
When the Ministry of Education tried to implement cross-cultural language 
learning it had difficulty in finding suitable teachers. So it was decided to 
introduce it as a radio programme. In 1978 the Ministry of Education started 
teaching Fijian and Hindi cross-culturally as a school broadcast programme and 
radio based lessons were developed. It unfortunately had a very short life span 
probably because the majority of the population seemed to have no interest in the 
issue.  By 1982 the emphasis had shifted from cross-cultural language learning to, 
each one learning his/her own mother tongue, as this was the priority of most of 
the committees that ran schools. The then Minister for Education, Ahmed Ali, 
supported these moves, especially by the South Indian and Muslim organizations, 
probably in the hope of winning more votes. Neither the Opposition nor the 
teachers’ union, attacked the policy for fear of antagonising the communities 
involved.    
 
In the 1920s, when Indians started establishing their schools, they wanted to teach 
their children their various languages and took the trouble of getting teachers from 
India if they were not available locally. Fifty years later, the majority of them only 
spoke Hindi. So it was a sheer waste of resources to re-introduce languages like 
Tamil and Telugu in schools as there was hardly any demand for them from the 
general public. The voluntary agencies running the schools were promoting these 
languages for their own reasons, ignoring the need of the nation, which was 
clearly cross-cultural language learning. The government again made the mistake 
of not sticking to its original policies and allowing them to be modified as it did 
not get the support of the Opposition for implementing them.  So three decades 
later the language barrier between Fijians and Indo-Fijians still remained.  
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 Fijian Educational Problem 
 
The Commission noticed a wide disparity in the educational development of 
Fijians by comparison with other races. It also found that the quality of Fijian 
primary education was often low. Bridging the gap between Indian and Fijian 
educational achievement was important for bringing about national integration. 
Otherwise Fijians would be disadvantaged when it came to occupying positions of 
responsibility in the newly independent nation. 
 
The Commission found that with a few exceptions, representatives of other racial 
groups were generally supportive of special measures for the improvement of 
Fijian education, although understandably not on a permanent basis. It was also 
found that Fijians were anxious to ensure that any such measures were not 
permanent and that they should be phased out as the achievement gap narrowed. 
Any permanent discrimination in favour of Fijians was regarded as unworthy of 
the dignity of the Fijian people (1969 Education Commission). 
  
Improving the quality of primary education, especially in the rural areas, was seen 
as the long term solution to the problem. This could be brought about through 
more government involvement and by setting up Junior Secondary Schools. In 
promoting measures that would help the Fijian students to achieve better 
standards, the Commission cautiously avoided any steps that could be interpreted 
as blatantly discriminatory. Instead, it emphasized the rural-urban dichotomy and 
recommended policies that would improve rural education. 
 
For example, the Commission wanted to see a progressive increase in the funds 
made available to provide free and partly free places at secondary schools for 
children of indigent parents. Such an increase would do much to correct the 
disparity between the number of Fijian children at secondary schools and those of 
other races because it was mainly the former who lived in the rural areas where 
ready cash was hard to come by. This recommendation was clearly aimed at 
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helping the Fijians but the Commission wanted the emphasis to be placed on need 
rather than on race so that it would not appear to be discriminatory. 
 
The opposition had been very rightly criticising the implementation of the free 
and partly free places. In 1969, A.D. Patel had pointed out that many deserving 
students in Nadi, whose parents could not afford to pay school fees, missed out on 
that. Another opposition member, Chirag Ali Shah, had also given similar 
instances from Ba and Tavua and the Minister in charge had promised to look into 
those cases. Such problems persisted after independence, and Ramrakha, the 
Opposition Whip, gave the example of his own child who was offered a free place 
though he had not applied for it.  
 
The problems in the proper implementation of these awards came to a head in the 
mid-1970s when government announced that only Fijian students would be given 
free and partly free places in schools. Indian members in Parliament, on both 
sides, protested vehemently against the move and the government withdrew its 
decision and admitted that an error was made. 
 
The incident proved how effectively Parliament could be used, to put pressure on 
the government, when decisions were made that were unfair to one particular 
community. Unfortunately, this was a rare example after independence of making 
use of the Parliament to fight issues affecting Indians, with some unity of purpose, 
rather than being at logger heads on party lines. This kind of co-operation which 
could have transformed Fiji society was, however, short lived.   
 
USP Quota System 
 
The Fijian Affairs Board had proposed that fifty per cent of the government 
scholarship funds at the University of the South Pacific should be earmarked for 
Fijians. The Commission, given the special circumstances of time and place, 
favoured such an allocation but only for a specific period.  The Commission 
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recommended special provisions for Fijian education for a period of nine years 
with a preliminary review at the end of six years. If there was no marked lessening 
in the disparity by then, the position was to be reviewed. It was also to be clearly 
understood that special measures of themselves availed nothing, unless they were 
matched by a converse Fijian effort.  
 
The Minister for Social Services, while introducing DPVI, had explained what 
was being done to improve Fijian education (Parliamentary Debates, 7 December, 
1970, pp.221-224). He had said that the government intended to keep the problem 
constantly under review. The first proposal was the award of scholarships to all 
deserving Fijian applicants. This, the Minister said, was already being done, but 
the problem was that too often there were very few qualified Fijian applicants and 
there was no point in giving scholarships to people who were not qualified to 
undertake the courses for which the scholarships were awarded. 
 
On the other hand, if qualified Fijians were available in adequate numbers, then 
the recommendation of the Commission that fifty per cent of the scholarship 
award be reserved for Fijians would do no more than maintain the existing racial 
imbalance in senior posts, the Minister claimed. To show the enormity of the 
Fijian educational problem, the Minister drew attention to the racial breakdown of 
secondary school roll in 1969 which was: Indians 8,330; Fijians 3,964; others 
1500. Far more than fifty per cent of the scholarships would need to be devoted to 
Fijians if the government was to correct the present imbalance, the Minister 
warned.   
 
The Opposition Leader, Siddiq Koya, had said a few months before the country 
became independent that there would be problems after independence and “the 
only way I can see how we can solve these problems is to approach them as if 
they were national problems”.  He gave an assurance that “as long as I occupy my 
chair, I shall do my best to see that they [the Fijian problems] are [solved] … by 
joint consultation and we would give our fullest support to the Government”. He 
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further assured that this attitude would continue “until we have completed the 
transition period” (LC Debates, 15 June, 1970, p.193). 
 
The Minister in charge of Education expressed pleasure at Koya’s assurance but 
added: “In years to come, I think the Fijian people … will need to see some 
practical action of what is being done to help them … we should aim in the future 
to remove the imbalance in the distribution of income and also in the education of 
our people” (LC Debates, 15 June, 1970, p.218).  
 
Unfortunately, there was not only no “practical action” to help the Fijian people; 
but also no practical suggestions from the Opposition for the improvement of 
Fijian education, while they (the Opposition) continued to attack Government 
policies during election times. 
 
Three years after independence Koya reiterated that the problems facing the Fijian 
people were national problems. He said: “… we have already said words to the 
effect that the concern for the welfare of Fijian people is not the monopoly of the 
Alliance Government. It is a national problem and as such we have a duty to solve 
the problem, to do our best to contribute all we can to solve it and that is where we 
stand” (Parliamentary Debates, 14 December, 1973, pp.2325-2326).  
 
The Opposition had not only accepted the preferential policies to improve Fijian 
education without any criticism but it also did not ask for a review of these 
policies after six years as the Commission had recommended. But in October, 
1975 during the debate in Parliament on Butadroka’s motion calling for the 
repatriation of Indians from Fiji, Koya admitted that the Opposition did not agree 
with the Government’s policy on education. Both the Prime Minister and the then 
Minister for Education (Naisara) wanted to know what exactly he opposed and 
what proposition he had. Koya’s reply was vague: “Sir, it is the objective [with] 
which, I think, both sides agree … this is a national problem and it must be 
achieved – but the method, Sir, we disagree with” (10 October, 1975, p.1152). 
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The PM interjected that Koya was only paying lip service (to improving Fijian 
education).  
 
Koya was obviously referring to the Government’s policies for improving Fijian 
education, which included preferential policies for Fijian students for scholarships 
at the University of the South Pacific. The Prime Minister perhaps was justified in 
suggesting that Koya was not sincere in his support for improving Fijian 
education because the Government’s educational policies were largely based on 
the recommendations of the Education Commission. The Opposition had neither 
criticised these recommendations nor suggested alternatives.   
 
In 1976 a Senate Select Committee was appointed to look into the problem of 
absenteeism among Fijian children. That would have been an ideal time to review 
the special measures as, coincidentally, it was six years after the policies were first 
introduced. But the Senate committee made no mention of a review of these 
policies. More importantly, the Opposition did not demand such a review. 
 
The Opposition criticism of the special measures to improve Fijian education only 
helped to turn these into a permanent feature as it became a political issue with the 
Fijian Nationalists accusing the government of not helping the Fijians while doing 
a lot for the Indians. 
 
Fijian education had made great strides during the first six years after 
independence because at the end of 1976 a good number of Fijian students did 
qualify to attend university, unlike in previous years, depriving some of the Indian 
students with better marks of their chances of receiving a scholarship. In 1977, the 
government decided to grant scholarships to the University of the South Pacific’s 
Foundation Year science programme to Fijian students who passed the New 
Zealand University Entrance Examination with a minimum of 216 marks while 
the Indian students were required to have a minimum of 261 marks. The 
announcement provoked a student strike on the campus. 
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The NFP which had earlier accepted the quota system took up the issue before the 
general elections of 1977 to gain political mileage (see Lal, 1986 and Ali, 1980). 
Koya, the Opposition Leader, “denounced the policy in ringing terms” (Lal, 1986, 
p.86). 
 
Instead of explaining to its Indian followers why such a policy was imperative for 
achieving long term harmony in the country, and asking for a review of the policy, 
as recommended by the 1969 Education Commission, the opposition NFP chose 
to make it an election issue in the 1977 general elections. It was an ideal time to 
demand a review and decide on what the future policy should be but it was not to 
be. The policy could have been changed to give more emphasis to need rather than 
to exam results in granting scholarships, explaining to the people that the main 
priority of the government was equity. 
 
The Opposition succeeded in attracting most of the Indians under its banner by 
campaigning against the quota system. The NFP was in disarray at that time with 
a leadership struggle between its two factions, one supporting the Opposition 
Leader, Koya, and the other opposed to him. With all its internal problems, NFP 
was still able to gain most of the Indian votes with the Indian support for the 
Alliance dwindling considerably. 
 
Indian students with better marks failing to get USP scholarships, many of those 
Indians who had traditionally supported the Alliance now voted for the NFP.  
Roderic Alley summed up the situation precisely: “For all its talk of 
multiracialism and tolerance, could the Alliance really be trusted to play fair? That 
was a question many Indians must have asked. With a vigilance bred from past 
insecurities, enough Indians must have responded negatively, viewing the NFP, its 
warts and all, as a lesser threat” (1977, p.287).  
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Until now the Indians had been divided between the NFP (75%) and the Indian 
Alliance (25%), a wing of the ruling Alliance Party. Unfortunately, the Indian 
Alliance now lost most of its support since the Indians overwhelmingly rallied 
behind the NFP in the hope that its leaders would ensure the security of their 
future in Fiji. This marked the beginning of ethnic politics, a fact that was pointed 
out by the Fijian Nationalist Party leader, Sakeasi Butadroka (Parliamentary 
Debates, 26 May, 1977, p.113).  
 
Meanwhile the Fijian education problem seemed to continue in spite of the 
preferential system and there was no in-depth analysis of the causes of the 
problems or a systematic review of the policies being followed. One of the major 
problems was the very poor standard in most rural schools and very little was 
done to remedy this situation. The Education Commission had recommended the 
setting up of Government Junior Secondary Schools of high standard in carefully 
selected rural areas with boarding facilities but this did not eventuate as the 
voluntary system persisted.  
 
In 1978, a Fijian academic and later Deputy Prime Minister in the People’s 
Coalition Government, Tupeni Baba, gave a prophetic warning: “In my view, the 
so called Fijian education problem is a national problem and … it is going to 
determine in a significant way how we are going to live together in this country as 
a multiethnic and multicultural society. Can we afford not to meet this challenge?” 
(Baba, 1978, p.5) 
 
Fiji as a nation clearly could not afford to fail to meet this challenge posed by the 
Fijian educational problem but the Indian leaders did not realize this. The NFP 
leader, Koya, also agreed that it was a national problem but he did not do anything 
to help to resolve it. Instead of trying to help to solve this major national problem 
that the country faced, the NFP, its leader in particular, was playing politics with 
education. It led to the consolidation of ethnic politics in Fiji. From then onwards, 
ethnic conflict became a political time bomb waiting to be detonated. 
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To sum up, the NFP’s education policies which put pressure on the Government 
to introduce free education led to the abandoning of other policies which were 
aimed at wiping out communalism and bringing about more integration. In 
particular, it resulted in the continuation of the voluntary system. The persistence 
of voluntarism in education stood in the way of the Government’s plan to 
introduce cross-cultural language learning in order to create a distinct Fiji identity 
in the growing generation. The NFP policies in education also led to the 
consolidation of ethnic politics in Fiji as the Indian leaders, rather than explaining 
to their followers the need for preferential treatment for Fijian students for a 
period of time for the sake of equity, made it into an election issue. This led to the 
Indians abandoning the Alliance Party.  
 
In the 1977 general elections, by making the USP quota system a major issue, the 
NFP succeeded in its quest for more electoral support, with Indian voters flocking 
to the party, seeing it as their only saviour. It, however, destroyed the possibility 
of the policy being implemented properly (that is, according to the 
recommendations of the 1969 Education Commission). This led to the policy 
degenerating into a permanent discrimination in favour of the Fijian students – the 
very thing the Commission had warned against. The combined result of all these 
lapses was that education failed to develop a distinct national identity and lay the 
foundation for the new multiracial nation that was to be created.                                 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 93
                                           Chapter 4 
                         Worker Solidarities Emerge  
 
This chapter looks at the union movement which brought the Fijians and Indians 
together as class solidarity challenged ethnic alignments. Unfortunately, the 
‘labour aristocracy’, which emerged in the urban areas, politicized the union 
movement in the mid-1980s and formed the Fiji Labour Party (FLP), against the 
wishes of several blue collar unions, and went into an opportunistic alliance with 
the almost exclusively Indian NFP when the only thing they  had in common was 
their wish to get rid of the Fijian-dominated Alliance government. The chapter 
concludes by looking at how the FLP soon lost its multiracial image and with that 
its credibility. Moreover, it affected the carefully nurtured ethnic unity of the 
labour movement.  
 
Workers Unite to Stop Exploitation 
 
Worker solidarities had started emerging from the 1950s, to the rude shock of the 
European business establishment which had never anticipated such a development 
(Bain, 1989, p.13).The earliest resistance to European commercial exploitation 
perhaps came from Apolosi R. Nawai, a Fijian commoner from western Viti Levu 
(see chapter 1). His movement (during WWI) was seen as an attack on the chiefly 
system though what Apolosi was trying to do was to do away with the European 
middlemen in trying to sell bananas (Scarr, 1979).  
 
Brij Lal has noted that the causes Apolosi championed, which involved fighting 
“the ethos and ideology of British colonialism ... earned him the wrath of the 
colonial establishment and the Fijian chiefs, and they eventually combined to 
defeat him and his vision for the future of the Fijian people” (Lal, 1992,p.48). 
 
According to Lal, at the heart of Apolosi’s message was a desire to better the lives 
of the Fijian people. Apolosi, however, like other Fijian leaders after him, also 
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made racist utterances about Indians though “he was not alone in wanting to ‘rid 
Fiji of Indians’”(Lal, 1992, p.48).  This, moreover, showed that Fijian leaders 
were already wary of the Indian presence. These were not the chiefly leaders 
alone but commoners, some of whom, like Apolosi came from the western 
provinces. 
 
A few years later, in 1920 and again in 1921, Indian workers struck demanding 
higher wages (see Chapter 1). Until the 1930s, however, there were no formal 
trade unions except for an association of European civil servants (Anderson, 1977, 
p.4). In the 1930s the colonial government urged all colonies to introduce 
legislation giving legal rights to trade unions. The response from Fiji was slow 
because there was resistance from companies like CSR, so the colonial 
government did not act to regulate labour organizations until 1942 when a 
Department of Labour was set up and the trade union movement received formal 
recognition (Lawson, 1991, p.159). 
 
The colonial government gave workers freedom to form unions, but it provided 
“no legal frame to allow compulsory recognition of unions” as the state “in 
collusion with capital undermined any real possibilities towards collective 
bargaining” (Plange, 1986, p.15). Such legal recognition of unions through 
legislation came only a few years after independence, in 1976. 
 
It has been suggested that personal advancement in the political sphere was a 
strong motive for involvement by Fiji Indian leaders in union activities and 
because Fijian voters could not be a source of political support (owing to 
communal voting) they received little attention from Fiji Indian leaders (see for 
instance, Lawson, 1991, p.60). Perhaps there is some truth to it but there were 
exceptions. In 1959 B. D. Lakshman (an Indian) formed the Fiji Trade Union 
Congress and his associates in the new organization were James Anthony, Apisai 
Tora, and Michael Columbus (Hince, 1990, p.18). The four of them belonged to 
four different ethnic groups (James Anthony is part Indian, Apisai Tora is a Fijian 
 95
and Michael Columbus is part Fijian). A small group like that was not indicative 
of a general trend but at least it was a start. 
 
The unions were ethnically based initially because of the pattern of employment 
“but overt racial exclusion clauses were not common until the late 1950s” 
(Anderson, 1977, p.9). After the 1959 riots in Suva by the Wholesale and Retail 
Workers General Union (WRWGU) members under Apisai Tora and James 
Anthony, when the Fijian chiefs intervened to calm the rioters, ethnically 
exclusive unions for Fijians were actively encouraged by the establishment. 
 
The most significant aspect of the 1959 strike was the co-operation between 
Indian and Fijian workers against white employers (Bain, 1989, p.17). “The 
appearance of a coalition between Indian workers and Fijian workers combined as 
a more or less united proletariat against white domination and exploitation was 
very disturbing to the chiefs”, claims Bain. More than to the chiefs, I would say 
that it was disturbing to the European vested interests who enlisted the help of the 
Fijian chiefs.  
 
“The Fijian workers were weaned quickly from their new found alliance and the 
status quo ante was quickly restored” (Bain, 1989, p.18; emphasis added).  Bain’s 
patronizing language suggests that the Fijians are naïve and trusting and open to 
manipulation. The chiefs are credited with quelling the riots, but B. D. Lakshman, 
a leading trade unionist and Member of the Legislative Council, played a more 
important role. Hince noted that the official report, after praising Lakshman for 
his public action, “widened such praise to include Fijian chiefs” (Hince, 1990, 
p.20).  
 
Bain claims that the chiefs did it to maintain the status quo. After the disturbances, 
the chiefs encouraged the formation of separate Fijian unions in all major 
industries so that Fijians would not be “corrupted” or “led astray” by “Indian 
agitators” (Bain, 1989, p.18).  
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The 1959 riots in Suva were seen by most as a ‘racial’ phenomenon with Fijian 
and Indian workers joining forces against the Europeans and attacking their 
properties. According to Heartfield, the report of the riot to the Fiji Legislative 
Council by Chief Justice A. G. Lowe  “established beyond doubt that the riots 
contained an anti-European motive” (Heartfield, 2002, p.76). 
 
Heartfield, however, questions the validity of this claim. Europeans suffered the 
most because of their greater wealth. So it was not anti-European but “anti-
poverty”. The protest and strike were not ‘racial’ at all as far as the leaders of the 
strike were concerned “but the means to advance a legitimate economic demand” 
(Heartfield, 2002, p.77). Heartfield suggests that it was the Fiji Times editor, Len 
Usher, who “first introduced a racial element into the reporting”.      
 
Rather than appreciating the role of the Fijian chiefs as peace makers in calming 
the mob22 and stopping the rioting, Bain is critical of the chiefs, claiming that they 
tried to divide the Fijian and Indian workers on ‘racial’ lines in order to maintain 
their status quo. I believe that it was the European vested interests who wanted to 
stop the Fijians and Indians coming together and challenging their status quo just 
as in the 1920s they tried to stop the Fijians and Indians getting together by using 
the Fijians against the Indians when the Indians went on strike and the Fijians 
initially were sympathetic and helpful to the Indians. 
 
In 1858 the Fijian chiefs were just called upon to calm the rioters. The chiefs had 
been moderators and against any violent change. So Ratu Sukuna supported the 
banishment of Apolosi in 1917. The chiefs who addressed the unruly crowd at 
Albert Park in 1959 and put an end to the rioting included the highest chief, Ratu 
George Cakobau, and the other high chiefs, Ratu Edward Cakobau, Ratu Penaia 
Ganilau and Ratu Mara.  “Ratu Edward expressed his shame that the Fijians had 
been led on by ‘other people’ who were using them for their own ends. The same 
                                                 
22 This was a role they successfully played again in 1968 as Norton has noted (1990, p.102). 
 97
theme was hammered home even more forcefully by Ratu Penaia Ganilau”  (Bain, 
1989, p. 16). 
 
Elsewhere, however, Bain writes very appreciatively of Ratu Edward. “His warm 
charm, innate dignity and gentle courtesy were to win hearts around the world … 
and above all in his capacity to transcend race in his wide-ranging friends and 
admirers.  He was a significant and successful breaker of racial divides in Fiji 
itself – always considerate, never condescending, and the teller of stories … he 
was rarely without a willing audience, and it was invariably inter-racial. Not for 
nothing had he been one of the founders of the Union Club in Suva where Fijians, 
Indians, Europeans and part-Europeans met and mixed in colonial days when it 
was the exception so to do” (Bain, 1989, p.30).  So Bain seems to be inconsistent 
in his attitude to the chiefs. (He describes Ratu Edward as a ‘breaker of racial 
divides in Fiji’ in one place and in another mentions him as a chief who tried to 
stop the Indian and Fijian workers coming together against the vested interests.) 
 
If the workers of the two ethnic groups coming together meant rioting and 
destruction, then perhaps the chiefs were astute in believing it was better to have 
separate unions for Fijians. The chiefs also believed that the Fijians were being 
used by others for their own ends. The chiefs were for a gradual change, rather 
than a sudden one, which would ensure Fijian rights and protect their culture.  
 
However, it proved impossible for the establishment to stop the workers from 
joining hands in a common cause. Anderson noted that the splinter ethnically 
based unions that arose were not successful in the long run and most had a fairly 
short life span, one of the main reasons for this being the small size of most of 
these unions (1977, p.8). The only one to survive was the Fijian Teachers’ 
Association.     
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Trade Unions and the Political Parties 
When party politics started in Fiji in the 1960s the two major parties represented 
the workers (NFP) and the capitalists (Alliance). The founder-leader of the NFP, 
A.D. Patel, was also a capitalist but he was against exploitation so he fought hard 
to stop the exploitation of the farmers by the European vested interests. Similarly, 
though Ratu Mara was a capitalist and led a political party supported by the 
capitalists of the country, he was also against exploitation. So when Patel 
succeeded in getting a better deal for the farmers through the Denning Award (see 
Chapter 5), Ratu Mara was supportive of taking measures to stop the exploitation 
by the Australian monopoly, the CSR.   
 
Patel died before independence but the first elected Parliament in 1972 had trade 
union leaders on both sides, Sakeasi Waqanivavalagi, who represented the 
Mineworkers’ Union on the government side and controversial union leader, 
Apisai Tora, who was with the opposition NFP. The Alliance Party, though it 
started as a party for the capitalists, was sympathetic towards the workers. Ratu 
Mara had said that his government wanted the workers to receive the maximum 
wage that the economy of the country could support (LC Debate, April 2, 1968, 
p.66). Similarly, the NFP leaders helped not only the sugarcane farmers but also 
other workers. Opposition Member of Parliament Ramrakha, a lawyer, used to be 
the president of the Fiji Teachers’ Union for several years until after independence 
by when their salaries and conditions of work improved considerably. According 
to Deryck Scarr, the “Alliance government could fairly be credited with having 
assumed responsibility since the mid-1970s for expanding employment and 
incomes by putting financial and technical support into developing natural 
resources” (1988, p.27).   
If the Alliance Party was becoming more pro-worker, the NFP was becoming less 
worker-oriented. Patel had identified the mineworkers as the next group to 
champion after the sugarcane farmers. But under Koya, the party no longer 
showed an interest in the mineworkers who were victims of exploitation. Slowly it 
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was beginning to concentrate only on issues of concern to the Indians and there 
were no Indian mineworkers. In 1977 when Jai Ram Reddy became its leader the 
change became complete as it became a party for the Indian capitalists.  
Trade Unions in Independent Fiji 
 
From the mid-1960s the union movement managed to develop without ethnic 
differences. This was remarkable in a country where such differences were 
significant. Anderson noted: “The success of the union movement in avoiding 
such a split would seem to be due to a conscious effort to exclude racial 
differences in organization and among office holders. It is common for the top 
positions in a union to be held by persons of both Indian and Fijian ‘race’. The 
fact that the union movement has avoided direct political involvement has also 
helped as political parties tend to divide on racial lines” (Anderson, 1977, pp.23-
24). 
 
After independence, civil servants gained substantial salary increases and 
improvements in working conditions23. The workers of Fiji led by their unions 
enjoyed a remarkable degree of success in improving their wages/salaries and 
conditions of work by remaining politically neutral and ensuring multiracialism in 
the unions. The FPSA, with Mahendra Chaudhry as its General Secretary, “proved 
to be a remarkably successful union” and its success was attributed partly to the 
personality of Chaudhry who gave it a strong ‘bargaining image’ (Leckie, 1988, 
p.167). It also acquired a “reputation for submitting well researched papers” 
(Leckie, 1988, p.167). It was, however, accused of opportunism.  This accusation 
of opportunism stemmed mainly from its ability to display “a range of attitudes 
and tactics” (Leckie, 1988, p.167). 
 
                                                 
23 This led to the creation of a ‘labour aristocracy’ in the urban areas (More on this in Chapter 6). 
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The central organization of trade unions in Fiji officially adopted the name Fiji 
Trade Union Congress (FTUC) in 1967 (Hince, 1990, p.18)24. James Raman was 
the secretary of the FTUC from 1972 to 1988 when he was replaced by Mahendra 
Chaudhry who had been the Assistant Secretary (Hince, 1996, pp.27-28). One 
scholar has suggested that the reason for the change was that the “old guard of the 
Congress were slow to oppose the military takeover” and that “the FTUC leaders 
showed a willingness to co-operate with rather than challenge the regime” 
(Slatter, 1988, p.23). So in January 1988, at its Biennial Conference, the 
leadership was changed. “This historic change in leadership after seventeen long 
years reflected the widespread and bitter disappointment within the movement 
with the prevaricating and compromising stance of the FTUC old guard” (Slatter, 
1988, p.24).     
 
Tripartism 
 
An important step in the development of trade union solidarity in Fiji was the 
formation in 1951 of the Fiji Industrial Workers’ Congress (FIWC) which in 1967 
changed its name to the Fiji Trade Union Congress (FTUC) and became affiliated 
to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). In 1973 a few 
unions broke away from the FTUC and organised another national body called the 
Fiji Council of Trade Unions (FCTU) ( Fiji Ministry of Information, 1980, p.68). 
 
The growing strength of organised labour and recognition of trade unions by the 
Government made it imperative for employers to form their own organisation so 
that they could also have a united voice. In 1960, an association of employers, 
called the Fiji Employers’ Consultative Association, was formed. The main aim of 
the Association was to protect the interest of its members and to provide 
consultative services to the members on industrial relation matters ( Fiji Ministry 
of Information, 1980, pp.68-69). 
                                                 
24 It, however, had nothing to do with the B. D. Lakshman-led grouping of unions under the same 
name established in 1959. 
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In 1964 the Trade Disputes Act was enacted. The main provision of the Act was 
the inclusion of settlement of disputes in certain situations by reference to 
compulsory arbitration. A problem which began to cause a lot of friction was the 
one of recognition of unions by their employers. Since it was Government policy 
to promote collective bargaining, Government realised that recognition was an 
essential pre-requisite to its effectiveness. The Recognition Act came into being in 
late 1976. The main criteria entitling union recognition for the purpose of 
collective bargaining was that the union must have as its members more than 50 
per cent of the persons eligible for membership. The Permanent Secretary for 
Labour is empowered under the Act to issue a compulsory recognition order after 
having satisfied himself that the union has the requisite membership of more than 
50 per cent of the eligible persons (Fiji Ministry of Information, 1980, p.69). 
 
The Tripartite Forum was formed in December 1976 to achieve a balanced 
approach in matters of national interest. The Forum was made up of 
representatives from the Fiji Trade Union Congress, Fiji Employers’ Consultative 
Association and Government. The Forum sought to reach a common 
understanding when dealing  with issues which affect the national interest such as 
industrial relations, job creation, greater flow of investment and general economic 
and social development of the country. The Tripartite Forum had no statutory 
authority. The three parties involved had voluntarily come together and had 
agreed to abide by the Forum’s decisions voluntarily.   
 
From the mid-1970s the Tripartite Forum played a key role in worker-employer 
interaction. One scholar had this to say about tripartism: “I regard tripartism … as 
the philosophic cornerstone of sound, progressive and equitable industrial 
relationships” (Hince, 1996, p.4). Another scholar, however, believed that while 
this “corporatist approach to labour management attempted to institutionalize 
union leaders toward ‘responsible’ unionism and create industrial peace” it also 
“effectively undermined the more militant Fiji Council of Trade Unions (FCTU)” 
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by incorporating the FTUC (Naidu, 1987, p.215). The fact remains that the FTUC 
was the original organisation while the FCTU was a breakaway one which was 
fairly new at the time the Tripartite Forum was established. 
 
The Prime Minister chaired the Forum. The sub-committees which operated 
indicated the overall breadth of the tripartite consultations.  It was further noted 
about the working of tripartism in Fiji: “Whilst the processes of the Forum were 
consultative, government inevitably sought to honour agreements” (Hince, 1996, 
p.52). Until 1984 the Tripartite Forum had a stabilising effect on the country’s 
economy and the industrial relations scene because of its voluntary commitment 
to work out a balanced solution that was satisfactory to the parties concerned, and 
to Fiji as a whole. 
The Achievements of the Union Movement 
The period between 1970 and 1984 was one of positive achievements for the 
union movement, though it is said that an attempt was made to control union 
action through the Trade Dispute Act of 1973 which “weakened trade unionism in 
Fiji” (Naidu, 1987, p.215; also see Plange, 1986, p.20 and Leckie, 1988, p.139). 
It, however, strengthened the position of labour bureaucrats “as spontaneity of 
action from the rank and file was all but legislated out of existence” (Naidu, 1987, 
p,215).  
By 1975, the strength of the Fiji Public Service Association, arising from its 
increased membership and financial security, enabled it to appoint a full time 
General Secretary, Mahendra Chaudhry (Leckie, 1988, p.150). By the late 1970s 
both the government and the public were aware of “the emerging power of the 
FPSA as a union” (Leckie, 1988, p.149).  
One major problem the FPSA encountered was “the totally uncooperative 
attitude” of the Public Service Commission for which it (the FPSA) placed much 
of the blame on individuals, especially the expatriate Director of Industrial 
Relations of the PSC, Bill Greenaway (Leckie, 1988, p.163). The Ministry of 
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Labour tried to conciliate before Chaudhry decided to “bring this serious matter to 
the attention of the Prime Minister” (Leckie, 1988, p.162). Not only was the 
FPSA critical of Greenaway’s handling of industrial relations; even members of a 
committee appointed by the Public Service Commission to examine gradings in 
the department of Civil Aviation “found the PSC’s attitude unhelpful and difficult 
to understand”. They further noted the “hostile and uncooperative manner” of the 
PSC representative, Greenaway (Leckie, 1988, p.164).     
Greenaway was also accused of using methods which were divisive and of 
attempts to “divide and rule” by approaching staff associations separately; and of 
seeking to “create new confrontation” by attempting to tie salary increases to 
those of housing rentals for civil servants (Leckie, 1988, p.165). Chaudhry was 
also critical of the Chairman of the PSC, J.W. Sykes, who turned meetings into 
“mud slinging matches between the two sides” (Leckie, 1988, p.165).  
 
A significant achievement of the union movement was in the aviation industry. At 
Nadi Airport, Qantas maintained aircraft and facilities. After several industrial 
actions by the airport workers, who had problems with Qantas, Air Terminal 
Services (ATS) was established in 1981 to take over from Qantas with worker 
participation. The Prime Minister applauded the establishment of ATS. The initial 
plan was for a state-owned enterprise under the Air Pacific Company. “With 
intensive negotiations and unfailing efforts by the union’s leader, government 
finally agreed to remain only a majority shareholder with the union members 
owning the rest” (Plange, 1986, pp. 21-22).  
ATS is a joint venture operation between the Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji 
which holds 51 per cent of the shares and the workers who hold 49 per cent. The 
company was formed to take over the catering and ground handling services at 
Nadi International Airport when QANTAS decided to withdraw from providing 
these services (Hince, 1996, p.33). 
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Vatukoula Goldmine 
 
What marred the achievements of the union movement in the period after 
independence was the demise of unionism in the goldmining industry at 
Vatukoula. Vatukoula was a specific example of the failure of unionism outside 
the main urban areas. This was the most noticeable failure in the union movement 
in the post independence period. 
 
The initial problem of the mineworkers union was in finding a sincere and 
dedicated leader. Sakeasi Waqanivavalagi seemed to have been the first 
responsible leader they had but since he was not a mineworker he did not have 
first hand knowledge of their problems. Waqanivavalagi, who became an Alliance 
parliamentarian in 1972, however, was not the usual trade union leader. Before his 
appointment the mineworkers’ union appeared to be in disarray with yet another 
of its secretaries charged with embezzlement. At the invitation of the 
mineworkers’ union executive, the colonial administration intervened, suggesting 
Waqanivavalagi as successor to the secretary.  
 
Waqanivavalagi who became the mineworkers’ union secretary in 1962 was an 
outsider, who was “unfamiliar with the harsh demands of [the mineworkers’] 
trade”.  He had been taught “the principles of ‘responsible’ trade unionism at 
Oxford and Harvard” (Emberson-Bain, 1994, 185). Apisai Tora, the other union 
man who was in Parliament representing the NFP opposition, was a contrast to 
Waqanivavalagi.  
 
Labour department gave fellowships for selected union members to undertake 
courses in labour economics and labour studies abroad. Waqanivavalagi had 
undertaken study abroad under such a fellowship. When he became the 
Mineworkers Union secretary, he encouraged the Joint Consultative Council 
which was accepted as a forum for Emperor Gold Mines and the Fiji Mineworkers 
Union. It is claimed that Waqanivavalagi “turned labour management relations at 
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the goldmines into a model, even if temporarily, for the country” (Plange, 1986, 
p.19). Ironically, the living standards for workers at the mine remained far below 
what was acceptable, as Emberson-Bain noted three decades later. More 
importantly, the mineworkers did not share the view that relations between labour 
and management at the goldmine was a model for the country, as is evident from 
their desire to get rid of Waqanivavalagi. 
 
When R.D. Patel called for nationalization of the gold mine in 1967 
Waqanivavalagi failed to support his call. Patel even criticized the perks and the 
luxurious lifestyle enjoyed by the expatriate officers at the mine (Legislative 
Council Debates, 1 September, 1967, p.593). This should have been the signal for 
Waqanivavalagi to expose the shocking living conditions of the mineworkers.  
Patel might not have been quite aware of the poor living conditions of the 
mineworkers. Most of them were Fijians and the Indian leaders at that time had 
very limited contact with Fijians. The opportunity was not taken by 
Waqanivavalagi to highlight the contrast in the facilities given to the indigenous 
mineworkers and their families and their expatriate bosses. 
 
Waqanivavalagi, as an Alliance Member of the Legislative Council was in a good 
position to highlight this sorry state of affairs at the gold mine and persuade the 
government, which was a partly elected government, to take remedial action. The 
opposition also would have been supportive of any such move as at that time it 
supported government policies which were in the interest of the nation. 
Waqanivavalagi was short-sighted in thinking that the grants from the government 
given to the company would solve the problem of the mineworkers whom he 
represented by expanding employment opportunities. 
 
He did not try to improve the living conditions of the workers and his only interest 
seemed to have been getting more money from the government. It was when there 
was a request for more aid to the gold industry in 1967 that R.D. Patel first 
advocated nationalization of the goldmine (Legislative Council Debates, 1 
 106
September, 1967, p.595). NFP opposed further aid but no one spoke in support of 
R. D. Patel’s call for nationalization (LC Debates, 1 September, 1967, pp.592-
611) at that time. Neither the government side which had a union official from 
Vatukoula, Sakiasi Waqanivavalagi, nor the opposition to which R. D. Patel 
belonged spoke in favour of such a move though a year later the NFP advocated 
such a policy. According to one scholar, “nationalisation of the gold-mining 
industry” was in the NFP’s manifesto for the August 1968 by-elections (Lal, 
1992, p.203).  
 
A few months after the by elections the NFP, through R. D. Patel, introduced a 
motion in the Legislative Council calling for the nationalization of the goldmine 
(Legislative Council Debates, 30 January, 1969, pp.151 - 163). A European 
member on the government side, in opposing nationalization, claimed that it was 
against the very notion of a ‘free’ society and it would spell doom for further 
overseas investment (Emberson-Bain, 1994, p.177). Emberson-Bain has claimed 
that nationalisation of the goldmine “had crystallized into a central issue” in the 
party’s “electoral platform” (Emberson-Bain, 1994, ?). But A.D. Patel died in 
October 1969 before the next general elections which was in 1972 and Vatukoula 
did not feature in it at all. Siddiq Koya, who had become the NFP leader after 
Patel’s death, himself admitted that the only thing the party advocated in the 1972 
general elections was free education (see Chapter 3). 
 
In introducing the motion calling for the nationalization of the Vatukoula 
goldmine, R.D. Patel said he was doing it “in the interest of national economy” 
and “in the best interests of our country”  (Legislative Council Debates, 30 
January, 1969, p.152). He further said nationalization of the goldmine was not 
“for the benefit of any particular race, any particular party, any particular group of 
people but for the whole state of Fiji” (Legislative Council Debates, 30 January, 
1969, p.153). 
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A. D. Patel might have wanted to make the goldmine a major policy platform. It 
would have been logical to do so, for by then the NFP under Patel was about to 
achieve the two major issues it had been fighting for – the end of colonialism and 
exploitation, mainly by the CSR Company. So Vatukoula would have given him a 
new issue to fight for and it would have also brought the party the Fijian support 
that Patel had been seeking, to make it a multiracial party not only in name but in 
reality. But he did not live to see it happen and the new leader of the party, Siddiq 
Koya, did not seem to have been interested in the mineworkers’ welfare. Perhaps 
this was the earliest indication that the NFP under its new leader was fast 
changing from what it originally was to an ethnic opposition. 
 
Dissatisfaction at Waqanivavalagi’s leadership as the secretary of the 
mineworkers’ union culminated in the nomination of Apisai Tora, a member of 
the NFP, for the position. Tora, however, did not become the secretary of the 
union as his nomination was invalidated in 1967 because the Trade Union 
Ordinance prohibited any person from holding office in more than one union 
(Emberson-Bain, 1994, p.186). Navitalai Raqona, a young underground miner, 
was later elected as the secretary.  
 
In 1978, for the first time, the mineworkers pressed the case for nationalization. 
“And for a while, the possibility of a government purchase of the mine was 
seriously entertained” (Emberson-Bain, 1994, p.205). In January 1978, the Prime 
Minister visited Vatukloula and “announced the Government’s decision to enter 
into negotiations with Emperor with a view of acquiring Emperor’s operations in 
Fiji” (Parliamentary Debates, 24 February, 1978, p.95).  
 
The Prime Minister asked Attorney General, Vijay Singh, to begin work on behalf 
of the government. Vijay Singh asked the Minister for Labour, the Minister of 
State for Lands and Mineral Resources and the Minister of State for Forests to 
join him in discussions with Emperor. Help was also provided by Commonwealth 
Technical Fund while other experts provided reports. Vijay Singh told Parliament 
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that the last report was expected from Canadian experts after which a decision was 
to be made.  So there was a “delay as compared to the hopes that had been 
expressed by the Prime Minister in early January when he visited Vatukoula”, 
Singh said (Parliamentary Debates, 24 February, 1978, p.96).  Ratu Mara later 
noted that “negotiations ultimately broke down on price, when the gap between 
the sides was too great to be bridged” (Mara, 1997, p.140).   
 
In 1972 the sugar industry was nationalised, putting an end to the exploitation by 
the Australian CSR company. The sugar cane farmers were fortunate to have had 
dedicated leaders like Swami Rudrananda and A.D. Patel to highlight their plight 
and fight for their redress. Unfortunately the mineworkers did not have such 
leaders to fight on their behalf. 
  
“Losing the battle for nationalization was another mark of the union’s failure”, 
one scholar noted (Emberson-Bain, 1994, p. 205). It is also not clear if this failure 
had anything to do with the opposition in the Alliance party (by mainly its 
European members) to nationalization. In 1970 when the decision was made to 
nationalize the sugar industry Ratu Mara had the Fijians solidly behind him in 
everything he did and the Indian community wanted the CSR to leave so he was 
not worried about the reaction of the European community to his actions.  
 
By the mid-1970s he no longer enjoyed this solid support of the nation so he had 
to be more sensitive to criticism from all quarters. Besides he no longer had the 
support even of the NFP to nationalising the gold industry though initially it was 
the NFP, as a ‘thoughtful’ opposition which had suggested such a move in the late 
1960s for the good of the country.  
 
Another reason for the government’s reluctance to nationalize the goldmine could 
have been the negative publicity that its union officials generated. Navitalai 
Raqona, who succeeded Waqanivavalagi as the Mineworkers Union secretary, 
was a contrast to the latter not only because the former was a mineworker and had 
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first hand knowledge of the problems.  He was also very militant as a trade 
unionist, but by his flippancy, he mainly succeeded in making the union a 
laughing stock and soon people stopped taking him seriously. Hince noted: “In 
1977 the excuse of a specific strike of mineworkers was utilized by the company 
to refuse to re-employ active unionists” (Hince, 1990, p.5).  
The union failed to convince the government to take over the mine and the 
opposition NFP which had earlier suggested the takeover also showed no interest 
in the mineworkers.  Later it is claimed that “Government colluded with the 
employer to remove Navitalai Raqona, secretary of the union during the period of 
militancy, from office and ultimately deregister the union” (Hince, 1996,  p. 5).      
 
Almost a decade after nationalising the sugar industry, in 1981 ATS was 
established to take over ground handling at Nadi Airport from Qantas. If the 
creation of FSC only resulted in getting expatriate exploiters replaced by local 
ones as has been suggested (see Chapter 5), ATS was a “multidimensional” 
success story (Hince, 1996, p.33) which was made possible by its union leaders 
refusing to politicize the union and concentrating on important issues that affected 
the workers. Rather than following the example of ATS, the advisers of the 
workers at Vatukoula in the 1980s decided to make it part of party politics of the 
FLP. They also failed to learn from the example of A.D. Patel, who in 1969, 
agreed to Ratu Mara’s suggestion of making sugar a bi-partisan (non-political) 
issue and succeeded in his efforts to get a better deal for the cane farmers (see 
Chapter 5).The supporters of the mineworkers, perhaps would have had better 
success if they had merely highlighted the problems rather than trying to turn 
them into party politics.  
 
To sum up, in colonial Fiji though there was formal recognition given to trade 
unionism by giving workers the freedom to form unions, there was no legal 
framework for the compulsory recognition of unions. This came only after 
independence as both the major political parties were sympathetic towards the 
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workers. What the leaders of the two major parties abhorred most was the 
exploitation of the workers especially by the European vested interests. The NFP 
which started as a party of the ‘have-nots’, however, started changing later as it 
started concentrating on mainly issues that affected the Indians. Later it became a 
party of the Indian capitalists.  
Meanwhile the Alliance Party which started as a party of the capitalists in the 
country became more pro-worker. This change in the Alliance Party (during its 
17-year rule of the country) contributed towards improvements in the lives of the 
workers in the 1970s which led to the formation of a ‘labour aristocracy’ in the 
urban areas. The ‘labour aristocracy’ politicised the union movement in the 1980s. 
Moreover, with the NFP no longer championing issues that affected the workers 
and having any concrete policies which were different from that of the Alliance, 
the need for a strong opposition to protect the rights of the workers and to make 
the Westminster system work effectively became imperative. The expectation 
seemed to have been that the labour party that would emerge would become an 
effective opposition, as the NFP had been initially, before it was ready to rule the 
country. Robertson and Tamanisau have noted that in the 1980s the Alliance and 
NFP “policies varied little in substance” (1988, p.22). This, in effect, created the 
opportunity for the rise of the Fiji Labour Party in 1985. 
 
Unfortunately the Fiji Labour Party did not become the opposition, ‘thoughtful’ or 
otherwise, while it became reduced to a predominantly ethnic Indian party by 
forming a coalition with the almost exclusively Indian NFP (see Chapter 6). This 
resulted in many of the ethnic Fijians who had supported the formation of the FLP 
withdrawing their support for the new party. So the major gains that the union 
movement had made (positive developments in the union movement) in the 1970s 
(such as developing without racial barriers and improving the working and living 
conditions of the majority of the people in the country) were all lost in 1987 
following the military coup that overthrew the democratically elected labour party 
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led coalition government which many perceived as Indian dominated rather than 
multiracial. 
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                                                CHAPTER 5 
                                            SUGAR POLITICS 
 
Sugar was the backbone of the Fiji economy throughout the twentieth century. 
This chapter outlines how sugar became an important political issue after 
independence with Indo-Fijian politicians trying to manipulate the sugarcane 
farmers for their own political ends. This turned the NFP, which was multiracial 
in its policies, to an ethnic Indian party.  
 
The Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR) which operated the sugar mills in 
the colony had a virtual monopoly over the industry and prospered from the hard 
work of the farmers (almost all of them Indians). The indenture system had come 
to an end in 1920 but the farmers continued to suffer under the CSR. At the least 
sign of any policy aimed at improving the lot of the farmers the CSR would 
threaten to withdraw its operations and the colonial government would make 
concessions and beg the company to stay on with the result that the sufferings of 
the farmers continued. 
 
The situation changed drastically when Fiji became self governing in 1966. In 
1969 the Chief Minister Ratu Mara and the Leader of the Opposition A.D. Patel 
decided to make sugar a bipartisan issue.  This was mainly because Ratu Mara 
wanted sugar to be non-political and not “made a political football” (Legislative 
Council Debates, 23 April, 1969, p. 543).  Later the same year during an 
arbitration, the arbitrator, Lord Denning, ruled that the farmers should get 65 per 
cent of the profits and the company 35 per cent. CSR as expected said it could not 
operate under such terms. Ratu Mara was supportive of the idea of “acquiring the 
industry for the nation” ( Mara, 1997, p.161) and the Fiji Sugar Corporation (FSC) 
was established in 1972 to take over the operations from the CSR. 
 
A.D. Patel, the founder-leader of the National Federation Party, was a lawyer and 
had been fighting the farmers’ cause for several years. His greatest achievement 
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was getting a fair deal for the farmers through the Denning Award in 1969. 
Unfortunately he did not live to see the result of his long struggle. He died in 
October 1969 just before Denning made his historic award which gave the farmers 
a fair price for their sugarcane.  
 
Siddiq Koya who succeeded Patel as the leader of the NFP as well as the Leader 
of the Opposition was also a lawyer. But from the beginning he showed a lack of 
commitment and dedication to his position, giving priority to his law practice. 
This was evident from his frequent absences from Parliament even during 
important sittings. He also made sugar into a ‘political football’ soon after the 
country became independent, ignoring Ratu Mara’s timely warning against such a 
move.    
  
When Koya became the Opposition Leader in 1969, he initially co-operated with 
Ratu Mara and both parties made concessions which saw a rapid transition to 
independence. When the NFP agreed not to press for the immediate introduction 
of a common electoral roll, the Alliance agreed to immediate independence. The 
NFP also agreed to special provisions to safeguard indigenous Fijians rights, 
especially their land rights. They also gave recognition to the importance of the 
Great Council of Chiefs to ethnic Fijians by giving it the right to appoint senators 
with veto powers when it came to matters affecting Fijian traditions and culture. 
Everyone seemed to have been taken aback by the change in Koya who until then 
had been most aggressive but now “assumed a conciliatory stance” (Norton, 2004, 
p.176). 
 
It was further noted that the “close rapport Koya developed with Mara, despite 
previous mutual aloofness, was the foundation of an extraordinary smooth and 
rapid transition to Independence” (Norton, 2004, p.177). Even Governor Foster, 
who had earlier described Koya as “full of intrigue and calculation …a wheeler-
dealer if ever there was one” seemed to have been impressed, noting that he 
(Koya) “never shared Patel’s main fault as politician; a complete inability to 
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compromise” (quoted in Norton, 2004, p.177). 
 
A note of warning was, however, sounded by the Australian High Commissioner 
who stressed that “the tensions of 1968 are but a short memory away and our 
private conversations with Fijians reveal a persistent undercurrent of suspicion as 
to the motives of the Indians” (quoted in Norton, 2004, p.179).  One scholar, 
Robert Norton, thought that perhaps Koya’s fervent commitment to independence 
was “encouraged partly by the prospect of post-Independence power-sharing” 
(Norton, 2004, p.179).  
 
At the time of independence, everyone found this sudden change in Koya difficult 
to understand. Norton’s conclusion that perhaps it was because Koya had hopes of 
sharing power after independence was true to some extent but he did not seem to 
have wanted to be in government. He had been in politics long enough to 
understand that Fijians would not accept an Indian-dominated government and 
rather than becoming a minister in a coalition government, which would have 
necessitated his giving up his law practice, he seemed to have wanted to continue 
as the Leader of the Opposition by winning more support from the Indian voters. 
So he tried to appeal only to the Indians, unlike Patel who had a national outlook 
and looked at what was good for the country as a whole. Besides Patel wanted to 
integrate all the different ethnic groups which Koya did not seem to have been 
interested in. That is where sugar politics came in.  
 
It is true that sugar cane farmers’ cause formed a central issue for Patel also but 
the difference was that he was trying to stop the exploitation of farmers by the 
CSR and help them in their struggle for a fair deal. The farmers got a fair deal 
through the Denning Award leading to the withdrawal of the CSR. So the major 
problem facing the farmers after independence was security of tenure and for this 
it was necessary to proceed carefully so that the Fijian landlords would feel no 
threat to their ownership by leasing their land. By politicizing sugar Koya 
contributed to conflicts. 
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In his early years as Leader of the Opposition, Koya supported Ratu Mara’s 
efforts to improve the social and economic welfare of the people of the country. 
But Koya was not consistent as Patel was and he also lacked the foresight of Patel 
which led to problems. At the time of independence Koya seemed to have been 
leading a ‘thoughtful’ Opposition as Patel had done. Soon it became clear that his 
lack of consistency was affecting the performance of the Opposition. This first 
came to the surface in 1972 during the first general elections after independence in 
1970. 
 
Patel had assured that ownership of any land would not be questioned and Koya 
had also repeated Patel’s assurance. Ratu Mara later said that it was this assurance 
that made the Fijian leaders agree to independence. But in 1972, during the first 
general elections after independence, Koya made the freehold land owned by 
CSR, an election issue. The government had decided to turn this land into crown 
land when the company withdrew its operations. Koya told farmers at election 
meetings that the NFP would arrange to sell that land to sitting tenants.  
 
After the elections Ratu Joshua Tonganivalu, the Minister for Lands, pointed out 
how dangerous the line the Opposition was taking was as it would lead to 
demands by many original landowners who had sold their land to European 
settlers before cession for next to nothing. They would start claiming back their 
lands, Ratu Joshua warned (Parliamentary Debates, 12 November, 1972, p.1438). 
The suggestion of the sale of CSR land to sitting tenants rather than it becoming 
Crown land as the government had decided was an early example of the 
Opposition becoming less “thoughtful”, because they failed to realize the 
repercussions this policy would have, if implemented. It was like stirring up a 
hornet’s nest, as Ratu Joshua had warned. 
 
The farmers had been divided from the beginning because of the divisions in the 
Indian community itself. By the 1960s, however, most of them had started 
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supporting A.D. Patel because of his brilliance as a lawyer and years of selfless 
service to the farmers with Swami Rudrananda (a Hindu monk, popularly known 
as Swamiji),25 who had been working for the betterment of the farmers from the 
1940s. (Swamiji had come to Fiji from India in 1938 to help with the activities of 
the TISI Sangam, the South Indian cultural organization.) After the Denning 
Award, though Patel died, Swamiji continued to serve the sugarcane growers. 
 
Koya had started showing his lack of consistency from 1972 onwards. But it was 
when the sugar industry was being reorganized in the mid-1970s after the 
withdrawal of the CSR that things came to a head. After the takeover of the sugar 
industry from the CSR when new arrangements were being made in the industry a 
Sugarcane Growers’ Council was set up. Koya wanted to be a paid official in this 
Council. Koya’s plans to become a paid official in the restructured Sugarcane 
Growers’ Council were mainly to strengthen his control over the sugarcane 
farmers whom he valued as voters. Later Koya was more interested in 
reorganizing the sugar industry than in his duties as the Leader of the Opposition. 
This reorganization was, however, seen as a big financial burden on the farmers 
(Robertson and Tamanisau, 1988, p. 22).  
 
Koya started organizing meetings with the farmers and confusing them because he 
disagreed with the advice Swami Rudrananda was giving them. In doing that he 
was politicizing sugar and it led to a split in the NFP. Koya was not only not 
acting in the interests of the nation but he was also not acting in the best interests 
of the Indian community the majority of whom were sugarcane farmers who 
supported the NFP. Later he attacked the $2.50 deduction from every tonne of 
cane for the price stabilization fund.  
 
After independence Ratu Mara was able to negotiate a much higher price for Fiji 
sugar than the world market price through the European Union (see Mara, 1997, 
pp.164-166). He had agreed to the deduction from the price of every tonne of cane 
                                                 
25 Swami is a title given to a Hindu monk. ‘ji’ is an Indian suffix showing respect. 
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for the price stabilization fund as an insurance against a fall in the world market 
price for sugar. Koya, who had gone with Ratu Mara on his overseas tour, had 
initially agreed to the deduction but changed his mind on his return to Fiji (Mara, 
1997, p.138).  
 
The sugarcane growers were wary of the deduction because many of them had lost 
money from a similar deduction when their leases expired (Ramrakha, 2005, 
personal communication). But that was in the colonial days under the CSR. Rather 
than explaining the changed situation to the reluctant farmers Koya played on 
their fears. Swamiji, who was the Senior Representative of the Sugarcane 
Growers, had supported the deduction but Koya started attacking it.  
 
Swamiji had organized meetings to educate the farmers of the new developments 
in the sugar industry while Koya organized rival meetings. Swamiji had given free 
service to the farmers for years and with his right hand man, A.D. Patel, he had 
achieved a lot for the benefit of the farmers. Swamiji and Ian Thompson, the 
Independent Chairman of the Sugar Industry, had brought unity among the 
farmers after independence. A leading member of the NFP, R.D. Patel, accused 
Koya of breaking that unity (Parliamentary Debates, 2 October, 1975, p.1042).  
 
With A.D. Patel no more, Swami Rudrananda, faced a dilemma. The only person 
he could now rely on to give him sound legal advice was A.D. Patel’s brother, 
R.D. Patel, who was then the Speaker of the House of Representatives. So 
Swamiji requested R.D. Patel to attend a farmers’ meeting with him and Patel 
obliged. Patel also issued a pamphlet in Hindi which was an appeal to the farmers. 
Patel explained to the House of Representatives later that he did this because he 
could see that the “beneficial situation we have created for the farmers, the Sugar 
Industry and Fiji, after years of struggle and perseverance, will be destroyed at the 
hands of some people” (Parliamentary Debates, 2 October, 1975, p.1042). 
 
Soon there was a split in the NFP, the first signal of which was the resignation of 
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R.D. Patel from the party in 1975. By taking an active part at the farmers’ meeting 
R. D. Patel knew he had compromised his position as the Speaker. So Patel 
decided to resign from not only his position as the Speaker, but also his seat in 
Parliament to which he had been elected on an NFP ticket. He decided to resign 
from the NFP since he no longer agreed with the policies advocated by its leader, 
Koya. As he made his speech from the Chair, two NFP members, Chirag Ali Shah 
and Vijay Parmanandam, kept interjecting, giving a clear indication that there was 
a split in the NFP, with some staunchly supporting Koya, while Patel (and perhaps 
some others) opposed what Koya was doing in the sugar industry.  A few days 
later when Sakeasi Butadroka introduced his notorious motion in Parliament 
calling for the repatriation of Indians from Fiji the transition of the Koya-led 
opposition from a ‘thoughtful’ to a ‘confrontational’ opposition was complete 
(more on this in Chapter 6). 
 
The division in the NFP became clearer and wider a year later during the debate 
on Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (ALTO) which granted 30 year 
leases to farmers.  Koya rejected it as not being long enough, while the group 
opposed to Koya decided to vote with the government, to enable it to be passed,26 
considering it an improvement on the existing 10 year leases. Laisenia Qarase 
who tried to promote 50 year leases under the Native Land Trust Act (NLTA), has 
commented that the 1976 Act was a political compromise between the ruling 
Alliance and the Opposition NFP with the intention of buying “a generation of 
time” (fijilive, 2 December, 2005). While Koya continued with his confrontational 
approach, those opposed to him believed in co-operating with the Fijian leaders 
and coming to a compromise for the benefit of the people (especially the 
sugarcane farmers) and the country.  
 
The division within the NFP, although it became open in 1976 when, in 
Parliament, several members of the Opposition voted with the government to pass 
ALTO, was patched up by the time the general elections were held a few months 
                                                 
26 ALTO needed a two-thirds majority to be passed. 
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later, in April 1977. The NFP was able, not only to patch up the differences, but  
was also to attract most Indian votes by attacking the USP quota system for Fijian 
students, leading to the Indian voters becoming a unified voting block under the 
NFP banner (see Chapter 3).  
 
The first general elections of 1977 provided ample proof of the Koya-led NFP’s 
lack of foresight. There were claims that the NFP and the Fijian Nationalist Party 
(FNP) “were actually colluding in various strategies of mutual support” against 
the Alliance Party (Alley, 1977, p.288). The Fiji Times noted in an editorial on 4 
April, 1977 that an “unusual feature of the election was the curious political 
marriage” between the FNP and NFP in some constituencies, while Ratu Mara 
claimed that, in spite of Butadroka’s denial, they (the NFP and FNP) had been 
travelling around and working together (Fiji Times, 5 April, 1977, p.3).     
 
This was surprising as the elections took place less than two years after the FNP 
brought its motion calling for the repatriation of Indians from Fiji. As the Fiji 
Times noted: “It is hard to understand how a predominantly Indian political party 
such as the NFP can equivocate its principles or ideology by wheeling and dealing 
with a party which has made no secret of its attitude towards Indian citizens of 
this country” (4 April, 1977). In supporting the Fijian Nationalists against the 
Alliance Party the NFP showed lack of foresight as they seemed to support 
anyone against Ratu Mara whatever their policies. 
 
With the split in the Fijian votes caused by the FNP led by Sakeasi Butadroka, and 
increased support from the Indian voters because of the USP quota system, the 
NFP emerged as the narrow winner in the elections, though they did not have an 
absolute majority. The Fijian Nationalists were happy with this result “because it 
was  their purpose in participating in the elections to demonstrate that Fijian 
paramountcy was an Alliance-created illusion, that the Indians were likely, sooner 
or later, to take political control of the country (thereby endangering Fijian 
rights)” (Premdas, 1993, p.20). 
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But because of the continuing divisions within the NFP, Koya was not able to 
claim immediate victory27 and be sworn in as the Prime Minister, with the result 
that the Governor General appointed a minority government led by Ratu Mara for 
a few months until the government fell by failing to win a vote of confidence.  
 
When the Governor General appointed a minority government led by Ratu Mara 
Koya accused Ratu Mara and the Alliance Party of not wanting an Indian Prime 
Minister in Fiji (V.Lal, 1990, p.58). Koya further said that their decision was an 
“insult to the Indian community and its self-respect” but Ramrakha, who used to 
be the Opposition Whip, dissociated himself from these allegations saying that 
they were extreme and lacked wisdom. This showed that some members of the 
opposition remained ‘thoughtful’ unlike Koya who had turned ‘confrontational’.  
Moreover, he had reduced the NFP to an ethnic party. 
 
If Butadroka was guilty of stirring up Fijian nationalism, Koya was equally guilty 
of whipping up Indian communalism which affected Ratu Mara’s efforts of 
building a harmonious multiracial nation.  
 
After the fall of the minority government in 1977 a second general election was 
held later in the year  but by then the NFP could no longer hide its internal 
problems and split into two factions, the Flower and the Dove, named after the 
symbols they chose for the elections. The Dove faction led by Koya won very few 
seats and the Flower faction became the official opposition. Mrs Jai Narayan who 
had been providing leadership to the Flower faction as the President of the NFP 
made Jai Ram Reddy the Leader of the Opposition. Reddy had stood against Koya 
in the election and defeated him, though he was a new comer in Parliament. K. C. 
Ramrakha, the Secretary of the NFP, who was the other leading member of the 
Flower faction, had suggested making Ratu Julian Toganivalu the Leader of the 
                                                 
27 The NFP were also hesitant to assume power (which would have led to a loss of ethnic balance) 
asking Ratu Mara to lead a coalition government instead which he refused (see V. Lal, 1990, p.58). 
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Opposition and when his advice was not taken Ramrakha distanced himself from 
the party. Though he served his full term in Parliament before migrating to 
Australia in 1982, Ramrakha kept aloof from the party of which he had been a 
leading member for several years. This showed that Ramrakha considered the 
development as a major setback for the party. Here was an opportunity to shed its 
image as an Indian party and attract more Fijian support but the NFP did not seize 
the opportunity.  
   
The FNP managed to win one seat in the first general elections in 1977, that of its 
leader, Sakeasi Butadroka, who stood for the Fijian communal seat in his home 
province of Rewa. The party had a lot of grassroots Fijian support, as was evident 
from its performance in the general elections, securing one Fijian communal seat 
and winning a large proportion of Fijian votes in other constituencies. Most 
Fijians seemed to agree with its policies of maintaining Fijian hegemony and 
curtailing the Indian advance in most spheres of life. But in the second general 
elections a few months later, most Fijian voters withdrew their electoral support 
for the party for fear that NFP might win again by default. With the NFP in 
disarray and the Fijians giving their electoral support once again to the Alliance, 
the Alliance was able to win comfortably in the second general elections in 1977. 
This did not, however, mean that the Fijians no longer supported the policies of 
the FNP which remained dormant but intact (see Lasaqa, 1984, p.188). 
 
If the FNP was an ethnic party, the NFP had also started slowly becoming another 
ethnic party. The difference between the two major parties during Patel’s time had 
been policy-based. The NFP had followed policies to improve the lot of the 
people who were being exploited, without racial distinction. They were also 
against colonialism. It was perhaps this ideology that attracted Fijians like Ratu 
Julian Toganivalu to the party. The Alliance Party represented the European 
businesses, the Fijian chiefs and upwardly mobile Indians and it believed in a 
slow change while preserving the unique features of each of the ethnic groups 
with communal representation. Ramrakha, a leading member of the NFP, claimed 
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in the Legislative Council in 1969 that the NFP represented the have-nots of the 
country while the Alliance represented the "have-goods" (LC Debates, 12 May, 
1969, p.1075).  
 
It was true that the NFP under Patel sometimes appealed to the ethnic loyalties of 
the Indians28 such as their condemnation of those Indians who sided with the 
Alliance Party, describing them as ‘traitors’. Their attack, however, was based on 
ideological differences rather than on ethnicity alone. What the NFP leadership 
found unacceptable was that Indians like Vijay Singh and K. S. Reddy were 
siding with a party that was supported by the colonials, while the majority of 
Indians were suffering under colonial rule. What Patel failed to understand was 
that the Indian Alliance was trying to co-operate with Fijian leaders, who were the 
paramount chiefs, rather than with the colonial government. Patel mistakenly 
thought the Fijian commoners did not want the chiefs to continue as leaders. Even 
if he was incredibly naïve in doing so, Patel must be given  credit for thinking in  
terms of the nation and what he saw as the national good rather than just the 
Indians and what would benefit the Indians alone.   
 
The NFP under Patel was an effective Opposition, acting as the watchdog, 
keeping the government under constant scrutiny. The NFP continued to be a 
strong and effective Opposition for a few years after Patel’s death. At the last 
session of Parliament in 1969, Ratu Mara remarked: “Criticism from the other 
side has been marked for its constructiveness” (Legislative Council Debates, 
December, 1969, pp.2083-2084). Again in 1970 the Prime Minister talked of the 
“spirit of co-operation in this House” and suggested that it might “underline the 
role of leadership” (Parliamentary Debates, 14 December, 1970, p.533).  
 
                                                 
28 Patel also made racist remarks about the Chinese in 1968 before he led the walk-out of the NFP 
from the Legislative Council protesting against communal rolls (see Firth and Tarte (eds), 2001, 
p.97. Twentieth Century Fiji. University of the South Pacific).    
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It is true that when Koya became the Leader of the Opposition he failed to provide 
effective leadership and was often away from the Parliament. However, the other 
NFP parliamentarians like R.D. Patel, Ramrakha and Mrs. Narayan continued to 
use Parliament to make the government change its policies when they were found 
to be blatantly discriminatory. An example was the remission of fees for indigent 
children when the government decided to provide fee remission only for Fijian 
students (see Chapter 3).  
 
Koya was only interested in his personal power rather than serving the people, 
which was clearly shown in 1973 when Ratu Mara offered a government of 
national unity. Koya’s main concern then was what would happen to his position 
as the Leader of the Opposition (Milne, 1975, p.418). Koya did not want to lose 
his position as the Leader of the Opposition. He did not want to be a cabinet 
minister as that would have necessitated his giving up his law practice. Later 
Koya again refused to co-operate with the government on land policies which led 
to the split in the NFP.  
 
While Ratu Mara was working to change the plural society into an integrated 
nation, Koya was trying to strengthen ethnic cleavages, particularly through his 
policies in education, land and politics. The pity was that hardly anyone noticed 
what was happening, so initially no one in the opposition seemed to have objected 
to the policies that he put forward, pointing out that for achieving integration the 
priority should be policies like nationalization of the goldmine (which Patel had in 
mind) and not free education. No one seemed to have understood how the policies 
he was advocating would adversely affect multiracialism and lead to ethnic 
polarization. 
 
So when there was a split in the NFP, most, including senior members of the 
party, saw it as a clash of personalities rather than a clash resulting from the 
differences in policies. K. N. Rao, who was elected to Parliament in 1977, said 
that he had been asked by people throughout the country what the differences 
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were between the leaders and all he could say was that he did not know (Fiji 
Times, 24 June, 1977). The only leading member of the party who noticed the 
change in policy and remarked on it was R.D. Patel who resigned from the NFP in 
1975, complaining that the NFP under Koya had changed beyond recognition (Fiji 
Times, 11 October, 1975).  
 
Then in 1976 when the party split in Parliament over ALTO, the difference was 
not so much in what they wanted, but more in the approach taken by the two 
factions (who both wanted security of tenure for the sugarcane farmers).  The 
group opposing Koya believed in co-operating with the government on policies 
which were for the good of the people, while Koya became confrontational.  
 
With independence, the NFP's two primary targets vanished overnight, with the 
withdrawal of the colonial government and the CSR from the scene. Exploitation 
by another Australian company, the Emperor Gold Mining Company in 
Vatukoula, was still going on and Patel was just coming to grips with this issue 
and formulating his policy when he died. After Patel’s death the NFP was not 
interested in helping the exploited mineworkers, the majority of whom were 
ethnic Fijians. The party started to concentrate only on issues that affected the 
Indians, such as sugar. Not everyone in the party agreed with this change in policy 
so it became fragmented. Therefore it failed to continue as the effective and strong 
Opposition that it once was.    
 
Although at the time of independence Koya appeared very conciliatory he started 
showing his true colours soon after. He indulged in personal attacks on people 
inside and outside Parliament. This was in sharp contrast to Patel who attacked 
policies rather than people. Koya had, in fact, shown a tendency for personal 
attacks during Patel’s time when he attacked doctors and nurses at Lautoka 
Hospital, but Patel was able to arrest it (LC Debates, 1965). He had also attacked 
and ridiculed Andrew Deoki, another Indian member in the Legislative Council 
(21 July, 1966, pp.612-613). A few months before that the Colonial Secretary had 
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accused Koya of “pursuing a personal vendetta … in this House” (LC Debates, 10 
December, 1965, p.561).  
 
Now as the leader, rather than setting a high standard for other members to 
emulate, Koya gave free rein to his passion for personal attacks. After regularly 
attacking Len Usher, Charles Stinson, John Falvey, Vijay Singh and K. S. Reddy, 
Koya then turned to Ratu Mara. In the early years of independence Koya used to 
often praise the Prime Minister but from the mid 1970s he started attacking Ratu 
Mara and refused to co-operate with the Prime Minister even on important issues 
like the motion by Butadroka calling for the repatriation of  all Indians from Fiji 
(see  Chapter 6).  
 
Ratu Mara said in Parliament in 1977 that under the constitution he had to consult 
the opposition leader on a number of matters, but from 1974 Koya had not had the 
courtesy to acknowledge any of his letters. Koya interjected and asked about 
consultation on ALTO which was passed the previous year. Ratu Mara replied 
that Koya had not even consulted his own members on ALTO (Fiji Times, 1 June, 
1977). This clearly showed that Koya was not only missing many important 
sessions of Parliament (which was often pointed out by the government members) 
but he was failing to fulfil his duties as the Leader of the Opposition in other 
respects also. 
 
In many ways the 1972 general elections marked the turning point in independent 
Fiji’s political history, though hardly anyone seemed to have noticed the 
important changes taking place. This was because the elections did not have any 
drastic effect on the country as they returned Ratu Mara’s Alliance government 
with a comfortable majority. More importantly, multiracialism seemed to have 
been working in politics as about a quarter of the Indian voters had voted for the 
Alliance Party, although the Fijian support for the NFP remained negligible (only 
2 per cent). It was in the 1972 elections that Koya started playing sugar politics by 
promising the farmers that if the NFP came into power, the land that the CSR 
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owned would be sold as freehold to existing tenants when the company withdrew 
from the country. 
 
Leaders or a ‘gaggle of squabbling lawyers’?  
 
One major problem identified by Brij Lal as an important factor in the NFP's lack 
of effectiveness had been its “largely self-seeking leadership which [had] rested 
almost exclusively in the hands of 'a gaggle of squabbling lawyers' unwilling to 
sacrifice their flourishing legal practices to devote more attention to party matters" 
(1986, pp.92-93).  Steven Ratuva, a Fijian academic, described the NFP leaders as 
"professional lawyers with limited political vision and regressive ideologies" 
which were "politically myopic and racially parochial" (1993, p.59).  
 
There was a reason for Indian leadership resting mainly with lawyers until 
independence. Manilal, the first leader of the Indians in Fiji, was a lawyer who 
used law and the legal principle as a political weapon.  Those who succeeded 
Manilal, such as Badri Maharaj, Vishnu Deo, S. B. Patel and A. D. Patel, 
continued this tradition, started by Manilal, of inquiring into government records, 
making arguments on sound principles, and seeking specifications on Indians’ 
rights and status. This was in spite of the fact that Maharaj and Deo were not 
lawyers. They, however, used the formal equality of the Indians before the law as 
a leverage for improving their substantive position elsewhere. “Thus political 
work was always in large measure legal work” (Sanadhyay, 1991, pp. 206-207).        
 
Indians were given equal rights for the first time at independence through the 
1970 constitution so there was nothing more to fight for. But the tradition of 
having lawyers as leaders of the National Federation Party continued.  
Unfortunately, Patel’s successors did not “inquire into government records” or 
make “arguments on sound principles”.  Reddy, for example, accused the 
government in the 1980s of practising discrimination against the Indians without 
providing any concrete examples. This won him added electoral support from the 
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Indian community as they saw him as a fearless leader who championed their 
cause, but it did not promote ethnic harmony. 
 
As sugar remained the most important economic base of the new nation the Indian 
leaders in particular (because the majority of the farmers were still Indians) 
continued to play political football with it. Consequently the industry continued to 
face problems after independence. The new company (FSC) did very well initially 
and production and profits more than doubled by 1986. Swamiji had pointed out 
that in the CSR days Fiji produced only 140,000 tonnes of sugar but in 1983 the 
production was approaching 500,000 tonnes (Fiji Sugar, vol.8, no.1, March, 
1983). Others have also pointed out a similar trend (see Narsey, 1979, pp.136-
137;  Tarte. 2001). 
 
The lifestyle of the farmers improved considerably in the 1970s as they enjoyed a 
measure of prosperity. The agreement with the European Union which gave a 
guaranteed price for Fiji sugar was an important factor in its increased profits, and 
the Denning Award made sure the farmers got their fair share, but unfortunately 
the prosperity enjoyed by the farmers did not last. This was because there was 
renewed exploitation of farmers from the mid-1970s, leading to a slow decline in 
efficiency in the industry.  
 
Perhaps this was what made one scholar claim that “apart from periodic feuds 
with the CSR, over cane contracts and share of cane proceeds, these unions [in the 
sugar industry] did little to improve the conditions of the peasantry” (Naidu, 1987, 
p.218). This may have been true under the CSR during the colonial days when the 
unions had little success in improving the lives of the farmers but this was not true 
after Fiji became self-governing. Fiji got a very good price for its sugar through 
the European Union and the Denning Award, as mentioned earlier, ensured that 
the farmers got the major share.  
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Daryl Tarte has described how the quality of life of farmers changed radically: 
“Solid concrete homes replaced flimsy shacks. Tractors replaced horses and 
bullocks. Farmers acquired cars and television sets. They set up businesses and 
their children went to universities and entered the professions” (2001, p.133).  If 
they still had problems it was because the expatriate exploiters were perhaps 
replaced by those from their own midst as Wadan Narsey has suggested.  
 
Narsey noted that “our people who are in positions originally occupied by whites 
cannot expect the incomes and standards of living that whites previously expected 
and obtained only through the exploitation of our labourers and farmers. To do so 
would be merely to replace one class of exploiters by another class derived from 
our own ranks, but whose behaviour is identical and equally inexcusable” 
(Narsey, 1979, p.136).  
 
Unfortunately this is what seemed to have happened. Not only did the local staff 
continue to have the perquisites enjoyed by the expatriates whom they had 
replaced. There were greater problems too as the Indian politicians started 
exploiting the sugarcane growers.  This was because they wanted to have control 
over the farmers to retain the farmers’ electoral support. The reorganization in the 
sugar industry gave these politicians the opportunity to be involved in the Sugar 
Cane Growers’ Council. These politicians (from both the NFP and the Alliance) 
now stepped into positions which became paid positions with several other 
benefits, whereas until then Swamiji had given free service to the farmers. Sugar 
became a major political issue and the farmers and the industry itself suffered as a 
consequence. 
 
When the NFP became an ethnic party concentrating on promoting the concerns 
of the well off Indians rather than the poorer sections of society, sugar politics 
took a back seat at least temporarily in the 1980s. This unfortunately meant that 
the cane farmers were leaderless after the 1987 military coups until Mahendra 
Chaudhry revived the National Farmers’ Union which had been inactive. The 
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farmers now gave their allegiance to Chaudhry who had by then become the 
leader of the Fiji Labour Party.  
National Farmers’ Union had been established in 1979 with a constitution 
providing for rural labourer membership, but little happened until the military 
coups of 1987 (Hince, 1996, p.6). After 1987, the National Farmers’ Union 
became the power base of the Fiji Labour Party to the rude shock of the NFP in 
the 1992 general elections. In those elections almost half of the Indian communal 
seats were won by the FLP. This led to the formation of the Fiji Sugar Cane 
Growers’ Association (FSGA) backed by the NFP, in their effort to win back the 
farmers for their own political ends. Both the political parties had neglected them 
in the 1980s, but in the 1990s the politicians once again realized their importance 
as voters.  They once again became aware of the importance of sugarcane farmers 
for their electoral success. Rather than putting up a united front to fight for the 
rights of the Indian community, which had become second class citizens in the 
country after 1987, they revived sugar politics by establishing the FSGA in 
opposition to the NFU.   
 
Unions still play a very important role in the sugar industry and consequently in 
national politics. Narsey claims that rival unions are fostered on “ethnicist lines by 
the state in order to reduce the strength of farmers” (Narsey, 1990, p.102). This is 
not true at least in the sugar industry where more than the state, the Indian 
politicians are behind the divisions. The formation of the FSGA as a rival to the 
NFU proves this. The NFP leaders, who were dismayed by the electoral success 
of the FLP in the Indian communal seats in the 1992 general elections, were 
behind this division which they caused for their own electoral gain rather than for 
the benefit of the farmers (Naidu, 2001, p.181).     
 
Sugar politics continued to play an important role in Fiji’s national politics even 
after the 2000 crisis, as the NFU and the FSGA continued to be at loggerheads, 
one supporting the Fiji Labour Party and the other the NFP. But in 2005, after a 
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change in leadership in the NFP, the two predominantly Indian parties seemed to 
come to an understanding. For example, in the May 2006 general elections, NFP 
shared preferences with both the ruling SDL party and the multiracial FLP, unlike 
in the 2001 general elections29.  Hopefully this would put an end to sugar politics 
and may also help to eliminate ethnicity from politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 In the 2001 elections the NFP gave its first preferences to the SDL which enabled it to win 
narrowly and form the government (fijilive, 25 April, 2006). 
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                                              CHAPTER 6                                                                                             
                                           Ethnicity in Politics 
Fiji had its first party-based elections in 1966 and before that a membership 
system (see Chapter 1) as Britain started slowly handing over the reins of 
government to the local people. Decolonization had started in the Pacific in the 
1960s but Fiji became independent only towards the end of 1970, after her 
Polynesian neighbours, Western Samoa and Tonga, as well as phosphate-rich, tiny 
Nauru to the north had ceased to be under colonial rule/oversight. This was not 
due to any reluctance on the part of Britain to leave but because ethnic Fijians 
were wary of independence as they feared the consequences of the numerical 
supremacy of the immigrant Indians, once the colonial rulers left, ushering in 
democracy. 
 
Ratu George Cakobau, the highest ranking chief of Fiji in its rigid hierarchical 
chiefly system, who was later knighted and became the first local Governor 
General, put it bluntly: "Fijians don't want independence. The main reason is fear 
of domination by the Indian majority [who] don't adapt themselves easily enough 
to the country they've come to adopt as home" ( Turnbull, 1977, p.131). 
 
Ratu Mara, who became the first Prime Minister at independence and who stood 
for racial cooperation, acknowledged that Indians had made a contribution, and 
was willing to share power with Indian leaders, but even he was not sure of the 
future aims of the Indians: " ...if only they were satisfied with participation, not 
domination . . ." He explained that the Fijians resisted very strongly "the danger of 
being dominated by another race in a part of the world they call their own" 
(Turnbull, 1977, p.131). 
 
With an ethnic problem simmering in the background, most observers of the Fiji 
scene in the 1960s were unsure of the direction it would take and they saw the 
future of the country as bleak (see Mayer, 1963 and Coulter, 1967). Most writers 
agreed that the most important prerequisite for the survival of the nation as a 
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peaceful, multiracial one was enlightened and selfless leadership. One writer even 
warned that if the leaders of the major ethnic groups did not act with vision, and 
sacrifice and subordinate their narrow, sectarian interests to the interests of  the 
country as a whole, then Fiji might become “something like a Cyprus in the South 
Pacific” (Watters, 1969, p.269).  
 
When party politics emerged in the 1960s after the start of self-government, the 
system worked well initially, because the parties were divided on ideological lines 
and had clear policies. This proved the scaremongers wrong as it became clear 
that “the Federation leaders performed the Opposition role well” (Norton, 2004, 
p.165). With Patel’s death, however, the NFP no longer had a clear ideology and 
this affected the performance of the opposition.  
 
I begin this chapter by looking at the aims and policies of each of the main 
political parties from 1966 to 1987 and then describe how party politics over the 
years degenerated into ethnic politics, leading to ethnic tensions and the prospect 
of ethnic conflict.  I conclude by looking at the political scene today.                                            
 
The Alliance Party  
 
Fijians were given the franchise only in 1963 and the Fijian Association was 
revitalised for party politics in 1966 and became the base of the Alliance Party. 
Soon a conflict developed “between the established [Fijian] political leaders and a 
group of young [Fijian] men fresh from tertiary studies in England” ( Norton, 
1990, p.81). These men were mainly from non-chiefly families, although this 
group also had a few chiefs like Ratu Mosese Verasikete and Ratu David 
Toganivalu. Their outlook was aggressively racial in contrast to the moderate 
stand taken by the chiefly leaders. They urged the chiefs to strive for a "Fiji for 
the Fijians" (Norton, 1990, p.81 and Lal, 1997, p.232). 
 
The chiefs for the most part emerged as mediators. Ratu Mara, in particular, was 
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for multiracialism and equal rights for all the ethnic groups (with a general 
acceptance of Fijian hegemony based on the notion that they were first among 
equals), while most of the other chiefs, especially Ratu George Cakobau, were 
less responsive to Indian demands. Ratu George was for Fijian hegemony while in 
the Legislative Council he supported the policies for accommodating the interests 
of the other ethnic groups, especially the Indians. In a way Ratu George might 
have been contradicting himself but Norton believes he was making a symbolic 
stand for an audience of Fijians while in the Legislative Council making 
pragmatic concessions to non-Fijians (Norton, 1990, p.82).  
 
Under Ratu Mara’s leadership, the Fijian Association went into a coalition with 
those Indians who stood for moderation and cooperation with Fijian chiefly 
leaders. These Indians were mainly from the Kisan Sangh (a farmers' 
organization) and they formed the Indian Alliance, which became a constituent of 
the Alliance Party. The Fijian Association also joined with the General Electors' 
Association as well as the Rotuman Association, the Chinese Association, the 
Muslim Political Front and the Tongan Association to form the multiracial 
Alliance Party. All these associations were moderate in their outlook and wanted 
gradual change with communal representation continuing (Lal, 1997, p.208 and 
Norton, 1990, pp.85-86).  
Ratu Mara maintained that race was a fact of life in Fiji and as long as it remained 
so, communal representation was necessary. Until the population became 
integrated this system of election to the Legislative Council had to continue to 
ensure that all the communities were represented fairly. A.D. Patel, the National 
Federation Party leader, believed integration could only be achieved by having a 
common electoral roll but Fijians, Europeans and some Indians disagreed.  
Ratu Mara tried to bring about political integration through the multiracial 
political party, the Alliance, which was officially founded on 3 February 1966. 
Ratu Mara had claimed that the Alliance Party, was Fiji’s “first and perhaps only 
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genuine multiracial party” (1997, p.80). This is a justifiable claim based on 
election results. The Alliance might not have won an Indian communal seat but it 
attracted 25 per cent of Indian votes, in some constituencies even over 35 per cent 
(Lal, 1986, p.90), and had the support of most other ethnic groups in the country. 
No other political party so far has had this support from the greatest range of 
ethnic groups found in Fiji.  
By contrast, the NFP used to attract only about 2 per cent Fijian support 
throughout its history so far.  The Fiji Labour Party which was multiracial in 
composition and had (and still has) policies which appealed to all ethnic groups 
became reduced to an Indian party in 1987 because of its coalition with NFP. 
 
The Alliance Party was in power from 1966 (when Fiji became self - governing 
although the colonial government was still ultimately in control) until 1987 when 
it was defeated by a coalition between the National Federation Party and the Fiji 
Labour Party. During its rule of two decades the Alliance government provided 
good governance which resulted in all round progress and prosperity as marked by 
expansion in education, health services and housing. There were also 
developments in agriculture, tourism and other industries like fisheries and dairy 
with most of them experiencing  strong expansion and strengthening of the 
national economy.  
 
In 1980 Ratu Mara identified political stability as the most important factor for the 
great advance made in economic development during the first decade of 
independence (Fiji Ministry of Information , 1980, p.13).He believed that a 
coalition government or a government of national unity offered the best chance 
for maintaining stability as it gave all major interests a voice in the affairs of the 
country. He further believed that political problems could be better solved by 
cooperation between the political leaders rather than by confrontation. The leaders 
of the opposition, Koya (1969- 1977) and Reddy (1977 – 1983) did not seem to 
recognize the importance of cooperation as they turned down Ratu Mara’s offers 
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for a coalition government/a government of national unity. 
The Alliance and the Policy of Multiracialism  
 
The Alliance government offered ‘multiracialism’ as the way forward for the 
country. That the government’s policy of multiracialism was working was evident 
as early as 1977 when, after the narrow defeat of the Alliance Party in the first 
general elections, though there was rising anger in the Fijian mind, there was no 
threat of violence unlike in 1968 after the by-elections. In 1968 there was no 
threat to Fijian status quo as the by-elections were only for the Indian seats which 
were regained by the National Federation Party who had walked out of Parliament 
the previous year. But there was general agreement that Fiji was on the verge of 
ethnic conflict then and the chiefs saved the day. In 1977, the Fijian-dominated 
Alliance Party lost the elections narrowly to the Indian-dominated NFP because of 
the split in Fijian votes caused by the Fijian Nationalist Party. But the situation 
remained outwardly calm, though it could have been the calm before the storm 
which was perhaps astutely prevented by the Governor General (see Chapter 5). 
That ‘multiracialism’ was working was further demonstrated in 1987, after the 
Alliance defeat, when the Indian dominated coalition came into power.  Though 
the Fijians were clearly not happy with the turn of events, there was hardly any 
violent reaction. Even after the military coups there was little violence and the 
country was able to get back to a semblance of democracy soon after. Within the 
short period of twelve years, the country had a fully democratic government with 
an ethnic Indian as the Prime Minister. This was partly possible because of the 
strength of ‘multiracialism’ which had survived two coups and associated racism. 
 
From the mid-1970s, the Alliance government met with steady opposition from 
many fronts. This started with the Fijian Nationalists who were disgruntled with 
the multiracial policies of the government which they believed favoured the 
Indians and disadvantaged the Fijians. On the other hand, the Indian opposition 
leaders felt that the Indians were being unfairly treated by the preferential policies 
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in education for Fijians. These preferential policies were for raising the level of 
achievement of the Fijian students so that there was no disparity between the 
Fijian students and students of other ethnic groups but the opposition NFP started 
attacking these policies at election times as anti-Indian even though they had not 
attacked them in Parliament and had given their silent consent (see Chapter 3). 
 
In the 1980s the trade unionists also joined in the attack of the government when 
it introduced a wage freeze. These union leaders were, moreover, supported by 
several activists (local and expatriate) on the staff of the University of the South 
Pacific. With the encouragement of these academics the trade unions formally 
entered politics in 1985 by forming the Fiji Labour Party.  
 
At the same time the foreign media, especially the Australian journalists, started 
coming up with stories that claimed that the government was corrupt. The 
Opposition took up the cry during election campaigns rather than in Parliament 
but hardly any actual evidence was produced. Even when the government was 
buffeted from all directions, it continued to look after the interests of all the 
groups (see Premdas, 1986, p.115) and to hold free and fair elections (see Nandan, 
2000, p.13).  
 
It may be argued that the Alliance government was only discharging its 
constitutional responsibility.  But it must not be forgotten that Ratu Mara was first 
and foremost a Fijian chief and his main concern had always been ensuring Fijian 
rights as shown by the Wakaya letter30 in 1965 to which he was a signatory (Mara, 
1997, Appendix). He, however, realized that Fiji had to move with the times and 
follow democratic practices, not to be left behind in the modern world. 
 
The Fijian chiefly leadership had entrusted him with the difficult task of making 
Fiji part of the modern world and at the same time preserving Fijian rights. He 
                                                 
30 This letter was written by the leading Fijian chiefs, to the British government, after they had a 
meeting on Wakaya Island, emphasising that Fijian interests should be paramount 
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was the youngest and lowest in rank among the “Big Four” chiefs at independence 
but he was made the leader because he was seen as the only one who could 
successfully reconcile these seemingly contradictory demands. Further, this could 
only be achieved with Indian leaders accepting Fijian rights.  
 
A. D. Patel, the main Indian leader before independence, acknowledged Fijian 
paramountcy and gave his word that Fijian rights (especially land rights) would 
not be questioned. With Patel’s death in 1969, there was a change in the attitude 
of the Indian leaders. Ratu Mara held on to his commitment to give equal rights to 
all the citizens until 1987 when a predominantly Indian coalition came into power 
which over 90 per cent of the Fijians had rejected. 
 
The Alliance now became the Opposition, with Ratu Mara becoming the Leader 
of the Opposition. A month later the coalition government was overthrown in a 
military coup led by Sitiveni Rabuka. Soon the Alliance Party ceased to exist but 
during its 21 years of dominance, it achieved a great deal for the country. One of 
its major priorities was trying to bring the major races together and forming a 
distinct national identity which would lead to integration. If the Alliance 
government did not wholly succeed in its efforts in this, it was because it did not 
get the support of the Opposition NFP which had over the years become a 
‘confrontational’ opposition rather than the ‘thoughtful’ opposition it was under 
its founder leader, A.D. Patel. Patel died just before the country became 
independent and “the Indian Fijians never recovered from the death of their 
leader” (Nandan, 2000, p.136). 
 
National Federation Party  
 
Technically speaking, the first political party to be formed in Fiji was the 
Federation Party, although there were other political groupings earlier. It was born 
in the cane fields to fight for the rights of the sugarcane farmers. It was 
established in 1963 by the militant cane growers' associations headed by A. D. 
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Patel. Since it had its origin in the cane fields, and the major aim was to fight for 
the rights of the growers, it was predominantly Indian. Though its membership 
was open to all ethnic groups, it never attracted much Fijian support or the support 
of any other ethnic group in the country. As Norton notes: “A striking paradox of 
Fiji’s politics was that, despite its universal ideology, the Federation Party was 
indeed a communal body, whereas the Alliance, though stressing the need for 
separate and unequal political representation, was nonetheless a multiethnic 
organization” (2004, p.168). 
 
Under its founder leader, Patel, the NFP was a highly disciplined party (Norton, 
1990, p.89). It also had a clear ideology. The NFP claimed to be fighting for the 
downtrodden of all ethnic groups and their main aim was to stop exploitation of 
all kinds. It was fighting against the establishment as represented by the colonial 
government and the CSR Company for the rights of the common people. It also 
acknowledged the privileged position of the Fijians in the country as the 
indigenous people and accepted the notion that they were first among equals 
(Norton, 1990, p.103). 
 
Patel and Common Roll 
During a debate in the Legislative Council, Patel had said that the “aim and the 
object of the [Federation] Party is to integrate the people of this colony in one 
nation” (LC Debates, 15 December, 1965, p.630). Patel believed that the only way 
to bring about political integration and change a plural society into one nation was 
by having a common electoral roll (LC Debates, 15 December,1965, p.635). 
Ronald Kermode, a European member in the Council, noted that integration could 
not be brought about with a ‘political device’ such as common roll. What was 
needed was trust, he said. Kermode urged the Indian leaders to work towards 
creating trust which was essential for building a single nation (LC Debates, 15 
December, 1965, p.633).  
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The Fijian leaders agreed that common roll was the ultimate goal but none of 
them could agree to its immediate introduction because they agreed with Ratu 
Edward that it would be “disastrous under the conditions existing in Fiji” (LC 
Debates, 16 December, 1965, p.656). They accepted it as an ideal "but insisted 
that in the prevailing circumstances of economic, educational and numerical 
inequality [between the Indians and Fijians] the time was not ripe for change" 
(Lal, 1986, p.65). 
Ratu Mara demolished Patel’s arguments in a brief contribution. Ratu Mara said 
that Patel was contradicting himself because he claimed that communal 
representation had not given Fiji unity. “Yet in the next breath he said: ‘This is a 
wonderful country; for 90 years we have enjoyed racial harmony’. There does not 
seem to be any logical sequence to this type of thought”, Ratu Mara said (LC 
Debates, 16 December, 1965). 
Ratu Mara also accused Patel of arrogance, which prevented him from coming 
down and sitting and talking with people whom he thought beneath his status. 
This arrogance prevented him from finding out more about the Council of Chiefs 
and declaring it “a little group of men”. His refusal to learn more about the 
Council of Chiefs showed that he could not be a national leader, “but only of one 
section of the population.”. Patel constantly refused to compromise, Mara said. 
This again was the attitude of a sectional leader, not of a national leader. 
“Compromise is the solution for this country, and people who do not believe in 
compromise are not leaders of this country”, Ratu Mara concluded (LC Debates, 
16 December, 1965).    
 
Later the Federation Party made a genuine effort to win Fijian support and 
launched "Operation Taukei" in 1967 aimed at attracting more Fijians to the party. 
The Federation Party which now became the NFP still failed to win much 
grassroots support from the Fijians. 
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In fact, there was heightened inter-ethnic tension after the by-elections of 1968 
during which the NFP was highly critical of the Fijian chiefs. The Fijian anger did 
not erupt in violence and destroy the peace of the country because the Fijian 
chiefly elite mediated and the Indian leader, A. D. Patel, realized that he had made 
a mistake in challenging the Fijian chiefly system. It was "cultural capital" 
(Norton,1990, pp.9-10) for the Fijians and it shaped their thoughts, feelings and 
attitudes. It was a source of strength for the Fijians rather than oppression, 
contrary to what Patel had thought. 
 
Patel was now willing to co-operate with Fijian chiefly leaders because he 
realized that what was at stake was the survival of the nation. In Ratu Mara's 
words, Fiji "sailed so close to the rocks... we came so near to the edge of the abyss 
that we could see with unmistakable clearness the danger that lay there if we did 
not change course. So we changed course" (quoted in Lal, 1986, p.127).  
 
Patel acknowledged that he had made a mistake. This impressed his opponents 
and helped to create a cordial atmosphere not only in the Legislative Council but 
throughout the country. Patel and Mara agreed to hold talks on independence. The 
major area of disagreement was the idea of a common electoral roll to which Patel 
still clung.  
 
Siddiq Koya who became the NFP leader after Patel’s death cooperated with Ratu 
Mara and both parties made concessions which saw a rapid transition to 
independence. It has been noted that there had seldom been a transition with such 
aplomb (see Norton, 2004). This was attributed to the greater willingness of the 
new NFP leader to compromise than Patel had been.  The NFP now agreed not to 
press for the immediate introduction of a common electoral roll, so the Alliance 
agreed to immediate independence.  
 
On common roll, which had been the major stumbling block when Patel was 
alive, the two parties agreed to have a Royal Commission later to work out a 
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permanent electoral system for Fiji. Koya had hoped that it “would probably be 
possible within 15 years” (Norton, 2004, p.178). A Commission of Inquiry into 
the question of franchise was to be held after the first post-Independence elections 
and “its recommendations was to be inserted in the constitution if supported by 
two-thirds of the House of Representatives” (Norton, 2004, p.182).  
 
The Royal Commission, headed by Prof. Harry Street, recommended in 1975 a 
common electoral roll and removal of racial reservation for the 25 national seats, 
with elections for these seats on a Single Transferable Vote (STV). Ratu Mara 
rejected this and he was accused of shifting his stance because the 'interim 
arrangement' had preserved his party’s advantage in the 1972 general elections 
(Lal, 1986, p.78).  
 
Mara had reasons for rejecting the recommendations of the Street Commission. 
Fijian leaders had accepted common roll only as a long term goal (when certain 
conditions were fulfilled. Economic and educational inequality between Fijians 
and Indians remained, though with increased migration from Fiji of the Indo-
Fijians and their lower birth rate the gap in population had started narrowing. The 
five years of independence had not integrated society. The foundation for such a 
society, which was to have been multiracial/multicultural education, was still not 
laid.  
 
There was also no consistency between the words and actions of the NFP leaders. 
They talked of a common roll but none of the leading members of the party risked 
standing in a national constituency, which was the closest to a common roll, 
during the 1972 general elections (Mamak, 1977, p.165). Moreover, using their 
numerical advantage, the NFP defeated the second highest chief in Fiji in a 
national constituency, thus showing that a common roll would not bring about 
national integration as Patel had envisaged.  
 
In a way it was a test of how a common roll would work by one of the leading 
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chiefs, standing in a national constituency where Indians were the majority. The 
chief was Ratu Penaia, whom the NFP always praised in Parliament, who was 
later knighted and became the second governor-general. The NFP fielded a little 
known Fijian commoner against Ratu Penaia and defeated him with the Indians 
overwhelmingly voting for the NFP candidate seemingly without any 
consideration for who was the more able of the candidates. Rather than voting for 
the candidate who had a proven record of service to the country, the NFP made 
the national constituency into an extension of its communal constituency 
encouraging people to vote on ethnic lines – e.g., Indians voting for the NFP.  If 
that was how the common roll was going to work, it was to be expected that the 
Fijian leaders and the Fijian voters would have none of it.  
 
The 1972 election result proved that Patel had been wrong in his expectation that 
common roll would lead to integration with people voting for the candidate who 
was more able rather than looking at communal considerations. Patel seemed to 
have been sincere in his belief that a common electoral roll would lead to 
integration as he believed ability should be the criterion for the election of a 
candidate, not ethnicity or anything else (Lal, 1997, p.50) but he failed to realize 
that the majority, including leading members of his own party, did not share his 
idealism.31  
 
Ratu Mara could be accused of not debating the Street Commission’s 
recommendations in Parliament but the only thing it would have achieved was to 
give an opportunity to the members, especially the opposition, to express their 
strong views on the proposal. A debate of that nature could have stirred up Fijian 
                                                 
31 Brij Lal, who had earlier agreed with Patel’s view on the importance of common roll, had 
argued: “The failure to break ethnic barriers and transcend communal consciousness which a 
common roll would have facilitated would come back to haunt and eventually consume Fiji” 
(1992, p.196). A few years later he seemed to have changed his views as he talked of  “the 
mistaken idealistic belief that a complete Common Roll system of election  … will by some magic 
power unite and integrate the different peoples of Fiji into ‘one people, one nation’. This is a naïve 
political belief  that has no correspondence with reality ….A study of electoral results in Fiji will 
show that the vast majority of the people have always voted along communal or racial lines” 
(1998, p.146). Lal, however, was not referring to Patel, in particular, here.  
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emotions and affected the ethnic harmony that had prevailed so far after 
independence. With the comfortable majority that the Alliance government had in 
Parliament it was a foregone conclusion that the proposal would not get a majority 
support, leave alone a two-third majority that was required to pass it (see Ali 
1979, p.74 and Norton, 2004, pp.181-182). 
 
"The Alliance's new position marked the end of the 'honeymoon period' between 
Koya and Mara", Brij Lal claimed (Lal, 1986, p.79). Lal was, however, wrong in 
suggesting that the Alliance had a “new position” because, as mentioned earlier, 
the Fijian leaders had accepted common roll only as a long term goal (when 
certain conditions were fulfilled). Since the conditions had still not been fulfilled 
Mara had justification for rejecting the recommendations. The defeat of Ratu 
Penaia in a national seat in the 1972 general election clearly demonstrated that Fiji 
was not ready for a common roll electoral system yet as it would not bring about 
integration. On the contrary it would cause heightened ethnic tension.  
The NFP under Koya 
 
The NFP continued to perform effectively as an opposition for a few years after 
Patel’s death. Koya was often away from Parliament, but there were other able 
members like R.D. Patel, K.C. Ramrakha and Mrs. Narayan who continued as a 
‘thoughtful’ opposition. After the first general elections following independence, 
R.D. Patel was made the Speaker of the Parliament. This reduced the debating 
strength of the opposition, but with their number increased from 9 to 19 the loss 
was not greatly felt.  
 
Koya’s continued absence from parliament was observed and commented on, not 
only by the members on the government side.  Ratu Julian Toganivalu, a leading 
Fijian member of the NFP, called on Koya to resign from his position as the 
Leader of the Opposition as he  (Koya) could not find time to devote to his work 
in that capacity (Fiji Times, 20 October, 1976). The best example was his absence 
from Parliament when Butadroka introduced his notorious motion in 1975 asking 
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for the repatriation of Indians from Fiji. A few days before Butadroka introduced 
his motion, R.D. Patel had resigned from the party because of differences with 
Koya (see Chapter 5) claiming that the NFP under Koya had changed beyond 
recognition (Fiji Times, 11 October, 1975).  
  
Koya was not willing to cooperate with Ratu Mara even on issues of vital 
importance to the nation like the Butadroka motion which clearly showed that he 
had changed since independence when his cooperation with the Prime Minister 
brought about a smooth transition. While rejecting Butadroka’s motion, Ratu 
Mara moved an amendment which “embodied [his] multiracial philosophy” as it 
acknowledged the contribution made by “all races in their own separate ways … 
to the economic development of Fiji” (Brown, 1978, p.8).  
 
Ratu Mara drafted and circulated the amendment to all members of the House 
long before he moved it in Parliament. But Koya, was not in Parliament as he was 
arguing a case at the Supreme Court. It is noted that Koya did not see the Prime 
Minister’s amendment until it was too late (Brown, 1978, p.5). 
 
The natural expectation of the Government was that on such a “serious and 
destructive” issue the Opposition would support the Government in unanimously 
condemning the mover of the motion. This would have helped to douse Fijian 
nationalism for the future well being of the Indians whom they represented. The 
next day Koya surprised everyone by opposing not only Butadroka’s motion but 
also Ratu Mara’s amendment and moving another stronger amendment 
reaffirming the Indian position but not mentioning any other race by name.  
 
Ratu Mara rejected Koya’s amendment. Ratu Mara’s amendment was passed 27 
to 10 but almost half the members of the NFP were not there to vote for Koya’s 
amendment while Butadroka abstained. Later Koya told a meeting of his 
supporters at the Suva Civic Centre that he had information that “there were 
elements in the Alliance Party who wanted to do legally what Butadroka tried to 
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do illegally” (quoted by Brown, 1978, p.11).When he was asked to produce facts 
to prove his wild allegation, Koya rather lamely declared that he would do so only 
to a Commission of Inquiry. 
 
If Ratu Mara had hoped that the Butadroka motion, by being thoroughly debated 
in Parliament, would signal the end of Fijian nationalism it proved otherwise. 
Instead it marked the strengthening of ethnic politics in Fiji. Two years later it 
became clearer in the first general elections of 1977 when a significant number of 
ethnic Fijians voted for the FNP, with the Indians overwhelmingly supporting the 
NFP. 
 
The multiracial Alliance Party found itself isolated as the NFP which had so far 
supported ‘multiracialism’ started degenerating into an ethnic party. It must, 
however, be emphasized that it was only the Leader of the Opposition and his 
staunch supporters who turned ‘confrontational’ as many of the NFP members of 
parliament still continued as ‘thoughtful’ opposition as was proven by their 
support for ALTO in 1976 (see Chapter 5).  
 
Koya seemed to overlook the harm the nationalists could do to the Indian settlers 
by arousing the anti-Indian sentiment. In fact, initially the NFP welcomed the 
nationalists and even worked closely with them in the first general election in 
1977 (see Chapters 3 and 5). In that election though the FNP polled an unexpected 
number of votes and even managed to win a Fijian communal seat, by the second 
general election that year most of those who voted for FNP in the first instance 
withdrew their electoral support for fear of NFP winning again by default. This 
did not mean that they had withdrawn their support for the party's policies which 
remained dormant but intact (see Lasaqa, 1984, p.188). 
 
Through his actions Koya, rather than trying to douse Fijian nationalism, helped 
to foster it.  According to Ramrakha, “multiracial harmony in this country” was 
brought to a fever pitch in 1970, but by the end of 1975 the spirit of 1970 seemed 
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to be slipping away, so he pleaded for the revival of that spirit (Parliamentary 
Debates, 2 December, 1975?). James Shankar Singh, the leader of the Indian 
Alliance, claimed that Koya had been “a major contributor to the deterioration of 
race relationship in Fiji in recent years” (Fiji Times, 1 July, 1976). The best 
example of this was in 1977 after the first general elections when Koya 
deliberately whipped up Indian sympathy by claiming that Ratu Mara and the 
Alliance Party did not want an Indian Prime Minister in Fiji and that was why he 
(Koya) was not appointed the Prime Minister after the NFP’s narrow win (see 
Chapter 5). In 1987 Koya, however, contradicted himself when he said, “It is our 
people [Indians] who went against me [in 1977]” (V. Lal, 1990, p.56).  
 
It must, however, be noted that it was not only Koya and his followers in the NFP 
who contributed to a deterioration in race relations in the country. Butadroka and 
his Fijian nationalists played an even greater part. Moreover, they were supported 
by the Fijian publication of the Fiji Times, the Nai Lalakai. In 1977 Ratu Mara 
talked of the “enormous damage” Nai Lalakai had done to racial harmony. He 
claimed that over the past five years it had done a lot to “foster, encourage and 
disseminate the views of the Fijian Nationalist Party” (Fiji Times, 6 June, 1977).   
 
Since these views appeared in the Fijian weekly, the Opposition NFP, in 
particular, did not seem to have taken much notice of them (or been even aware of 
the problem) though they used to be extremely critical of the Fiji Times in the 
early 1970s. Such views would have had their desired effect (in fact, it would 
have been more effective than the Fiji Times) as they would have had a great 
impact on the Fijian commoners who were the focus of the propaganda.  
 
Brij Lal had noted that the resurgent Fijian ethno-nationalism was part of a larger 
nativistic movement throughout the Pacific, which was asserting its voice and 
struggling for political dominance. In Fiji, it sought practical manifestation for the 
concept of Fijian paramountcy, as shown by the call for the revision of the 
constitution and the reservation of the position of the Prime Minister and the 
 147
Governor General for ethnic Fijians. The call for the reservation of two thirds of 
the Parliamentary seats for indigenous Fijians "found an astonishing amount of 
sympathy mainly among literate urban Fijians .... In effect it represent[ed] a 
concerted challenge to the notion of political co-existence that [had] long 
governed Fijian politics" (Lal, 1986, p.81). 
 
Rather than trying to understand the implications of this ‘resurgent’ Fijian 
nationalism and responding to it appropriately, the NFP leadership countered it by 
emphasizing Indian rights. NFP’s policies, which were national and universal, had 
been changing over the years to narrow communal ones. The change of policy of 
the NFP from one of championing the causes of the exploited in the country to 
fighting only for the rights of ethnic Indians  became evident as early as the 1972 
general elections when education and land (two issues close to the heart of the 
Indo-Fijians) both featured prominently during the election campaign. 1972 was 
crucial because it seemed to have marked the beginning of ethnic politics 
(although this became clear only in 1977). NFP for the first time started focusing 
on issues that would win them more Indian votes rather than looking at issues 
from a national perspective as Patel used to do.  
 
The Change in Policy of the NFP under Reddy 
 
With a change in leadership in 1977 NFP’s ideology also changed. When Jai Ram 
Reddy became the NFP leader, he rejected NFP’s original policies which were 
meant to improve the lot of the workers, and "openly embraced the capitalist 
philosophy of development .... In an effort to win a larger constituency, Reddy cut 
the NFP's umbilical cord with its past. In the end, the NFP became a shadow of 
the Alliance .... Ideologically at least, the Alliance now face[d] no opposition in 
the country" (Lal, 1986, pp. 94-95).  
 
NFP was no longer a party of the poor people but one patronized by rich 
merchants, well off civil servants and the sugarcane farmers who were no longer 
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poor. It no longer fought for the lower classes, who were the victims of 
exploitation, but became a party for the capitalists and the well-to-do Indians.  The 
main difference between the Alliance and the NFP remained in their racial 
composition. It became a party that fought solely for Indian rights and thus for all 
practical purposes, became the second ethnic party (after the Fijian Nationalist 
Party) in the country. 
 
An Indo-Fijian scholar, Vijay Naidu, has  noted that while “A. D. Patel perceived 
a class-divided colonial Fiji in which a minority benefited from the system that 
deprived and exploited a majority … with his death in  1969, NFP’s search for a 
just Fiji society was replaced by the racial bargaining of … elements from the two 
major ethnic categories in Fiji” (Naidu, 1987, p.220). This was not a sudden 
change in the NFP but a gradual one that started in 1972 and was completed by 
1979. No one, including senior party members seemed to have noticed or 
understood it at the beginning because it was very subtle, not open like the FNP’s 
championing of Fijian rights.     
  
Robertson and Tamanisau have also noted that in the 1980s the Alliance and NFP 
“policies varied little in substance” (1988, p.22). This, in effect, created the 
opportunity for the rise of the Fiji Labour Party in 1985. 
 
The NFP at independence had endorsed Ratu Mara's multiracial stance as the way 
forward for the country, but from the beginning there was a fundamental lack of 
understanding about the multiracial ideology. Many NFP leaders saw it only as 
the removal of white dominance and privileges as manifested in the policies of 
segregation. With Reddy as the NFP leader the situation became even worse. As 
noted earlier, he seemed to think that multiracialism was having ethnic parties 
with each in turn being in power (see Chapter 2).  
 
In 1974 Reddy had told the NFP convention in Nadi that “if the National 
Federation Party is aspiring to govern, then it must have broadly based support 
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among all the races in Fiji. Until the party acquires such support it must resign 
itself to being a permanent opposition” (quoted in Lal, 1992, p.243). When he 
became the Leader of the NFP,  rather than trying to increase the party’s non-
Indian support, which he himself had said was important if it wanted to be in 
power, Reddy concentrated his energies on going into coalitions with splinter 
Fijian parties during election times rather than having policies that appealed to all 
ethnic groups.  Later he himself described these Fijian parties as ‘token’ parties 
(his election telecast before the 1999 general elections). He realized that he could 
not rule without some Fijian support but had no policies to offer that would attract 
the Fijian voters (such as nationalization of the goldmine).  The policies Reddy 
offered were not different from those of the Alliance Party except that he 
concentrated on issues that affected the Indians and accused the government of 
practising discrimination against the Indians. 
 
Unlike Patel, Reddy did not make use of the Parliament to raise issues that 
affected the nation and force the government to provide answers in true 
Westminster tradition. Under Patel the NFP was an effective opposition, acting as 
the watchdog, keeping the government under constant scrutiny. In the 1970s also 
the NFP parliamentarians like Ramrakha had used Parliament to make the 
government change its policies when they were found to be blatantly 
discriminatory. An example was the remission of fees for indigent students in 
schools when the government decided to provide fee remission only for Fijian 
students (see Chapter 3). If under Koya, it started degenerating from a 
‘thoughtful’ opposition to a ‘hectoring’ one, in the 1980s it almost became 
defunct as an opposition, necessitating the emergence of the Fiji Labour Party. 
 
Talking of the 1997 constitution, which almost tried to stifle opposition with its 
multi-party government, Sir Vijay Singh had noted the crucial role played by the 
opposition in the Westminster system: “…it is the watchdog that keeps the 
government under constant scrutiny. It exposes government’s dubious dealings 
and offers alternative policies and programs” (Fiji Times, 21 February, 2002). The 
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NFP  in the 1980s had no ‘alternative policies and programs’. They exposed what 
they believed were government’s ‘dubious dealings’ but these were done outside 
parliament, so there was no effective opposition in Parliament. Moreover the aim 
was to consolidate their Indian support rather than to act as a watchdog of 
government policies. 
 
Sensitive issues like affirmative action and a government of national unity were 
raised at NFP conferences rather than in the Parliament where the government 
could provide the answers. Mrs. Narayan, a leading member of the NFP, had 
raised the question of imbalance in the civil service in Parliament and the Acting 
Prime Minister had replied that the question of parity applied only at the point of 
entry and that promotions and other opportunities for advancement depended on 
merit (Lal, 1986, p.87). 
 
Later at the NFP convention in Ba in 1980, Reddy asserted that the government 
was implementing a policy "designed to ensure that all strategic levels of 
government [were] staffed by loyal personnel which in effect meant that Fijians 
were placed in positions of command in order to deliberately create an 'out group' 
namely the Indians". The bitterness and distrust that this produced "conflict alone 
may resolve" he said, using PM Mara's words (Lal, 1986, p.87).  
 
Both Mara and Reddy agreed that "ethnic politics [was] divisive, wasteful, 
destructive and unwanted" (Premdas, 1986, p.108). "But instead of stopping after 
merely pointing to racial cleavages [Reddy] went on to suggest that the Alliance-
run government had embarked on a systematic policy of staffing the upper 
echelons of government with loyal Fijian personnel. In fact, he accused Ratu Mara 
of practising racial discrimination while publicly espousing a policy of 
multiracialism" (Premdas, 1986, p.109).  
 
Premdas, however, has pointed out that it was practically inevitable that the 
government, dominated by Fijians (and effectively criticized by the FNP for 
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neglecting Fijian interests) would staff the senior levels of the Public Service with 
loyal ethnic and political personnel (Premdas, 1986, p.109). But in spite of the 
feeling within the Indian community that "power over the civil service [was] in 
Fijian hands" there had been “very few cases of systematic discrimination on the 
basis of race and political affiliation” (Lal, 1986, pp.87-88). Until 1987, the 
government had been quite fair to all, with ethnicity and political affiliation not 
featuring prominently as a basis for its civil service appointments. So Reddy’s 
criticism of the government of practicing discrimination against the ethnic Indians 
seemed to have little basis as no sound evidence was provided. 
 
Reddy shot into fame in the political arena after the first general elections of 1977 
which resulted in a stalemate. He rose to prominence overnight when he went on 
air and declared that the NFP, though it had a two-seat majority, could not form 
the government, as it would not have the support of the army and other Fijian 
institutions, because it was predominantly an Indian party. His apparent sensible 
and moderate stand impressed everyone and he at once became widely acceptable 
as a future leader because people wanted an end to confrontation, which had 
become the order of the day. Ratu Mara and the Alliance Party welcomed him as a 
sensible and moderate leader. So did the majority of the Indians who thought that 
his advent would mark the end of racial tensions in politics and the uncertainties 
that prevailed as a consequence. 
 
Unfortunately the opposite proved to be the case. There were not only racial 
differences now but religious differences also re-emerged in politics, as the tussle 
for NFP leadership was between Koya, a Muslim, and Reddy, a Hindu. Since 
leadership was a major issue, it was an ideal time to have an indigenous Fijian as 
the leader of the party. NFP was fortunate to have had such a person in its midst. 
As mentioned earlier (see Chapter 5) a leading member of the NFP, Ramrakha, 
suggested making Ratu Julian Toganivalu the Leader of the Opposition (Ali, 
1979, p.79). 
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Ratu Julian would have been an ideal choice as he was one of the oldest members 
of the party. Having joined the NFP in the 1960s, after resigning from the Civil 
Service where he had risen to the prestigious position of a District Officer, he had 
stood loyally by the party during all the upheavals before and after independence. 
He was one Fijian member who seemed above reproach as his motives in joining 
the NFP did not seem dubious unlike that of some of the others like Apisai Tora 
and Ratu Mosese.  
 
Ratu Julian was one of the four Toganivalu brothers who were in politics, but the 
other three were senior members of the Alliance Party who had all been elected 
members of Parliament. Having Ratu Julian as the leader would have benefited 
the party in many ways. First of all, it would have been able to shed its image as 
an Indian party. Secondly, there would not have been a party split on religious 
lines between its Hindu and Muslim followers. Ratu Julian also had much more 
experience in politics than Reddy, who was a newcomer to politics. 
 
The NFP missed a rare opportunity to end the politics of ethnicity and make a new 
start, giving people of Fiji a genuine choice between two different ideologies - the 
Alliance, which protected the interests of the capitalists, and the NFP which stood 
for the working class people. With Ratu Julian as the leader, the party could have 
become a truly multiracial one as it could have attracted more indigenous 
members. The party officials failed to elect Ratu Julian to party leadership. 
 
The NFP spent the years from late 1970s to 1987 trying to topple the Alliance 
government as Reddy believed that the Indian side should be given a chance to 
rule as well. Since he realized that the NFP could not rule without Fijian support 
he concentrated his energies in forming coalitions with ‘token’ Fijian parties to 
defeat the Government. Brij Lal warned in 1986 that the NFP in trying to get rid 
of the Alliance did not realize the dire consequences that awaited the Indian 
community when that eventuality took place (Lal, 1986, p.79). But no one seemed 
to have taken heed of this warning. 
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Foreign Interference? 
 
In the 1980s the NFP claimed Australian involvement in Fiji’s domestic politics.  
This ‘involvement’ was later exposed on the ABC’s ‘Four Corners’ Programme 
(V.Lal, 1990, pp.121-123) but the programme itself became a source of the main 
interference as it tried to influence election results in Fiji. According to one writer  
the ‘Four Corners’ programme was “so one-sided in its opposition to Ratu Mara’s 
government that the opposition parties in Fiji made videos of the programme and 
used them as election propaganda” (Thomson, 1999, p.137). 
 
The NFP leaders showed lack of sensitivity to the feelings of the indigenous 
Fijians when in 1982 they widely showed this Australian TV programme alleging 
corruption in the Alliance government. The Fijians rejected this attempt and threw 
their support solidly behind the Alliance as they saw the TV programme (Four 
Corners) as an insult to them with its references to their cannibal past. If the idea 
was to expose corruption in the Mara government for the sake of good 
governance, it could have been raised in Parliament and answers sought from the 
government. Rather than doing that  the issue was brought up outside Parliament. 
Perhaps it was incidents like this  that “added fuel to the Fijian national 
sentiment” (Ratuva, 1993, p.59). 
 
There were also allegations of Russian involvement in the 1982 elections. The 
Alliance government accused the NFP of getting the support of Russia through 
Mr. Kochar, the husband of the Indian High Commissioner in Suva.  This finally 
resulted in Mrs. Kochar being transferred from Fiji (V.Lal, 1990, pp.129, 139-
141). 
 
Five years later, in 1987, an Australian magazine, Penthouse, claimed that Libya 
was also involved in influencing the outcome of the 1982 general elections by 
giving money to all the major political parties, the NFP, the Alliance and the 
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Western United Front (WUF) (V.Lal, 1990, p.137).  These allegations and counter 
allegations were not proved but they raised the possibility of Fiji becoming 
another Grenada (V. Lal, 1990, p.153). 
 
Whatever the truth or otherwise of these allegations, it showed the importance of 
national solidarity against any outside threat32.  The government and the 
opposition in Fiji should have put up a united front to ward off such interferences, 
if there were any, but the NFP made it an election issue in 1982 which further 
polarized the country on ethnic lines and increased ethnic tensions.  
 
Even after the awesome backlash of Fijian voters in 1982 through their rejection 
of the NFP and its coalition partner WUF, NFP leaders did not learn their lesson. 
In 1987 they decided to have a coalition with the newly formed Fiji Labour Party 
(FLP), led by a Fijian commoner, Dr. Timoci Bavadra. Reddy was not the Leader 
of the Opposition then as he had resigned from Parliament in protest against the 
Speaker's ruling (see Introduction). He was, however, mainly instrumental in 
forming a coalition with the multiracial Fiji Labour Party with disastrous results. 
 
The claim by one scholar that Indians wanted political power including “political 
ascendancy” because that was the only way they could come to terms with the 
indignities of indenture (Mishra, 1990, p.616) was perhaps true of some of the 
Indian leaders who thought on those terms.  It was, however, not true of the 
majority of Fiji Indians who only wanted security for themselves and their 
families. Those Indian voters who had supported the Alliance in the early 1970s 
switched to the NFP when they felt the Alliance would not look after their 
welfare.  
 
                                                 
32 An extreme example of such interference by foreign elements (governments and individuals) in 
the Pacific today and how harmful it can be to national interests is the case of Noah Musingku , the 
operator of the failed pyramid scheme, who has proclaimed himself the king of a part of 
Bougainville (in PNG) which is a no-go zone and is alleged to be involved in giving military 
training to rebels (fijilive, 5 January, 2006) 
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When the NFP failed to address their concerns, they started supporting the 
multiracial Fiji Labour Party but unfortunately it soon became another Indian 
party as the majority of Fijian members of the Labour Party had withdrawn their 
support for the party in protest against the coalition with the NFP.  The small core 
Fijian support that remained with Labour and increased support from the General 
Electors, however, enabled the NFP to succeed in its long quest to get rid of the 
government of Ratu Mara. The over 90 per cent of Fijians who had not voted for 
the coalition waited in expectation for their leadership to act and Rabuka burst 
upon the scene as the new leader. The Fijians threw their support solidly behind 
him because it seemed to them that their chiefly leaders had failed to safeguard 
their rights. 
 
Nationalist Parties 
 
The Fijian Nationalist Party (FNP), the first and most important of the nationalist  
parties, was formed in January 1974, the first truly ethnic party with no pretence 
of multiracialism. Its main slogan was 'Fiji for Fijians' although it was not the first 
to suggest this idea (see Chapter 4). Less than two years after its inception, in 
October 1975, its leader, Sakeasi Butadroka, introduced a motion in Parliament 
calling for the repatriation of all Indians from Fiji. 
 
Butadroka had no support in Parliament to even get his motion seconded but Ratu 
Mara wanted to wipe out the threat raised by him once and for all by everyone 
joining forces against him and giving him a sound thrashing from which he would 
not be able to recover. So the Prime Minister arranged to have the motion 
seconded by one of the Alliance backbenchers, the Indian Alliance member 
Kishore Govind, to give members a chance to air their views before unanimously 
rejecting it. Up to a point the strategy worked, as most members spoke strongly 
condemning the motion.  
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Ratu Mara pointed out that while Butadroka claimed to speak for the poor Fijians 
his new home was in Tamavua Heights, one of the richest suburbs, and not among 
the poor people. The FNP, however, had a lot of grassroots Fijian support as was 
proved two years later by its performance in the 1977 general elections, securing 
one Fijian communal seat and winning a large proportion of Fijian votes in other 
constituencies. Most Fijians seemed to agree with its policies of maintaining 
Fijian hegemony and curtailing the Indian advance in most spheres of life. 
 
If Ratu Mara had hoped that the Butadroka motion, by being thoroughly debated 
in Parliament, would signal the end of Fijian nationalism it proved otherwise. 
Instead it marked the strengthening of ethnic politics in Fiji. Two years later it 
became clearer in the first general elections of 1977 when a significant number of 
ethnic Fijians voted for the FNP, with the Indians overwhelmingly supporting the 
NFP. Butadroka drew attention to this fact in Parliament after the elections 
(Parliamentary Debates, April 1977). The communal rolls made it easy to identify 
this ethnic polarisation. In the first general elections of 1977, though the FNP 
polled an unexpected number of votes and even managed to win a Fijian 
communal seat, by the second general elections that year most of those who voted 
for FNP in the first instance withdrew their electoral support for fear of NFP 
winning again by default. 
 
Butadroka was a Methodist lay preacher and his message was often delivered 
from the pulpit which made it all the more acceptable to the grassroots Fijians. 
The Fijians believed that the policies of the FNP, which were invariably anti-
Indian, had the sanction of the Church. Indeed, they had the support of some 
church leaders. According to a past president of the Methodist Church, Rev. 
Koroi, Butadroka was from the beginning in cahoots with the dissidents in the 
church led by Rev. Lasaro (Dropsy, 1993, p.53). This was when religion became 
entangled in party politics. There was a convergence of Fijian nationalism and 
Methodist fundamentalism, which has persisted to this day.  
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As had been mentioned before support for the FNP remained dormant but intact 
until the military coups of 1987 after which it (FNP) started becoming irrelevant. 
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) and Soqosoqo Duavata ni 
Lewenivanua (SDL) are ethnic Fijian parties that were formed after the military 
coups of 1987 and the crisis of 2000 respectively. They are also nationalist parties 
in some ways. 
 
The SVT and SDL are similar to the FNP in that they promote Fijian interests 
including Fijian hegemony. The main difference with the FNP and these parties is 
that they have never called for the repatriation of Indians from Fiji. This is 
because the leaders of these parties, unlike the nationalist leader Butadroka, 
realize how much the country would suffer economically if they followed such a 
policy. In spite of that the country has hardly made any economic progress under 
these parties so far as it did under the chiefly-led Alliance party after 
independence (see Chapter 7).  
 
SVT lost its appeal during the 1999 general elections when it modified its stand 
and now it is almost non-existent. The decline in the popularity of the SVT led to 
the establishment of the SDL in 2000 which remained in power until December, 
2006 when it was overthrown in the forth coup in Fiji in two decades. Apart from 
the SDL the other Nationalist parties did not win any seats in the last general 
elections in May 2006. 
 
Fiji Labour Party 
 
In July 1985, the Fiji Labour Party was founded. It was formed by the major trade 
unions in the country. In the early 1980s public servants gained substantial salary 
increases backed by their militant union leaders. By 1983 the economy started 
feeling the pressure. A job evaluation review (Nicol-Hurst Report) recommended 
further substantial salary increases. The findings were implemented after a lengthy 
and militant campaign by the Fiji Public Servants Association (FPSA). Pressure 
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on government expenditure produced strong government reaction and late in 1984 
a wage freeze was implemented, resulting in more industrial problems. 
The labour aristocracy that was formed in the urban areas in the 1980s politicized 
the union movement. Indo-Fijian scholar, Vijay Naidu has noted that the term 
‘labour aristocracy’ gained currency in the latter half of the 19th century to 
designate a distinct upper stratum of the working class (Naidu, 1987, p.226). 
Naidu also noted that in Fiji the objective of wrestling power from the Alliance 
Party came from the labour aristocracy. “This privileged worker category derives 
from the relatively highly paid stratum of workers, predominantly white collar and 
labour bureaucrats” (Naidu, 1987, p.210). 
 
The labour aristocracy in Fiji is made up of trade union  bureaucrats, white collar 
workers and the better paid technicians (Naidu, 1987, p.216).  More importantly, 
“the incomes of majority of full-time trade union officials place them among the 
higher earning brackets of Fiji people” (Naidu, 1987, p.217). These union officials 
earn much higher incomes than the average worker (both white collar and blue 
collar).  
 
White collar union leaders were behind the politicization of the trade union 
movement in Fiji, which, led by the ‘labour aristocracy’, decided to launch a 
workers’ party (Naidu, 1987, p.219). Many blue collar unions of Fiji did not join 
forces with the labour aristocracy in establishing the Fiji Labour Party as they had 
reservations about politicizing the union movement (Naidu, 1987, p.211). The 
party’s commitment to improving the lot of the workers by challenging “ruling 
class hegemony” was in doubt from the beginning as the party leadership was in 
the hands of a “new, opportunistic labour aristocracy” (Hagan, 1987, p.134). 
 
Before the general elections of 1987, Vijay Naidu had urged the Fiji Labour Party 
to increase its membership among the rural workers rather than having a coalition 
with the NFP which was ideologically opposed to the Labour Party (Robertson 
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and Tamanisau, 1989, p.26). This was sound advice as the Labour influence was 
confined to urban centres while the majority of the population lived in the rural 
areas. Naidu further pointed out that any deal with the NFP smacked of 
opportunism. This view of Vijay Naidu about a coalition was initially shared by 
some leading members of the party such as Mahendra Chaudhry and Krishna Datt.  
 
Labour was hoping to be in the opposition for two terms and then form the 
government only in 1997. Bavadra formed the coalition despite the objections 
from the majority of delegates at the founding conference (Robertson and 
Tamanisau, 1989, p.40). Bavadra did not take heed of the advice given by Naidu 
and reject the idea of a coalition with the NFP as ‘opportunistic’; nor was there an 
attempt to increase the membership among the rural workers. The FLP leaders 
were more interested in a labour aristocracy in the urban areas than in making sure 
that the concerns of the rural dwellers were addressed. According to one scholar, 
the FLP was “the product of a frustrated aristocracy of labour which was prepared 
to challenge the whittling away of gains made by the labour movement” (Naidu, 
1987, p.226).  
 
The union leaders used the union movement for their own individual 
advancement, with the result that “the incomes of majority of full-time union 
officials place them among the higher earning brackets of Fiji people” (Naidu, 
1987, p.218). So USP activists like Atu’ Bain, if they were genuinely concerned 
about the lot of the workers (in the goldmine, for instance) might have had more 
success in achieving their goals by sticking with a proven leader like Ratu Mara 
who had over the years helped to improve the lot of the workers rather than 
joining hands with a new labour aristocracy. 
 
Jacqueline Leckie, however, describes the attempt to discredit the Fiji Labour 
Party because of its domination by the ‘labour aristocracy’. She argues that “such 
analyses fail to take into account the advances some public sector unions have 
made for members who do comprise a large proportion of the workforce” (Leckie, 
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1988, p.166). While she is right in pointing out that the unions have done a lot to 
benefit their members it was also true that the majority of the blue collar workers 
were against politicizing the union movement. 
 
Bavadra’s Contradictions! 
 
Apart from ‘elitism’ and ‘opportunism’ the newly formed Fiji Labour Party also 
revealed other problems. Naidu noticed several contradictions in Dr. Timoci 
Bavadra’s speech accepting the leadership of the party as well as in the draft FLP 
constitution. He gives as an example FLP’s support for nationally-owned 
enterprises by private interests (“currently amongst the most exploitative”) which 
contradicted its goals for an equitable society (Naidu,1987, p.225).  
 
Bavadra entered into a coalition with the NFP ignoring the wishes of the rank and 
file of the party. On getting elected as Prime Minister one of the first decisions 
that Bavadra made was to appoint a USP lecturer as his permanent secretary. The 
civil servants protested, but Bavadra ignored their protest.   
 
Bavadra had earlier described the NFP leaders as “self-serving characters” (Naidu, 
1987, p.224). Now he justified the coalition with the NFP on the basis that the two 
parties shared a common objective, “to get rid of the Alliance Government” 
(Hagan,1987, p.135). The reason for getting rid of the Alliance government was 
the allegations of corruption against it which were never substantiated. Moreover, 
after the election victory, the Alliance member who was considered the most 
corrupt, Militoni Leweniqila, was wooed by the coalition to be the Speaker. This 
further raised the question of the extent of the commitment that Bavadra had in 
rooting out corruption. 
 
Another major platform of the Labour Party was multiracialism. It claimed to 
want to get away from ethnic politics which had become prevalent in the country. 
But by forming a coalition with the predominantly Indian NFP, it lost most of its 
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Fijian support and thus forfeited its claim to multiracialism. One scholar noted 
that the most important test  for the FLP in respect of its multiracialism would be 
the 1987 general elections (Hagan, 1987, p.135). The FLP failed the test by 
polling below ten per cent of the Fijian votes which was less than the Indian votes 
(15 per cent) that the Alliance Party got in the same election.        
 
David Robie calls the FLP "Fiji's first real  multicultural political party" (1989, 
p.213 - his emphasis). There is some truth in this claim as from the beginning it 
was multiracial unlike the Alliance and the Federation Parties, which went into 
coalitions with ethnic parties to make them multiracial. In contrast, the Fiji Labour 
Party emerged as a multiracial party, but soon lost its multiracial image by joining 
with a predominantly ethnic party. So the Labour-NFP coalition of 1987 became a 
predominantly Indian one, with a Fijian leader who was seen by many as just a 
figurehead. 
 
Bavadra also did other things which were against the wishes of the majority of the 
party members. Although an assurance was given that policies would be 
determined at the delegates' conferences, in reality they were decided by the 
National Council and its smaller Management Board. Labour's leaders also 
ignored suggestions that branches have a say in the selection of candidates 
(Robertson and Tamanisau, 1988, p.40). 
 
Many of the branches established during the next one and a half years "never 
functioned as the constitution stipulated .... The first annual conference did not 
receive remits; instead it acted as a platform for disseminating new policy 
initiatives which the wider body then endorsed, thus contradicting the founding 
conference's explicit declaration that policy be determined by the delegates' 
conference .... To our knowledge the draft constitution has never been re-written, 
nor amendments endorsed by a delegates' conference" (Robertson and Tamanisau, 
1988, p.40). 
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FLP also abandoned (or modified) some of its policies when it went into a 
coalition so much so that there was no longer any difference between the FLP and 
the NFP.  This meant that there was no difference between the Alliance and the 
Coalition as there was no difference between the Alliance and the NFP as has 
been pointed out by scholars (Lal, 1986, p.95; Robertson and Tamanisau, 1988, 
p.22). [Lal also points out that the FLP policies were almost the same as the NFPs 
in the 1982 general elections. He gives this as a re-assurance that there was no 
threat to Fiji from the policies of the coalition.] 
 
Even the 9 per cent Fijian support that the Coalition got in the 1987 general 
election would not have been sufficient for it to win the election. It was the swing 
from the Alliance of the general electors, especially in the Suva area, that 
contributed to the coalition’s narrow victory. The actual numbers of general 
electoral votes were small but the margin of victory of the Coalition over the 
Alliance in four of these national seats ranged from 500 to 939 (Hagan, 1987, 
p.133). So it was the Indian and general elector votes that won the elections for 
the Coalition rather than the Fijian votes. Moreover, though the coalition won 
more seats, the Alliance had received more votes on the whole.  
     
At the end of April, 1987, when there were protest marches by those who were 
against the coalition government, "Bavadra warned Fijians in a national radio 
broadcast not to allow a 'disgruntled few' to sabotage the country" (Robie, 1989, 
p.216). Ironically, Bavadra was also leading a disgruntled few Fijians and General 
Electors as he went into an opportunistic coalition with the predominantly Indian 
NFP. So Robie’s claim that Bavadra “had greater credibility than the man he 
ousted” (Robie, 1989, p.215) cannot be substantiated. For the indigenous 
community was still in the minority and majority rule worked against them when 
parties were organized on ethnic lines.  
 
Not only was an overwhelming majority of Fijians against the FLP; but as 
mentioned earlier, the coalition also had not polled the majority of the votes cast. 
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Alliance had polled 49.5 per cent votes while the coalition had only 47.1 per cent 
(Fraenkel, 2000, p.105).  So Bavadra was in fact providing token leadership to the 
majority of Indians and a few disgruntled Fijians and General Electors. 
 
Moreover, many of the Fijians who had voted for the coalition, perhaps with the 
hope that it would provide a strong opposition, seemed to have been shocked by 
its win and withdrew support for the new government. An example was that the 
leaders of the two teachers’ unions played a leading role in the formation of the 
Fiji Labour Party. Both FTA and FTU were represented in the Parliament and in 
the cabinet of the Bavadra government. Despite that FTA responded to rank and 
file pressure after the military coups and withdrew affiliation from FTUC in 1987 
(Hince, 1991, pp.22-25).  
 
According to Robie, Ratu Mara "became increasingly autocratic, aloof and 
unresponsive to his people" (1989, p.208). This also seems to have been true of 
Bavadra during his short stint at leadership. Bavadra started acting in an autocratic 
manner in forming the coalition and not consulting the views of the branches 
when making important policy decisions. He was guilty of not following 
procedures in other respects also. His appointment of Sutherland as his private 
secretary was a case in point. The civil servants objected but Bavadra refused to 
budge (Bain,1989, p.14). 
 
Was Bavadra naive or was he a selfish, power hungry person who did not care a 
hoot for the country or its people but had his eyes set on becoming the Prime 
Minister at all cost? It is difficult to believe the latter because even people who 
were strongly opposed to the FLP - for example, Deryck Scarr - do not see him as 
power hungry and selfish. So the only alternative seems to believe Peter Thomson 
that his “naivety was breathtaking” (Thomson, 1999, p.64). (Perhaps the truth 
came somewhere in-between.)  
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After the overthrow of his government, Bavadra became very ill and two years 
later, in 1989, he died. For a while, his widow, Adi Kuini, became the leader of 
the FLP. After a while she left Fiji and Mahendra Chaudhry became the new 
leader. Soon the coalition with the NFP broke up. After the coups of 1987 cane 
farmers were virtually leaderless as most of the Indian leaders had moved away 
from Fiji at least temporarily. Chaudhry was able to muster the support of the 
sugarcane farmers through the National Farmers Union which had been largely 
inactive until then. When elections were held in 1992, as mentioned earlier (see 
Chapter 5) the NFP received a shock, as it lost many of the Indian seats to the FLP 
which won almost as many seats as the NFP.   
To win back Indian support, the NFP encouraged the formation of a rival farmers’ 
union, the Fiji Sugar Cane Growers’ Association (see Chapter 5). Both the 
political parties had neglected the cane growers in the 1980s but in the 1990s the 
politicians once again realized their importance as voters.  Two years later, when 
elections were held in 1994, the NFP was able to win back many of the seats it 
had lost earlier to the FLP.  
 
Rather than putting up a united front to win back the rights that the Indians had 
lost through the 1990 constitution, the Indian leaders were concentrating on 
consolidating their own positions. After 1987 FLP became a predominantly Indian 
party, though the core support that it had from ethnic Fijians still remained. It also 
continued to follow policies which were broad rather than communal based, 
which was the reason for its outstanding success in the elections in 1999 when 
democracy was fully restored in the country.  
 
The Fiji Labour Party-led People’s Coalition won overwhelmingly in that election 
while the NFP and Rabuka-led SVT suffered greatly (NFP was almost wiped out 
as it failed to win a single seat). According to one scholar it was due to their 
following moderate policies as they [the NFP and SVT] were “outflanked by more 
extremist parties” (Lal, 1999). This conclusion is wrong because the party that 
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won the most Fijian seats was the Adi Kuini- led Fijian Association Party (FAP) 
which did not advocate any extremist policies (while Indians overwhelmingly 
voted for the FLP). On the contrary, the nationalists did not gain much support. 
FAP later joined the People’s Coalition to form the multiparty government. 
Another scholar sees the defeat of the SVT as the result of its “failure to improve 
conditions for indigenous Fijians” (Palmer, 2005, p.212) which seems to be the 
real reason for its rejection by ethnic Fijians.  
 
After the 2000 crisis, though the FLP once again became a predominantly Indian 
party it still followed policies which have relevance for the whole population 
rather than for any particular community.  
 
Ethnicity still plays a major role in politics in Fiji today as the general elections of 
May, 2006 have proved beyond question with indigenous Fijians voting for the 
SDL party under Laisenia Qarase and the Indo-Fijians voting for the FLP. It may 
be argued that the Indo-Fijians voted for the FLP which is not communal in its 
policies rather than for the Indian NFP which was completely rejected by the 
voters. This was because the NFP has no proven leaders while the FLP has an 
experienced leader in Mahendra Chaudhry. Although many Indians were wary of 
Chaudhry’s style of leadership they perhaps decided to stick with him because 
probably they see him as a committed leader who is willing to endure personal 
suffering for the cause he champions.  
 
It is also significant that the new multiracial National Alliance Party under Ratu 
Epeli Ganilau was rejected by both ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians. This shows 
that it may be a long time before ethnicity can take a back seat enabling the people 
of Fiji to begin to focus on policies of the parties and the ability and dedication of 
the candidates while electing their leaders. 
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                                             Chapter 7 
                         Leadership for Preserving Fiji Fijian 
 
Scholars who have written about governing multiethnic countries invariably talk 
about the importance of leadership. ‘Consociationalism’, which is recommended 
by Lijphart as the best form of government for such countries. involves co-
operation between leaders of various ethnic groups for the good of the country. 
This requires a lot of  give and take. Futa Helu believes that for democracy to 
work in small Pacific countries, leaders have to abide by the principles of Socrates 
rather than following the Sophists. Socrates believed leaders should work for the 
good of the country unlike Sophists who believed only in having personal power. 
Michael Goldsmith sees having a ‘thoughtful’ opposition rather than a ‘hectoring’ 
one as important if the Westminster system is to succeed in the Pacific. That again 
stresses the importance of leadership as it requires the opposition to co-operate 
with the government when it comes to issues that are for the benefit of the nation.  
 
In the 1960s, when Fiji became self governing, fortunately Fiji enjoyed 
enlightened leadership from the leaders of both the major ethnic groups. Ratu 
Mara and A. D. Patel were both prepared to “subordinate their narrow, sectarian 
interests to the interests of the country as a whole” (Watters, 1969, p.269). The 
reorganization of the Fijian Association in the 1960s, which was initially formed 
in 1956 to safeguard Fijian interests under the leadership of the chiefs, showed 
Ratu Mara’s willingness to accommodate other ethnic groups while Patel made 
attempts to reach across to the Fijians and always accepted the special rights of 
the Fijian people as the autochthonous community.  
 
With Patel’s death, however, the NFP degenerated from the ‘thoughtful’ 
opposition that it was to a ‘confrontational’ one. The party he (Patel) founded and 
led to look after the welfare of the exploited people of all ethnic groups in the 
country slowly turned into an ethnic Indian party because it no longer had a clear 
ideology. This marked the real beginning of ethnic politics. This also meant that 
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the NFP could no longer continue as the effective opposition that it was and it 
slowly became reduced to a nomial one.    
 
This chapter argues that leadership has played a major role in Fiji’s rise and fall 
(in a wide range of areas which include politics, economy, and race-relations) 
during the decades under review. I begin by looking at indigenous Fijian 
leadership in this period, its aims and how successful it was in achieving them. 
While on the whole the ethnic Fijian leadership during this period had been 
positive, there had been some lapses which affected the whole nation. I then look 
at ethnic Indian leadership and how initially it was difficult to provide leadership 
to the whole community because of the divisions among the Indians until A.D. 
Patel emerged as a leader of national stature. After Patel, leadership again became 
problematic as most of those who succeeded him lacked his broad vision. My 
conclusion is that leadership (or its lack) was a major contributor to the crises that 
Fiji faced in its recent history. 
 
The Major Aim of Fijian Leadership 
 
In the colonial days the major concern of the indigenous Fijian people was 
ensuring that Fiji was preserved as a Fijian country (Mara, 1997, p.62). This was 
because there was a fear lurking in their minds that it might become a “Little India 
of the Pacific” as one writer had predicted (Coulter, 1942). From the 1940s, 
because of the growing Indian population which overtook the Fijian population, 
this fear became acute. The Fijian people left to their leaders, mainly the chiefs, 
the task of keeping Fiji Fijian. At the same time the new leaders who were 
emerging from among the Fijian commoners articulated these concerns more 
openly. Two of the most vocal were Rauama Vunivalu and Semesa Sikivou who 
both often brought out these issues in the Legislative Council. 
 
Fijians often discussed these ‘problems’ in their villages (Manoa, 1979). This was 
the reason for their reluctance in even having multiracial schools because they 
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feared that  that would lead to the loss of Fijian culture as expressed by Sikivou 
and Vunivalu in 1959 (Legislative Council Debates, 19 June,1959, pp.279 & 282; 
see also Gaunder, 1999, p.120). This also made them hesitant about independence, 
especially if it meant democracy on the principle of one person, one vote.  
 
At the time of independence many Fijians wanted the country to be handed back 
to the Fijian chiefs who had ceded it to Great Britain in 1874 rather than having a 
parliamentary democracy with rights for everyone, with the majority being in 
control of the government (see Chapter 1). Dr. Timoci Bavadra, who used to be 
the Assistant Director of Primary and Preventive Health Services in 1985, and 
later became the Prime Minister in the short-lived NFP/FLP coalition government 
of 1987,  had come across similar concerns among the ordinary Fijian people even 
after independence and they were reluctant to practise family planning for fear 
that the disparity in numbers between the two major races would work to their 
disadvantage when they faced the Indian ‘threat’ (Daily Post, 25 July,1992). 
 
By 1963 Ratu Mara had become “the undisputed leader of the Fijians” because of 
“his intellectual ability” (Norton, 2002, pp.142-143). He was the most 
“progressive” among the Fijian leaders and the colonial administration found him 
important as a “moderating force” (Norton, 2002, pp.142-143). He was not the 
most popular among the Fijian people, and other leading chiefs did not always 
agree with him “because of his conciliatory attitude to the Indian leaders” 
(Norton, 2002, p.142). But because he was a paramount chief the Fijians 
commoners did not question him and accepted his decisions, because it was 
against the Fijian tradition to question the chiefs or go against their decisions (see 
Ravuvu, 1983, p.7).  
 
The colonial officials found the senior Fijian leaders, who were mainly the high 
chiefs, more open to change than ordinary Fijians. Ratu Mara and his fellow 
chiefs who became the national leaders at independence persuaded their people to 
accept democracy with equal rights for everyone. The Fijian chiefs were prepared 
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“for the sake of Fiji’s stability and economic advancement” to share power with 
other ethnic groups “but not to relinquish it or to subordinate themselves to the 
will of others” (Ali, 1978, p.153). The other Fijian paramount chiefs, while they 
were not happy with some of Ratu Mara’s multiracial policies, still were prepared 
to give him a free reign because they knew that he would never do anything that 
compromised Fijian rights or marginalized the Fijian people in any way.   
 
Rejecting Patel’s call for a common electoral roll, Ratu Mara had made the views 
of the Fijian people clear just before the start of self-government. Fijians were 
very proud of their culture, and if they abandoned some of their culture, it would 
be to adopt the best of western culture, Ratu Mara said. Condemning Patel’s 
constant criticism of the Europeans, he said:  “Remove the ‘buffer’ as it were of 
European culture in Fiji and there will be conflagration because we will have to 
come to a decision which culture dominates in the country - will it be a Fijian 
culture or an Indian culture. Until we agree to a compromise to all these cultures 
there will be no peace in this country”, Ratu Mara warned (Legislative Council 
Debates, 16 December, 1965, p.662). 
 
A major priority of the Alliance Party under Ratu Mara which was in power at the 
time of independence was, therefore, making the country integrated with a 
common identity and no major disparity in educational or economic achievements 
between the two major groups. As long as there was a disparity, there was the 
threat of Fijians becoming marginalized and the country becoming a “Little India 
of the Pacific”. 
 
The Fijian leaders, including Ratu Mara, were not going to let that happen. On the 
contrary, they would stop it at all cost as their main concern was to see that Fiji 
remained Fijian. The Fijians were not only concerned about their land rights and 
security in the country. They were equally concerned about the ethos of the 
country which they wanted to remain Fijian. The question was one of identity, 
Little India of the South Pacific or Fiji – “should Fiji promote a Fijian image or an 
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Indian image?” (Scarr, 1988, p.117). This was a point the Indian leaders had to 
understand and accept. The disparity in numbers was closing in with higher 
migration and lower birth rate of the Indians. So one of the major tasks for leaders 
of the country at independence was working to eliminate the educational and 
economic disparities that existed at that time and building a nation with a distinct 
Fiji identity. 
 
From Paramount Chiefs to National Leaders 
 
In pre-colonial days leadership among the indigenous Fijians was mainly 
determined by strength of arms. After European contact the vital question was 
who had access to firearms. The coastal villages were the ones that had this 
advantage. So some of the coastal villages like Bau became very powerful and 
soon most of the other tribes accepted its rule though there was still some 
resistance from the hill tribes in the interior of Viti Levu.  
 
After cession, the colonial government decided to formalize the rule of the chiefs 
in the villages by establishing a Council of Chiefs and bringing the chiefs from 
different areas together to meet and work together under the colonial 
administration. At the outset this ‘indirect rule’ under the village chiefs was set in 
place by the British colonial government which also emphasized from the 
beginning the division between chiefs and commoners. The administration dealt 
with the Fijians through their chiefs.  
 
Soon western education became more important than anything else for acquiring 
leadership qualities. The colonial government made provisions for educating the 
sons of chiefs so they could take up positions in the colonial service to help to 
administer the Fijian people. They did not consider it necessary to educate the 
commoners so high schools were not established in Fiji for ethnic Fijians other 
than the Queen Victoria School (QVS) which was opened for the education of the 
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sons of chiefs. After that many of the young chiefs were sent abroad to the United 
Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand for further studies. 
 
Those sons of chiefs who demonstrated ability in providing leadership to their 
people in the modern setting became prominent. Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna was the 
most distinguished of them all as he excelled himself academically as well as in 
the army (French Foreign Legion). He was able to hold his own with the colonial 
administrators while at the same time retaining his control over his own people. 
By the time Ratu Sukuna retired from public life, there were a few young chiefs 
who were groomed to take over from him.  
 
At the time of independence, ‘the Big Four’ chiefs, as they were popularly known, 
dominated national politics. They were Ratu Edward Cakobau, Ratu George 
Cakobau, Ratu Penaia Ganilau and Ratu Mara (all of whom were later knighted). 
They could speak with authority for the Fijian people because Fijians from every 
corner of the nation accepted their leadership unquestioningly and Indians also 
looked up to them as leaders of the nation. There was no one of comparable 
stature among the Indians after the death of A. D. Patel. As Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi 
noted, “together [the Big Four] assured the good governance of the Fijian people 
and the other citizens of Fiji for a considerable period. They were assisted by 
well-educated non-chiefly persons in their leadership” (2004). 
 
Maintaining the Fijian Ethos/Safeguarding the Fijian Heritage 
 
Simione Durutalo has rightly pointed out that it was “only a certain category of 
chiefs who mortgaged away our future by signing the so called Deed of Cession” 
(1983, p.12). But in 1970, most of the ordinary Fijian people seemed to have been 
united in their desire that Britain give back the country to the chiefs, rather than it 
becoming a multiracial democracy (LC Debates, 18 June, 1970, p.242). Similarly 
in 1968 the Fijian commoners were united in their anger against the Indian leaders 
for attacking their chiefs and it was acknowledged (even by the Indian leaders) 
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that the chiefs played an important role in containing ethnic tensions and averting 
conflict (see Chapter 1). 
In 1977 it was the ordinary Fijians who supported Butadroka and his ideology of 
‘Fiji for the Fijians’ and elected him to Parliament in the first general elections 
that year. When they realized the consequences of their actions (that it made the 
Indian dominated NFP win by default) a few months later in the next general 
elections they threw their support solidly behind the Alliance Party which was led 
by the Fijian chiefs. In 1982, the Fijian commoners en masse rejected attempts by 
the foreign media (the Australian Four Corners Programme, in particular) to 
influence the results of the general elections and gave a clear mandate to Ratu 
Mara (see Chapter 6). 
In 1987 again many of the Fijians who had earlier supported the Fiji Labour Party 
withdrew their support as soon as it entered into a coalition, before the election, 
with the predominantly Indian NFP (see Chapter 6). The Fijian people in general 
rejoiced at Rabuka’s overthrow of the elected government. It was not just the 
eastern Fijians or the Taukei supporters but the majority of Fijians from all the 
provinces. The chiefs and the commoners were one in their wish that Fiji remain 
predominantly Fijian. So long as the politics of ethnicity prevailed, this was only 
possible if there was a Fijian-dominated government.  
Martha Kaplan has noted that village Fijians linked Fijian paramountcy with 
chiefly leadership. During her field work in Fiji she worked with Fijians whose 
ancestors were deported in the colonial period both by British officials and by 
chiefly Fijian officials. “Yet most nowadays are far more willing to cede 
leadership of the modern state to the descendants of those colonial chiefs than to 
consider any commonality of experience with the descendants of the indentured 
Indians” (Kaplan, 1988, p.109). 
A lot of criticism was also directed at the chiefs who acquired power after 
independence. There was a reason for this predominance of the chiefs which was 
that most of the educated Fijians at that time were chiefs. This was the direct 
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result of colonial policy which believed in educating only the sons of chiefs. So 
there were no facilities for the higher education of ordinary Fijian children while 
the sons of chiefs were sent abroad.   
David Robie has noted that “power was not intentionally handed over to the 
partnership of [Fijian] chiefs and general electors in the Alliance” at independence 
though “this group became an oligarchy” (Robie, 1989, p.208). The chiefs taking 
charge after independence was more the direct result of the education policy 
followed by the colonial government than they (Fijian chiefs) trying to preserve 
old hierarchies (see Norton, 2002, p.143).  
During most of the colonial period, the Europeans dominated in business and 
industry and they were also leading in professions like law. Soon Indians started 
replacing the Europeans in most of these areas as the Indians gave high priority to 
education and made sacrifices to educate their children against several odds (see 
Chapter 3). Besides there was the Gujerati community which had come as free 
migrants mainly to trade and who already had small businesses. They started 
competing with the Europeans in business, and soon began replacing them, 
especially in the retail sector. Fijians meanwhile lagged behind in education and in 
business. 
The Role of Education in Fostering Leadership 
With the establishment of the University of the South Pacific, tertiary education 
became available to all Fijian students who qualified. A new generation of 
educated Fijians was emerging who came from all the provinces and included 
both chiefs and commoners. However, USP failed to produce a new generation of 
leaders who were able to think clearly about issues facing the nation. The most 
important question facing the country was reconciling Fijian and Indian 
aspirations to bring about genuine integration. Ratu Mara was the only leader who 
had considered this problem seriously and in the early years talked about it and 
had policies for achieving the goal. Unfortunately, others like Butadroka and to 
some extent the NFP leaders started pulling in the opposite direction. 
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It was also not true that the Fijian chiefs did not want any change so that they 
could hold on to power. On the other hand, the Fijian commoners did not want 
democracy but it was the chiefs who persuaded them to accept it with rights for 
everyone (see Chapter 1). What the chiefs were working towards was a gradual 
change so that they could preserve the major aspects of their culture rather than 
being overwhelmed by the other cultures present in the country. Like Sir Geoffrey 
Henry of the Cook Islands, they seemed to have believed that “if we facilitate 
peaceful change, we make violent revolution unnecessary” (quoted in vom Busch, 
Crocombe et al, 1994, p.1).    
Unlike the colonial government, the Alliance government under the chiefs did not 
deny Fijian commoners educational opportunities in order to subjugate them. On 
the contrary all Fijian students who qualified to enter university were given 
scholarships to pursue their tertiary education. This was an attempt to elevate 
them all to a higher level not to suppress them. Unfortunately USP failed to 
produce any national leaders, Fijian or non- Fijian, who could address the  issues 
facing the nation. 
Butodroka often accused Ratu Mara of developing his home province of Lau at 
the expense of other provinces, especially Rewa (see Chapter 2). Bavadra and his 
colleagues in the Labour Party embarked on a similar line of attack. Brij Lal noted 
that at the FLP’s first annual convention in 1986, Bavadra had set the theme (Lal, 
1988, p.53). For Bavadra and his colleagues in the Labour Party, the difference 
between the Alliance and Labour was not just class, but the difference between 
the western provinces and the eastern provinces. They complained that while the 
western districts were the main producers of wealth for the country the eastern 
chiefs were ruling.  
This again had to do with education. The highly educated chiefs were all from the 
east, though it is not clear what the reason for this was. One reason perhaps was 
that the Provincial School Western was closed during the Second World War and 
was not reopened. It had also been suggested to me that schools such as, QVS, 
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Ratu Kadavulevu School (RKS) and Adi Cakobau School (ACS) were all 
established in the east (during the colonial days) and this also had an effect on the 
education of the people from the west not going for higher education. This does 
not seem to be a plausible explanation as these schools were all boarding schools 
and western chiefs also attended these schools.  
For example, Ratu Mara and Ratu Iloilo (the current President and Tui Vuda, one 
of the highest chiefs from the west) were contemporaries at QVS. It is not clear 
why the western chiefs did not distinguish themselves in education although the 
closure of the Provincial School Western may have had some effect as the 
provincial schools normally prepared the students for QVS.  
As for the claim that the government was pouring money into the eastern 
provinces at the expense of the west, this was far from the truth. In the early years 
of the Alliance rule most of the major developments were in the west (see Chapter 
2). 
Bavadra could have been excused for highlighting the regional differences if the 
western Fijians had been really suffering under the Alliance rule and there was 
discrimination practised against them. But the evidence showed that the western 
provinces were in no way relegated to a subordinate position. So creating 
divisions between the eastern and western Fijians was in no way justified.   
The coalition also accused the Alliance government of corruption. The example 
they gave was unequal regional development in education. They alleged that Lau 
received $1.3 million over three years for its 14,000 people while Ba province 
received $400,000 for its 59,000 Fijians. Besides, they claimed, most monies went 
to Mara’s village of Tubou and surrounding areas. The Ministry of Fijian Affairs 
quickly denied the allegation, claiming that scholarship awards, half of the sum 
involved, were always based on merit (Robertson, 1988, p.49). 
Lakeba had an early start in western education with both the Methodist and 
Roman Catholic missionaries landing there first. As mentioned earlier (Chapter 2) 
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Lau Provincial School was one of the earliest provincial schools to be established 
(the only one to have English as the medium of instruction) and in the early years 
it had an Oxford scholar, A.M. Hocart, as its headmaster (see Chapter 2). It is not 
clear if this early start had given the province an advantage over other provinces 
when it came to educational achievement. In independent Fiji many of the 
educated Fijians hailed from Lau. Deryck Scarr noted that the Lau Provincial 
Council represented probably the best educated Fijians in the country (1988, 
p.112). 
So instead of trying to understand the historical reasons behind the prominence of 
Lau and trying to raise other provinces to that level, Bavadra, with encouragement 
from his ideologues, tried to bring Lau down. Bavadra’s scholarly advisers based 
at USP, many of them expatriate, seemed to have had limited understanding of 
local realities.  
Many of the academics at USP, both local and expatriate, took an active interest in 
Fiji’s local politics. They should have been able to conclude that at least from 
1977 the Westminster system had not been working well for Fiji as ethnicity 
became more important than policies for the political parties. Surely the 
academics should have realized the dangers such a situation would lead the 
country into.  
Some Indo-Fijian scholars sounded a note of warning against the continuation of 
ethnic politics. But no Fijian scholar, however, spoke about these issues 
dispassionately from a Fijian point of view. Professor Ravuvu was the foremost 
among those who took an anti-Labour stand but he failed to objectively talk of 
Fijian fears and perceptions, by giving the reasons behind them and examining 
their validity, and suggesting what should be done to bring about genuine 
multiracialism. 
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Fijian Leadership Lapses 
The majority of Fijian people, including the high chiefs, did not agree with Ratu 
Mara’s policy of multiracialism. The only other high chief who had a similar 
outlook and was happy to give equal rights to the Indians was Ratu Sir Edward 
Cakobau (see Lal, 1986, p.27). After Ratu Edward’s death in 1973, although no 
one openly raised any objections to the policies followed by the Prime Minister, 
they were not wholly behind him. This seemed to have been the reason for no 
high chief speaking against Butadroka or rebuking him when he started his attack 
on Ratu Mara and the Indians to whom he gave equal rights in the country.  
If the chiefs had been united in their condemnation of Butadroka he would have 
been soon silenced as the chiefly system was still very strong and Butadroka was 
a traditional Fijian. The others did not speak against Butadroka because they 
seemed to have shared his anti-Indian sentiments. The only other chiefly leader 
who seemed to have supported multiracialism was Adi Losalini Dovi who always 
spoke in favour of these policies in Parliament, especially multiracial education 
(see Chapter 3).     
The first mistake made by the chiefly leaders was in not putting up a united front 
against Butadroka and attacking his policies which were not in the best interests of 
the young nation. Ratu Sir George Cakobau, in particular, failed to silence 
Butadroka when the latter dragged the former into the controversy by saying that 
Ratu Mara was overriding Ratu George in implementing policies which worked 
against the Fijians and benefited the Indians (see Chapter 2). This was a very 
costly lapse because not condemning Butadroka when he started his attack on 
Ratu Mara led to the erosion of Fijian culture. In Fijian culture a chief is not 
questioned or criticized let alone attacked as Butadroka did.   
Apisai Tora noted (with regret?) in Parliament Butadroka’s attack on Ratu Mara 
and rightly predicted that it was a sign of things to come. Chiefly system was still 
very strong and Butadroka could have been easily made to toe the line. Since the 
problem was not nipped in the bud a few years later others like Rabuka followed 
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suit and Butadroka’s Fijian Nationalist Party even called for the abolition of the 
chiefly system. After 1987 Fijian culture became so eroded that it lost its 
uniqueness.  
Soon the difference of opinion between Ratu George and Ratu Mara led to greater 
problems that affected the whole country as was seen in the appointment of the 
new chief justice in the late 1970s.   Ratu Mara as Prime Minister was in charge of 
localization. When suitable local people were available for positions held by 
expatriates, the posts were slowly localized. The Prime Minister had assured that 
localization would be done with sensitivity (Legislative Council Debates, 25 
February, 1970, pp.52-53).  
So when Ratu Mara identified a suitable local person for the post of the Chief 
Justice, he made the ‘mistake’ of asking the expatriate Chief Justice how he felt 
about retiring and making way for a local person. Whatever the real reason for his 
taking offence was, the Chief Justice gave a curt reply that he came under the 
Governor General and not the Prime Minister. It was most unlikely that Ratu 
Mara intended to override Ratu George or interfere with the judiciary. However, 
the Chief Justice went to the press about it. When Ratu George came to know 
what had happened he was also offended that Ratu Mara had by passed him.  
If the Chief Justice had hoped that by creating a rift between the Governor 
General and the Prime Minister, he could retain his post, he was mistaken. Ratu 
George, to assert his authority, refused to appoint the person Ratu Mara had in 
mind (see also Kumar, Vijendra 2005). The Prime Minister had identified the 
former Speaker of Parliament, Ron Kermode, a man of proven integrity and 
acceptable to all sides, as the ideal choice for the first local Chief Justice. Instead 
Ratu George made the grave mistake of appointing Timoci Tuivaga, the only 
Fijian judge, but a very junior person, far from suitable for the post at that time as 
he had little experience.  It was a very poor and unwise choice and set the 
precedent, especially from 1987, for having Fijians with little experience and 
ability for important posts, with ethnicity becoming the major consideration.  
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Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi noted in 2004 that in their respective desire to assert 
themselves, “it is apparent that the chiefly relations among the chiefs of Fiji have 
frayed”. This incident, more than anything else perhaps, marked the beginning of 
that ‘fraying’ of that relationship. 
Ratu Penaia and the Army 
Ratu Penaia Ganilau, who became the Governor General after Ratu George, was 
considered more able by the colonial administration which had made him the first 
(or second, after Ratu Sukuna?) local to be the Secretary for Fijian Affairs. Ratu 
Penaia, however, made an even greater mistake by interfering in the internal 
matters of the army. According to Deryck Scarr, Ratu Penaia “struck some 
observers as rather simple, for all his years in politics. Once elevated to 
Government House he had reportedly been inclined to attempt to interfere in 
civilian appointments as well as military matters in a manner not constitutional” 
(Scarr, 1988, p.93).     
According to another writer, Ganilau “personally backed [Rabuka’s] promotion 
through the ranks because the colonel was also from Cakaudrove province” 
(Robie, 1989, p.227). After the coup, the “Governor General not only granted 
Rabuka an amnesty for treason (which carries the death penalty) but also 
promoted him to full colonel. Rabuka was later promoted to brigadier after his 
second coup on 25 September. A year after the coup he became major-general” 
(Robie, 1989, p.229).  
As Governor General, Ratu Penaia was the Commander in Chief of the army, but 
it was only an honorary position. So it was unethical and imprudent to override 
the decisions of the Commander of the Army. This Ratu Penaia did when the 
Commander, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, wanted to court martial Sitiveni Rabuka for 
disobeying orders (Scarr, 1988, pp.66 & 93; Robie, 1989, p.227). The Governor 
General supported Rabuka and by doing that he was affecting the discipline of the 
army. Later Rabuka felt confident to dismiss the commander of the army and 
another officer who was superior to him and to overthrow the elected government 
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and arrest and imprison the entire cabinet. He felt secure in his knowledge that the 
Governor General was there to protect him. A few months later, however, he 
dismissed the Governor General himself and appointed his own government, 
declaring Fiji a republic.  
When it came to Fijian rights and perceptions, Ratu George in some ways proved 
more effective at enforcing those rights, and thereby restraining violent reactions 
from the indigenous Fijians, than Ratu Penaia. In 1977, when the Alliance Party 
lost the general election, Ratu George appointed Ratu Mara as the leader of a 
minority government as he believed that was the best course for Fiji.  
Similarly, Ratu Penaia would have been justified in dismissing Dr. Bavadra’s 
coalition government (after the first few weeks) when it became clear that the 
majority of Fijians were not happy with the outcome.  It had not won a single 
Fijian communal seat and had polled less than ten per cent of the ethnic Fijian 
votes. As noted earlier, it had also “secured only a minority of overall vote”, 47.1 
per cent compared to 49.5 per cent for the Alliance Party (Fraenkel, 2000, pp.104-
105). So the Governor General would have been justified if he had decided to 
consider alternatives such as a Government of National Unity with himself as the 
Chairman and then called for another election after a few months to get a clearer 
verdict from the electorate.  
As long as the chiefs put on a united front and gave guidance to the Fijian people, 
with the interest of the nation as paramount, things moved smoothly. Things 
started going wrong not only for the ethnic Fijians but for the whole country when 
differences between the high chiefs and their personal preferences influenced their 
decisions at the national level. I have, however, not come across any evidence of 
the high chiefs trying to entrench their rule, establishing themselves as an 
‘oligarchy’ and denying rights to the commoners as some scholars have claimed.  
 Durutalo, for example, claimed that the indigenous ruling class was acting “in the 
interests of its own class rule” (1983, p.12). He rightly pointed out that the 
indigenous people were discouraged from thinking for themselves. This was true 
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during the colonial rule when they were denied opportunities for higher education. 
But from 1970 onwards people of Fiji, of all walks of life, enjoyed all the 
freedoms.  
Fijian people in particular had been making their own decisions as was evident 
from their voting pattern in the general elections. If one agrees with Bain that the 
“essence of democracy is choice” (Bain, 1989, p.215) then Fijians had been 
enjoying democracy ever since independence. They supported Butadroka in the 
1970s when they felt that Ratu Mara’s multiracial policies were benefiting the 
Indians more than the Fijians. Similarly, Rabuka was adored by the Fijian people 
for what he did to re-establish Fijian supremacy in 1987. Ten years later, when he 
took a more moderate stand and revised the racist constitution, his popularity 
declined and in the next general elections, in 1999, the majority withdrew their 
support for his chiefly sponsored SVT party. Another reason for their withdrawing 
support was that they realized that Rabuka was acting in his personal interests 
which took priority over national interests.   
Fijians had the right to choose their government though some scholars like 
Stephanie Lawson may claim that there was no democracy because there was no 
change of government. But surely if the majority does not want a change when 
free elections are held then they should be allowed to have the government of 
their choice. In Fiji even the opposition admitted that the elections were free. 
Satendra Nandan, a deposed minister in the Bavadra government, wrote: “During 
elections no one was imprisoned …. By and large, these elections were free and 
fair … the political process wasn’t corrupted” (2000, p.13)  
Ratu Mara and his Critics 
Ratu Mara is much maligned33 by academics, in particular, local and expatriate. 
But even his greatest critics are not able to diminish the greatness of his 
achievements. The writers are also forced to admit, however grudgingly, his 
                                                 
33 He is even accused of murder (see Connew, 2001, p.73) 
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contribution (Bain34, Harder, Robie). Ratu Mara’s greatest challenge was 
“assuaging Fijian fears as well as addressing Indo-Fijian concerns … Mara 
successfully balanced the competing demands of Fiji’s ethnic communities for 
much of his tenure in power”, Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi noted. His reputation 
declined in recent years for various reasons. “Young Fijians imbued with the 
arrogance of youth and the certainties of contemporary realities, consider he did 
not do enough to address Fijian failings in education, commerce and politics”, 
Ratu Joni said (fijilive, 16 May, 2003).  
Ratu Mara was also behind the formation of the South Pacific Forum in 1971 and 
“he argued strongly that the islands needed trade before aid if they were to survive 
economically” (Robie, 1989, p.208). Robie also acknowledged the important role 
Ratu Mara played “in establishing the region’s role and reputation abroad through 
his eloquence” (Robie, 1989, p.208).  
 
Ratu Mara succeeded in bringing Fijians and Indians closer together through the 
policies of his government. This I would say was the reason that even after the 
military coups there was very little violence. This, when contrasted with 1968, 
when the country was on the verge of violence though there was no threat to 
Fijian rights at that time (see Chapter 1), gives an indication of how the country 
had changed in less than 20 years.  
 
Another reason that contained violence was that Ratu Mara made sure that 
firearms were kept out of civilian hands as Christopher Harder35 had 
acknowledged. So people did not have access to firearms to start an armed 
                                                 
34 Bain noted: “The 1970 Constitution embraces all the conceptual protections for human rights 
and dignity that can be conceived to prevent man doing evil unto man, and it is entirely proper for 
Ratu Mara to take credit for being one of its principal intellectual architects”  (1988, p.134).  
35 Harder wrote: “Whatever other criticisms had been leveled against the 17-year-old Government 
of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, who had been Prime Minister since independence, until now they had 
done a good job keeping firearms out of Fiji …. In particular they were tough on visiting yachties 
…. They were given no option – hand the weapons over for storage in bond until they left or head 
back out to sea immediately. The authorities had always feared what might happen in such a 
volatile society if people were able to arm themselves with anything more than sticks, stones and 
cane knives” (1988, pp.159-160). 
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revolution, though after the 1987 coups there was an attempt to import firearms 
into the country, which was detected before they reached Fiji. It is, however, not 
clear who was behind that attempt.  
All in all the Fijian chiefly leadership, which was mainly in control of the nation 
from 1970 to 1987, looked after the interests of all the people of the country to a 
great extent and kept the country stable and peaceful. The country also made all 
round progress. Economists seem to agree that Fiji had a strong economy until 
1987. Australian National University economist Dr. Satish Chand said that Fiji 
was a lead economy in the region until the 1987 coup while Dr. Biman Prasad, 
Head of School of Economics at the University of the South Pacific said that the 
country’s political instability since 1987 had not allowed it to grow at the rate that 
it should have. According to Dr. Prasad the civil service was ‘uprooted’ after the 
coups in 1987 leading to the ‘culture of mediocrity’ that set in across the civil 
service while mismanagement and bad governance became more pronounced (Fiji 
Times,23 November, 2006).  
Dr Satish Chand has also said that the country's leaders since 1987 failed to 
exploit the advantages in steering Fiji to greater heights. These comments were 
made in response to an Australian Treasury Department report which said Fiji was 
among the Pacific countries who had squandered $US75million ($F126.9million) 
since independence through poor governance. 
The country had Fijian commoners leading the governments from 1992 to 2006 
(except for 12 months from May 1999 to May 2000). The main reason for the lack 
of economic progress during this period seems to have been that these non-chiefly 
leaders who have been in charge of the country (Rabuka and Qarase, in particular) 
have been following nationalist policies emphasising indigenous Fijian 
hegemony. Such policies do not inspire confidence in the investors who are 
mainly non-Fijians. It remains to be seen if the investor confidence would return 
under the interim government the country has now.  
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From Manilal to Mahendra Chaudhry: Leadership Woes of the Fiji Indians 
 
Unlike the indigenous Fijians who had their hereditary chiefs, leadership had 
always been problematic for the Fiji Indians, as Professor Subramani has observed 
(1995, p.179). This was partly because the Indians who came to Fiji did not form 
a homogeneous community. They came from different parts of the sub-continent; 
spoke different languages, followed different religions and had different customs. 
While the majority had come as indentured labourers, there were others who had 
come as free migrants, to farm and to trade.  
 
Most of the people who came during the indenture period were illiterate, which 
caused problems as challenging their European employers required an 
understanding of the laws and their legal rights, so there were very few among 
them with the potential to provide leadership to the community. The few literate 
ones like Totaram Sanadhyay (1991) and Sadhu Kuppuswami tried to do 
whatever they could to alleviate the suffering of their fellow migrants in a country 
far away from their homeland.  
 
On the other hand, some other time-expired labourers who were literate were used 
by the colonial administration for their own ends, promoting them as Indian 
leaders when they did not really represent the community. The best example was 
Badri Maharaj who was nominated to the Legislative Council in 1916 to represent 
the Indians. He had no popular support and “was little more than a puppet of the 
colonial government” (Narsey, 1979, p.122). 
 
The few who could read and write, looked up to India for leadership especially to 
Mahatma Gandhi, who sent C.F. Andrews in 1914 while the indenture system was 
still on. Andrews successfully sought to end the system with the last batch of 
indentured labourers coming to Fiji in 1916 on a five year contract which ended in 
1920. Even after that the colonial government did not take any measures to settle 
the Indians as permanent migrants which most of them had chosen to be. Instead 
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the administration left it to the CSR to do whatever it could with the time-expired 
Indian labourers.   
 
C. F. Andrews visited Fiji for a second time in 1917, while the indenture system 
was in the process of being abolished and again in 1936 and he gave sound advice 
to the Indian settlers. He stressed the paramountcy of Fijian interests and advised 
Indians to remember that “Fiji belonged to the Fijians, and they were there as 
guests” (Gillion, 1977 p.154). He also emphasized the importance of multiracial 
schools for building bridges of understanding between the Fijian and Indian 
communities. Swami Avinashananda, who came from India after Andrews, held 
similar views and described the Fijians as ‘the Brahmins of Fiji’ (Gillion, 1977, p. 
15). In India, Brahmins were not only the highest caste but they were the spiritual 
leaders as well, so perhaps Swamiji meant that the Fijians should be respected and 
their interests should take precedence.  
 
Other Indian leaders also stressed the paramountcy of Fijian interests. S. B. Patel, 
a lawyer from India who settled down in Fiji, and who offered behind-the-scene 
leadership to the Indian community, said in 1929: “We do not wish or desire to 
dominate. We do not want to see the Fijian suffer. His interest in the colony is 
paramount and we want to maintain it”; while Kunzru, who visited Fiji in 1938 
spoke of “the duty of the Indians to work for the advancement of the Fijians” 
(Gillion, pp.136 & 174). 
 
It was difficult for anyone to assume leadership of the whole group because of the 
divisions among the Indians, so it led to the emergence of sectional leaders who 
formed their own cultural and religious organizations. The indentured labourers 
lacked the necessary skills and knowledge in providing leadership to even their 
communal groups, so most of them looked to India again for help. It goes, 
however, to their great credit that even with their limited abilities and resources, 
they were able to establish schools for their children and places of worship for 
their communities. 
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Manilal Doctor, a lawyer from Baroda who came through Mauritius, could be 
considered as the first leader of the whole Indian community in Fiji rather than of 
just one section.  Totaram Sanadhyay described his arrival in Suva in 1912 as a 
‘seminal’ event. What was more, the Fijians were almost as enthusiastic about his 
arrival in the colony and organised a grand reception for him (Sanadhyay, 1991). 
Unfortunately, because of some of his personal failings (see Gillion, 1977, p.21), 
the administrators found it easy to find fault with him and arrange for his 
deportation. He was held responsible for the 1920 strike by the Indian workers.  
However, during his stay of a few years, he was able to provide leadership to the 
Indian community by fighting for their rights. In doing so he challenged the 
European vested interests and the colonial administration.  
 
Sadhu Bhashisht Muni was the next person to come from India and assume 
leadership of the Indians. This time it was the internal divisions among the 
Indians, which helped the administration to get rid of him. The Sadhu (Sadhu is a 
title given to someone who leads an ascetic life without formally renouncing the 
world) was a Sanatani (an orthodox Hindu) and the Sanatanis believed that the 
Arya Samajis (the reformed Hindus) had a hand in urging the government to send 
him away. He was blamed by the authorities for the 1921 strike and was also 
deported.  
 
Pandit Vishnu Deo was the most important Indian leader in the 1930s. Unlike the 
other leaders so far, he was born in Fiji. Earlier he had dissipated his energies in 
trying to ridicule the Sanatanis (the orthodox Hindus) which impeded his progress 
as a leader (Gillion, 1977, p.110). He later became the first Fiji-born Indian leader 
to be accepted by the whole Indian community as their leader. Vishnu Deo was 
first and foremost an Arya Samaji (reformed Hindu) but Ahmed Ali had noted that 
he (Deo) “was pundit to all Indians irrespective of religion; the community as a 
whole accepted his position as the leader” (Ali, 1979, p.82).  
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Sadhu Kuppuswami, who came as an indentured labourer from South India, 
played an important role in providing leadership though he never became a leader 
of the Indian community as a whole. When he established the Then India 
Sanmarga Ikya Sangam (the South Indian organisation) he showed remarkable 
foresight in inviting the monks of the Ramakrishna Mission to come to Fiji to 
guide the activities of the Sangam. Swami Avinashananda came initially, and 
during his stay of about a year, helped in giving the Sangam direction and getting 
it registered.  
 
Swami Rudrananda, who came after Swami Avinashananda’s return to India, 
remained in Fiji for the rest of his life fighting to improve the living standards of 
the downtrodden in the country. Swami Rudrananda, who was sent by the 
Ramakrishna Mission as a resident monk to help the Sangam, became an 
important leader, not only of the South Indians but of the whole sugar cane 
farming community (which consisted of the majority of the Indians at that time). 
Swamiji worked tirelessly for several decades to improve the standard of life of 
the farmers. He also had a major role in getting A. D. Patel, a Gujerati lawyer 
practising in Fiji, who had been made the legal adviser of the Sangam, involved in 
the struggle to get a better deal for the sugarcane farmers of Fiji.    
 
Patel’s Fight to Stop Exploitation 
 
A. D. Patel was the most outstanding among all the leaders Indians in Fiji ever 
had.  He remained the most important leader of the Indians for several decades, 
until his death in 1969 just before independence. He was a lawyer, like Manilal, 
who had come to Fiji in 1928. He soon earned a name as an eloquent speaker and 
a brilliant advocate but he did not make a great impact as a politician (he was 
defeated at the polls twice) until after he joined hands with Swami Rudrananda 
and started working for the betterment of the sugarcane farmers. Together they 
formed the farmers union, the Maha Sangh. 
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According to one scholar, the more prominent leaders from the outset tended to 
use the union movement for their own personal advancement (Naidu, 1987, 
p.218). This was not true of Patel as even when farmers’ leaders urged him to help 
the sugarcane farmers in their struggle Patel refused because he did not feel any 
commitment to them (Lal, 1997, p.59). It was only when Swami Rudrananda 
persuaded him to join forces with him that Patel was finally drawn in. This 
involvement undoubtedly helped him in his political career but he gave a lot of his 
time and energy for the cause so it was not one sided.  
 
Naidu had further claimed that “these unions did little to improve the conditions 
of the peasantry” (Naidu, 1987, p.218). This was not true of the farmers’ unions 
before independence. It was Patel’s efforts on their behalf that won the cane 
farmers a better deal resulting in the withdrawal of the CSR Company and the 
establishment of the Fiji Sugar Corporation. If farmers’ lot did not still improve it 
was perhaps because the outside exploiters were replaced by exploiters drawn 
from their own ranks as Wadan Narsey had suggested ( Narsey, 1979, p.136; see 
also Chapter 5).  
 
At first the Maha Sangh was supported only by the South Indian farmers while the 
North Indian farmers were members of the Kisan Sangh. Slowly, as Patel’s 
popularity grew, farmers from all communities started supporting the Maha 
Sangh. It later became the backbone of the Federation Party (later known as the 
National Federation Party).  Patel thus became the founder of the first political 
party in Fiji and remained its leader till his death. During his leadership, although 
the party was a predominantly Indian one in composition, its policies were not 
meant for any particular community. He was working to improve the lives of the 
poor people (mainly the farmers) and he was fighting against exploitation of any 
kind by anyone, be it the colonial government, the CSR Company or the Fijian 
establishment.  
 
Patel was fearless and highly principled and even his opponents appreciated his 
sincerity and commitment to his ideals. Patel saw the Fijian commoners also as 
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victims of exploitation and genuinely wanted to help them as well just as he 
wanted to help the downtrodden Fiji Indians. At the time of his death he seemed 
to have been formulating his policies for helping the workers at the goldmine who 
were predominantly Fijian who were victims of exploitation by the Australian 
Emperor Gold Mining Company (see Chapter 4). Patel had already started co-
operating with Ratu Mara from the time the membership system was introduced in 
1964 paving the way for self-government. After the by-elections of 1968, this co-
operation on issues of benefit to the nation strengthened (see Chapter 1). 
Unfortunately Patel died a year later and “the Indian Fijians never recovered from 
the death of their leader” (Nandan, 2000, p.136). I would say that Fiji as a nation 
suffered because so far it has not had an Opposition Leader to match Patel. In the 
Westminster system that Fiji followed the importance of the opposition could not 
be overlooked as the Fiji experience has proven.  
 
Siddiq Koya, who succeeded Patel as the leader of the Opposition National 
Federation Party, continued this co-operation leading to the smooth transition to 
independence in 1970. Unfortunately, Koya was not consistent or dedicated as 
Patel used to be and these failings in the new leader became the bane of the Indian 
community and the country itself, leading to ethnic tensions and ultimately ethnic 
conflict. 
 
Ratu Mara accused Patel of arrogance in 1965 saying he refused to learn about the 
Fijian chiefly system. If Patel was arrogant, his arrogance was directed against the 
European vested interests and the Fijian chiefs who he thought were exploiting the 
Fijian commoners. In 1968 when he realized how the ordinary Fijian people felt 
about the chiefly system, Patel’s attitude to the chiefs changed and he made a 
genuine effort at reconciliation (see Chapter 1). 
  
In paying tribute to Patel at his death, Ratu Mara noted: “As the first Leader of the 
Opposition, he set a standard of dignity, of eloquence and of courtesy in the finest 
traditions of Parliamentary form of Government which we have inherited” (LC 
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Debates, 21 November, 1969). Ratu Mara further noted that there were deep 
divisions between Patel and himself, between the Government members and the 
Opposition under Patel. But all of them respected his sincerity and the devotion to 
the cause for which he fought.  
 
Koya who succeeded Patel also stressed how dignified Patel was and how he did 
not let anything lower the dignity of the House. He further noted how Patel helped 
to emancipate a large number of people in Fiji and as counsel for cane farmers 
often accepted a brief without fee. Koya concluded that “with his abilities, 
knowledge and quality he could have amassed a fortune and lived a leisurely life, 
oblivious of the manner in which people around him were treated, lived and died 
or alternatively turned into an acquiescent conformer and won the favours of those 
in power for extra prestige and benefits. He, however, chose the painful path of 
sincere, dedicated service” (Legislative Council Debates, 21 November, 1969). 
 
It was Patel’s sincerity in his dedicated work to make a difference for the better 
for the ordinary people of Fiji of all races that set him apart as a great leader. A 
proof of his sincerity was his willingness to admit when he had made a mistake 
and make amends (see Chapter 1). So in 1968, when he realized that he was 
wrong in challenging the Fijian chiefly system, he started a dialogue with Ratu 
Mara to resolve their differences and work towards self government. Ratu Mara 
noted that it was Patel’s assurance that the Fijian ownership of land, whether it 
was native or crown, would not be questioned that made Fijian leaders agree to 
self government. 
 
When Patel demanded common roll his opponents accepted that he was sincere 
although mistaken in believing that that would bring about integration. Patel 
believed that the real “criterion for election should be ability, not one’s cultural 
background” (Lal, 1997, p.50) but he failed to realize that the majority did not 
follow that principle when casting votes and electing their representatives. 
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One scholar who seemed to be critical of Patel (though he does not mention him 
by name) is Vijay Mishra. He accuses the ‘expatriate’ Indian politicians of 
exploiting the Fiji Indians (1990, pp.609-610). This was far from the truth, 
especially if he was referring to A.D. Patel or his brother R.D. Patel. Patel, 
although not Fiji-born, did a lot to help the Fiji Indians and he was successful in 
stopping exploitation rather than exploiting anyone. 
 
Change of Policy under Koya 
When Koya became the leader, from the beginning he displayed a lack of 
dedication and sincerity that he acknowledged in Patel. As mentioned earlier, 
many times his absence from Parliament had been noted and commented on by 
the government side but it continued. The most conspicuous example was in 1975, 
when Butadroka introduced his pivotal motion calling for the repatriation of 
Indians from Fiji (see Chapter 6). The leader of the NFP which the majority of the 
Indians supported was in the Supreme Court fighting a case! 
 
Unlike Patel, who had clear policies for the party, under Koya the party lacked a 
coherent policy. One reason for this was that soon after Patel’s death the country 
had achieved the major things Patel had been fighting for which were an end to 
colonialism and exploitation.  The country gained independence and the farmers 
received a better deal with the CSR withdrawing from Fiji.  
 
What Koya failed to appreciate was that independence meant different problems, 
and one of the most important was bringing the two major races together. 
Although in his early years as the leader Koya gave the impression that he was 
sincere in his concern for improving the position of the Fijians in the country, 
especially in improving their educational achievement, when it came to 
implementing these policies he was not supportive. An example was the 
preferential policy for admission to the USP (see Chapter 3). 
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Then there was the question of the freehold land owned by the CSR which 
reverted to crown land after the departure of the Company. Patel had assured that 
the ownership of  land, be it crown land or native land, would not be questioned at 
all but the opposition under Koya advocated the sale of the CSR land to sitting 
tenants (see Chapter 2). There was also the question of common roll. Although 
Koya kept up the demand for this system of election, he never stood for a national 
seat which was the closest thing to a common roll seat. 
  
He also lowered the dignity of the Parliament by indulging in personal attacks 
(e.g. his attacks on Len Usher, Stinson, Falvey etc.). Perhaps the worst example 
was on 27 June, 1974 when he produced two nooses in Parliament and asked two 
Indian  members on the government side to hang themselves.  The combined 
result of all this was that rather than promoting multiracialism he generated 
conflict and unrest. Soon more divisions emerged. The one redeeming feature of 
his leadership, however, was that although he often said that as Leader of the 
Opposition he was the alternate Prime Minister, he did not ever try to deliberately 
get rid of the Fijian-dominated Alliance government, as his successor, Jai Ram 
Reddy, did. His hesitancy in assuming leadership of the country when his party 
narrowly won the first general elections in 1977 (see Chapter 5) was also to his 
credit as it showed an understanding of Fijian feelings and the need to keep the 
ethnic balance. 
 
NFP under Reddy 
 
Unlike Patel, Koya and Reddy were both Fiji-born, but they were less sensitive to 
Fijian feelings than Patel was. Gillion had noted in 1977: “But the time was past 
when visitors from India, however well meaning, could have any say in the affairs 
of Fiji. Indians would have to make their own terms with the other peoples of Fiji, 
and they would have to make them not on the basis of patronage of the Fijians, 
but on terms of equality with them, at best, and in the realization that they could 
not supplant the Europeans” (Gillion, 1977, p.174).       
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Two years later, in 1979, at the time of the centenary celebrations of the arrival of 
the first indentured labourers in Fiji, the Indian High Commissioner, Mrs. Soonu 
Kochar, made the mistake of not heeding this sound advice (that visitors from 
India should keep out of Fiji politics) when she publicly made an impassioned 
plea to the Indian leaders to unite, stopping their infighting. Ratu Mara soon 
wanted her out of Fiji as he thought she was interfering in Fiji’s domestic affairs. 
 
In 1979 there was also Banarsidas Chaturvedi, who had been “pursuing a lonely 
concern for the interests of Indians abroad” (Gillion, 1977, p.114). He offered his 
advice to the Fiji Indians but it was very different from Mrs. Kochar’s as he was 
more concerned about relationship between Fijians and Indians. Chaturvedi asked 
the Fiji Indians to respect Fijians and live in harmony with them (Girmit 
Centenary Souvenir Magazine, 1979).  
 
Chaturvedi also suggested to India’s Foreign Minister, Atal Behari Vajpai, who 
later became the  Prime Minister, that the Indian government should donate a sum 
of Rs. 6-7 ‘lakhs’ to build a centre for racial integration in Fiji.  This centre, 
Chaturvedi believed, should be managed not by Indians alone, but by all the races, 
which would bring about better relations between different races in Fiji (Girmit 
Souvenir Magazine, 1979). Following this suggestion, when the Indian Prime 
Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, visited Fiji in 1981, she donated the money and laid 
the foundation for the ‘Girmit Centre’, which was built on land donated by the Fiji 
Government. Unfortunately, from the beginning it failed to serve the purpose for 
which it was intended – bringing about national integration.      
 
The Leader of the Opposition, Jai Ram Reddy, must have read Chaturvedi’s 
message as his (Reddy’s) name came second after the Chairman Ratu Sir Penaia 
Ganilau’s in the editorial committee of the Souvenir Magazine. He, however, 
showed no sign of having taken that message seriously. His call to the Indians in 
Fiji on that historic occasion was a reminder of the achievements of the 
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‘girmitiyas’ and an exhortation to be strong in facing the future. There was 
nothing in his message about fostering harmonious relationships with other 
communities which was the challenge facing the Fiji Indians at that time 
 
When Reddy became the leader of the Opposition in 1977 after the second general 
elections that year, the Indian community had high expectations from him as he 
had made statements that gave the impression that he would be putting an end to 
the politics of confrontation and would co-operate with Fijian leaders and bring 
back the harmony that existed earlier (see Chapter 6). In other words, the 
expectation was that under him the opposition would become a ‘thoughtful’ 
opposition once again. Instead what Reddy did was to reduce the NFP to a party 
similar to the Alliance in ideology (see Lal, 1986, p.95). Besides he succeeded in 
heightening racial tensions in 1982 by his lack of appreciation of Fijian 
sensitivities and thereby antagonising the Fijian community.  
 
If Fijian leadership lapses led to the destruction of the unique Fijian culture with 
the chiefly system as its ‘cultural capital’, Indian leadership lapses led to the 
destruction of the prospect of a ‘multiracial’ nation with equal rights for everyone. 
Materially, the Indian community was the major loser here and this was caused by 
the limited vision of the Fiji Indian leaders who could only think in terms of their 
community rather than looking at the needs of the nation, though they paid lip 
service to nationalism. 
 
The Task of Leading a Nation 
 
Reddy noted in 1980 that “after ten years of independence, no nationalism exists, 
only communalism” (quoted in Premdas, 1993, p.22). This was said probably as a 
criticism of the Alliance government. Ironically, Reddy and his predecessor, 
Siddiq Koya, contributed immensely to this retrograde state of affairs.                       
 
In the 1972 and 1977 general elections, the NFP made education the main policy 
platform leading to the Indians withdrawing their support for the Alliance 
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government (see chapter 3). Patel looked at education “in terms of education not 
in terms of votes” (emphasis in the original) and “had (or at least gave the 
impression of having) no political axes to grind” (former Director of Education, 
quoted in Lal, 1997, p.168). Under Koya, the opposition looked at education only 
from the view of gaining a few extra votes and not in terms of what was good for 
the nation.  
 
So in 1977 the NFP made the USP quota system the main election issue. This led 
to the Indians withdrawing their support for the multiracial Alliance Party from 
1977. Earlier 25 per cent of Indians had supported the Alliance (in some 
constituencies over 35 per cent – Lal,1986, p.90) but now they saw the Alliance as 
a party that was against the Indians and for Fijians only as it followed education 
policies that affected the Indian students adversely (see Chapter 3). 
 
NFP leadership also showed lack of principles in colluding with the Nationalists 
in 1977 in the national seats using “various strategies of mutual support” (Alley, 
1977, p.288) to defeat the Alliance Party (see also Chapter 5). A Fiji Times 
editorial commented on  “the curious political marriage between the FNP and the 
NFP in some constituencies” and concluded that “politics makes strange 
bedfellows” (4 April, 1977).  This perhaps was the most thoughtless action of the 
NFP leadership as it colluded with a party that was openly against the Indians but 
wanted to help the NFP win a few extra seats to defeat the Alliance to prove their 
(the Nationalists’) claim that Fijian rights were under threat. 
 
The NFP leadership seemed to have no understanding of what the results of their 
actions would be as they seemed quite taken aback by their victory at the polls. It 
is difficult to describe the NFP leadership, whether they were immature, short-
sighted or plain idiotic. It is not clear if everyone agreed with Koya’s tactics as the 
divisions within the NFP had resurfaced soon after the elections splitting the party 
into two factions.  
 
 196
Koya proved that he had no aims or strategies except indulging in personal 
attacks. According to R. S. Milne, Koya’s outbursts “almost suggested personal 
instability” (1975, p.426). Milne noted that when Koya co-operated with Ratu 
Mara he played the part of a statesman. His co-operation with Ratu Mara was, 
however, different from the consociationalism practised by Patel. Under Patel the 
opposition scrutinized every policy and supported those that they believed were 
for the good of the country and severely criticized what they thought was 
detrimental to the country. Koya praised Ratu Mara in Parliament and went with 
him on some of his trips abroad but actual support for the major policies was not 
forthcoming.  
 
When Reddy became the leader he rejected Ratu Mara’s proposal for a 
government of national unity which was based on the consociational model 
because he found the proposal vague (see Rabuka, 2000, p.10) . Soon, as Premdas 
noted, “ethnic conflict resolution … moved away from consociation and sharing 
towards victory and dominance” (1993, p.23).  
 
In 1965, Ratu Penaia had said there was a simple solution to the problems in Fiji 
which was “for the Indian political leaders to change their attitude” because 
“[s]peeches made publicly, either in this House or outside this House … [do] not 
help to unite the feelings of people” (LC Debates, 16 December, 1965, p.657). 
Later, Patel, who was the Leader of the Opposition at that time, changed his 
attitude because he knew there was merit in Ratu Penaia’s warning that “[h]ad the 
United Kingdom decided to introduce common roll [in Fiji] … there would have 
been an uprising to show the dissatisfaction of the people at the decision” (LC 
Debates, 16 December, 1965, p.658). Patel realized, after the by-elections of 
1968, that it was not an empty threat and he took a more conciliatory attitude 
which brought about a sudden transformation in the political atmosphere in the 
country. 
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Ratu Penaia had continued: “It is a man-made problem that we are facing and so 
long as we are sensible I am quite sure that a satisfactory solution can be found to 
make everybody live happily in Fiji” (LC Debates, 16 December, 1965, p.658). 
Indian leaders after Patel chose not to be sensible because of their limited vision. 
Professor Subramani, noted in 1995: “Lack of broad-minded, principled 
leadership [among the Indians of Fiji] has been a problem in the past; the future 
looks even more bleak” (1995, p.206).          
 
NFP’s concern “to promote the interests of Indo-Fijians … contributed immensely 
to ethnic polarization and needless to say added fuel to the Fijian nationalist 
sentiment”, a Fijian scholar, Steven Ratuva noted (1993, p.59). Indian leaders, 
however, were blind to the consequences of their actions on the whole Indo-Fijian 
community. In the 1980s they single-mindedly pursued a policy aimed at getting 
rid of Ratu Mara and the Alliance government. 
 
Ratu Mara was the most moderate among the Fijian leaders (Norton, 2002, p.143) 
so it would have been in the best interests of the Indian community for its leaders 
to co-operate with him rather than trying to defeat his government. What the 
Indian leaders of independent Fiji failed to realize was that they not only had a 
friend in Ratu Mara but perhaps, more importantly, he was the only friend the 
Indians of Fiji had among the indigenous leaders after the death of Ratu Sir 
Edward Cakobau in 1973. Moreover, there were not many in the whole 
indigenous Fijian community who were happy to give equal rights to the Indians. 
The greatest mistake of Jai Ram Reddy as a leader was the concerted effort he 
made to get rid of Ratu Mara. Rather than having policies for the NFP to convince 
the voters that it could form an alternative government, which would be as good 
as, if not better than, the Alliance government, Reddy entered into coalitions of 
expediency with splinter Fijian parties to defeat Ratu Mara and his government 
(see Chapter 6).  
 
 198
The greatest failure of NFP leadership after Patel was its inability to promote 
policies different from that of the government and present itself as a viable 
alternative government. So it could not provide the electorate with a choice except 
an ethnic choice. Therefore it could not compete for office in Fiji’s racially 
volatile situation. This was all the more regrettable because the NFP in 1966 
(when the Westminster system started in the country) began as a strong but 
‘thoughtful’ opposition and continued in that vein (for several years) before 
turning  ‘confrontational’ and slowly becoming reduced to an ethnic party. In the 
mid 1980s it became defunct for all practical purposes necessitating the 
emergence of the Fiji Labour Party. 
   
Chaudhry, who became the first ethnic Indian Prime Minister in 1999, was similar 
to Patel in that he did not think in terms of Indians; had a clear ideology; and 
wanted to make a difference by improving the lot of the common man/woman. 
His major problem was his style of leadership, which was often described as 
‘arrogant’ and ‘dictatorial’(Connew, 2001, p.76; Field and Baba, 2005, p.61,67). 
Teresia Teaiwa was less critical and described Chaudhry’s leadership style as 
‘abrasive’ (2001, p.31). The main difference between Patel and Chaudhry was that 
the latter lacked the humility of the former who had the moral courage to admit 
that he had made a mistake when he realized it as in 1968.  This lack of humility 
made Chaudhry refuse to listen to any advice from anyone. Here he was a great 
contrast to Patel who had two close advisers in Swami Rudrananda, and S. B. 
Patel, whose views he valued (see, for example, Mara, 1997, p.74). 
 
Chaudhry would have done well if he had sought the advice and guidance of Ratu 
Mara. Ratu Mara was not only the President and elder statesman of the country 
but he had also helped Chaudhry become the Prime Minister by advising the 
Fijian parliamentarians like Adi Kuini and Poseci Bune to accept Chaudhry as the 
Prime Minister. Chaudhry himself acknowledged Ratu Mara’s help on assuming 
leadership of the country. So it would have been to Chaudhry’s benefit to seek and 
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follow Ratu Mara’s advice on all issues of importance. His failure to do this was a 
costly mistake.  
 
Ratu Mara could have given him sound advice how to steer clear of issues that 
were sensitive to Fijians such as land and constitution. If Chaudhry had done that 
it would not have raised the fear in the Fijian mind that he was trying to turn Fiji 
into a ‘Little India of the Pacific’. Instead of avoiding issues that would cause 
controversy Chaudhry played right into the hands of his opponents who were 
waiting for any opportunity to discredit him. In the final analysis it was leadership 
failures again which brought about the fall of his People’s Coalition  government 
in 2000. 
 
Leadership again featured as the main issue in the May 2006 general elections 
which again saw the ethnic polarisation of voters. The majority of the ethnic 
Fijians voted for the SDL party under Qarase while the majority of the Indians 
voted for the FLP under Chaudhry. An academic, Wadan Narsey, has pointed out 
that the ethnic Fijians supported Qarase overwhelmingly probably because they 
wanted leadership to remain with ethnic Fijians  (Fiji Times, 19 May, 2006) rather  
than it going to Chaudhry, the Indo-Fijian. Leadership seems to have been the 
main issue with both the major ethnic groups. 
 
Unfortunately, the political situation today has gone back to that of 1968 (before 
independence) when parties were communally divided even when their ideologies 
were different. The FLP and SDL have different policies but each is 
overwhelmingly supported by one ethnic group. The 1997 constitution seems to 
have done little to integrate the different ethnic groups. The multiparty 
government enforced by the 1997 constitution has not worked so far in its aim of 
bringing racial harmony in the country. One could say that so far it has fared 
worse than the 1970 constitution which at least worked for 17 years and brought 
the two major ethnic groups closer together, especially in the early years when the 
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opposition was an effective one. The problems only started when the opposition 
changed from a ‘thoughtful’ opposition to a ‘confrontational’, ethnic one. 
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                                                   Conclusion 
 
‘Fiji, the way the world should be’36, proudly proclaimed the people of Fiji from 
1970 to 1987 and it was not an empty slogan either. In an imperfect world, Fiji 
seemed to come close to perfection. 
 
“The people of Fiji, when they went abroad, could raise their heads with pride, 
and not without a bit of justified smugness. Outsiders spent a lot of time trying to 
explain how Fiji, a country that should have been in racial strife wasn’t; why a big 
bang racial conflagration had not taken place” (McCall, 1987, p.45). 
 
My conclusion is that what made the difference was the ideology of 
‘multiracialism’ in which Ratu Mara and other Fijian chiefly and non-chiefly 
leaders played an important role in formulating and promulgating. The Indo-Fijian 
leaders in the Alliance and the NFP provided the vital support by accepting these 
policies and the NFP by being a ‘thoughtful’ opposition made the Westminster 
system work effectively. In the early years of independence, therefore, Fiji 
seemed to move towards ‘multiracialism’ but soon it became clear that most other 
leaders, other than Ratu Mara, were only paying lip service to the ideology and 
did not have any genuine commitment to it.  
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Fiji Visitors Bureau used to advertise Fiji as ‘the way the world should be’. 
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Ratu Mara’s dream of a united Fiji still remained elusive after 30 years because 
of:  
(a) the failure of schools to lay the foundation for such a society with the 
continuation of the voluntary system in education which fostered 
communalism and hindered integration; 
(b) the opportunistic labour aristocracy which politicized the union movement 
and concentrated its efforts on toppling the Alliance government; 
(c) the failure of the political parties, especially the NFP, to continue to 
provide effective opposition, which affected the performance of the 
government  (as the political parties became more and more ethnically 
based); 
(d) leadership failures, most of all, as other leaders (both Fijian and Indo-
Fijian) failed to support Ratu Mara’s efforts in nation building while 
maintaining cultural heterogeneity. Indian and Fijian leadership failures 
prevented the country becoming a heterogeneous nation.  Indian leadership 
failures stood in the way of the implementation of government policies 
aimed at integration while Fijian leadership failures contributed to the 
destructive Fijian nationalism. 
 
The combined effect of all this was that the country failed to develop a distinct 
Fiji identity and become integrated. The result is that “the people of Fiji cannot go 
about with the pride that they had before, for their land too has demonstrated its 
imperfections” (McCall, 1987, p.46). 
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It was not only the pride that they had in their country as a model of ethnic 
harmony that the people of Fiji lost. Many people were displaced after the 
political problems of 1987 and 2000 and suffered in many ways. Talking of the 
crisis of 2000, Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi has noted: “It was a fearful time. The 
passage of years does not diminish the sense of dread and despair that one 
experienced. Under the pretext of asserting control, some Fijians took the law into 
their own hands to steal, loot and pillage” (Madraiwiwi, 2004).  
 
In spite of that, four years later, in 2004, Ratu Joni found ethnic relations in Fiji 
better than ever before. He noted several factors which accounted for this ironic 
phenomenon. First and foremost was the “acceptance by the Indian community of 
the primacy given [to] indigenous interests” (Madraiwiwi, 2004). 
 
When Patel was the NFP leader, he always emphasized the need to give priority to 
Fijian rights. After his death, his successor, S. M. Koya, also agreed with this 
principle which led to a smooth transition to independence. After independence 
the government of Ratu Mara, as part of its ‘multiracial’ policies, tried to 
eliminate inequalities between communities by using positive discrimination in 
education which the opposition attacked mainly at election times. The 
opposition’s failure to explain and make its followers understand that such 
policies were necessary for achieving equity and building a harmonious nation 
made the political upheavals of 1987 seem inevitable.  
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Before 1987 the people of Fiji enjoyed peace and tranquility. If the Indian leaders 
of independent Fiji had explained to their followers the special position of the 
Fijians as the original settlers, as Patel did, and therefore the need to give priority 
to Fijian interests, until the country became integrated with a distinct Fiji identity, 
the people of Fiji would have been spared  a great deal of agony. Since that was 
not done the Indians in Fiji had to learn the hard way through the coups of 1987 
and the attempted coup of 2000 which “emphasized the willingness of Fijians to 
assert their rights where they were believed to be under threat” (Madraiwiwi, 
2004). The main difference between the events of 1987 and those of 2000 was that 
in 1987 the Fijian perception that there was a threat to their rights as the 
indigenous community was widespread whereas in 2000 it was confined to  
particular areas like Tailevu where the rebel leader, George Speight, had personal 
influence. 
 
Therefore I conclude that the major reason for the dream of multiracial harmony 
in Fiji remaining elusive was the lack of enlightened and statesmanlike leadership. 
I have identified the reasons for Fiji failing to achieve integration and therefore 
remaining an ethnically divided society. But the question of how harmonious 
ethnic relations and a stable democratic government can be achieved in a 
multiethnic country like Fiji still remains.  
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John Stuart Mill seems to have been the first scholar to discuss this problem of 
governing an ethnically divided country in the nineteenth century and he 
identified a common loyalty to a nation as the most important prerequisite. Fiji 
lacked this at independence. The government of Ratu Mara had policies for 
fostering a common national identity and thereby generating a common sense of 
loyalty to the nation in the youth of Fiji primarily through its schools. The 
attempts to achieve these failed because of a general lack of interest in some of 
these policies such as cross-cultural language learning and the lack of will on the 
part of the government to enforce them without the solid support of the opposition 
NFP to such measures. The government was hesitant especially because the 
majority of schools in the country were run by voluntary agencies, many of them 
Indian.  
 
Sir Arthur Lewis was another scholar in the twentieth century who talked of the 
problems of governing a multiethnic country. He warned: “The surest way to kill 
the idea of democracy in a plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American electoral 
system of first-past-the-post” (quoted in Horowitz, 1991, p.164). Ratu Mara must 
have been aware of Arthur Lewis’ warning because he had quoted Lewis in 
Parliament in 1970 regarding the dangers that such societies faced, emphasizing 
the need for moderation (see Chapter 1). So, although Fiji adopted the first-past-
the-post system in elections, communal representation was retained with only 
limited common roll (cross-voting) which was to continue until the country 
became more integrated. The NFP, while not supporting the policies put forward 
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by the government for bringing about more integration, started accusing Ratu 
Mara from mid-1970s of not keeping his word on common roll.  
 
The two leading scholars today who have discussed the question of governing 
ethnically divided countries and suggested answers to this problem are Arend 
Lijphart and Donald Horowitz.  Lijphart recommends consociationalism. Fiji’s 
1970 constitution had clear elements of consociationalism.  There was elite co-
operation as the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition were expected to 
consult on all important matters. It also gave veto power to the Great Council of 
Chiefs in issues affecting the ethnic Fijians. It promoted power sharing by 
allocating equal number of seats in Parliament for the two major ethnic groups. 
 
Horowitz, however, feels that counting on enlightened leadership to take steps to 
avoid “mutual destruction” as the consociational model does, is not always 
satisfactory because leaders may not work in a selfless manner, putting the 
country before their personal interests.  He is of the opinion that “without 
incentives statesmanship will be in short supply” (1991, p.177). He recommends 
the alternative voting (AV) system as the answer for the amelioration of inter-
group conflicts and inducing changes in the behaviour of ethnically based parties.   
 
While Fiji did not have the AV system of elections until 1997, it had a kind of  
‘electoral engineering’ through the cross-voting system where each ethnic group 
had to seek some support from the others to win the national seats. I have shown 
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how the opposition NFP leadership, after Patel, did not try to reach across to the 
other groups and seek their support.  The policies of the party concentrated on 
issues affecting only ethnic Indians so they had no attraction for the other groups. 
Soon the cross-voting national seats became an extension of the communal seats 
and thus failed in their objective of bringing about more integration in politics.  
 
The 1997 constitution, on the other hand, followed the AV system rather than the 
first-past-the-post system of elections. The first elections under this constitution, 
in 1999, gave an overwhelming majority to the People’s Coalition led by the Fiji 
Labour Party leader, Mahendra Chaudhry, while the NFP was completely wiped 
out. The NFP/SVT coalition cried foul saying that the Labour Party manipulated 
the electoral system though the FLP would have won even under the first-past-
the-post system. Unfortunately the 1997 constitution also did not bring stability to 
the country probably because the people of Fiji still did not have a common 
loyalty to a nation and the People’s Coalition government was overthrown in May 
2000 after exactly a year in office.   
 
C. J. Lynch was the first to talk about the problems of Westminster type 
democracy in the Pacific  followed by I. F. Helu and Michael Goldsmith. Lynch 
talked of the importance of consensual-consultative style of the Pacific while Helu 
finds having selfless leaders imperative for the success of democracy. He suggests 
that the leaders should follow the Socratic tradition rather than the Sophists; while 
Goldsmith, who finds the Westminster system of government and opposition 
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problematic, stresses the importance of having a ‘thoughtful’ opposition. Helu and 
Goldsmith both seem to emphasize the importance of leadership for the success of 
democracy in the Pacific. 
  
We have seen that under A.D. Patel Fiji had a ‘thoughtful’ opposition but after his 
death it degenerated into a ‘confrontational’ one. The question then is how do we 
make the leaders ‘thoughtful’ and not ‘confrontational’ and be concerned with the 
good of the nation (following the Socratic principle) rather than giving priority to 
their self-interest (as the Sophists did)?  
 
Helu suggests that the gaining of power through politics should be balanced by 
some loss of privilege or natural rights (Helu, 1994, p.325).  This suggestion is 
quite valid when one considers what happened in Fiji from early 1970s to 1987. 
The NFP opposition would have been able to present itself as a viable alternative 
government if the leaders of the opposition had had to give up their lucrative law 
practices and concentrate more on their responsibilities as the alternative prime 
ministers.   
 
What all this boils down to is the importance of leadership. Hince offers these 
criteria for assessing a leader. The important questions to ask, he says, are whether 
the person concerned wanted “personal power” or was he/she doing “community 
service”; was he/she a “positive force for development or a divisive, destructive 
agent; a leader of men or manipulator” (Hince, 1991, p.1). In the period I have 
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looked at (from 1960 to 2000) only two leaders in Fiji, at the national level, seem 
to come close to passing the test according to these criteria. 
 
The two leaders are Ratu Mara and A.D. Patel. They both seemed to have wanted 
personal prestige (more than personal power) but they were enlightened enough to 
understand that what would give them prestige is what they achieve for the 
community and the nation (and in the case of Ratu Mara, it stretched to the whole 
region).  
 
Ratu Mara and Patel were similar in many ways, although most would be shocked 
by this claim because during most of his political career Patel disagreed with Ratu 
Mara. I say they were similar because they both had a similar national outlook 
(see Introduction). They looked at the country as a whole and what was best for 
the country rather than at the needs of any particular community. They were also 
very proud of their cultures but at the same time respected other cultures. 
  
They also had a similar educational background. They both were educated in 
England and had great respect for British education and British institutions like 
democracy and the rule of law. They both were capitalists but they were against 
exploitation and believed in an egalitarian society. They both were also against 
colonialism, especially the exploitation of the non-whites by the white colonial 
powers, which was a common feature of colonialism. The main difference 
between the two leaders was that while Ratu Mara was against colonialism, he 
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remained a loyal subject of the British crown, seeing it as an extension of the 
Fijian chiefly system as most Fijians did, whereas Patel could not see any 
difference between the British monarchy and British colonialism. 
 
Ratu Mara and Patel had clear policies for their political parties. While 
formulating these policies they looked at what was good for the country as a 
whole rather than for just a particular community so the policies they put forward 
were for the benefit of the people of the country without any ethnic distinctions. 
They believed in integrating the people of the country.  
 
The methods Ratu Mara and Patel advocated for bringing about integration, 
however, were different. While Ratu Mara believed in a slow change brought 
about mainly through education Patel believed integration could only be achieved 
through a common electoral roll. This is where the difference came between the 
two leaders though their ultimate aims were similar. They both were positive 
forces for development rather than destructive agents. So they can be located 
within the Socratic tradition of leaders.  
 
Unfortunately most who succeeded them were Sophists, who saw politics as just 
another rung in their career ladder. While concentrating mainly on their personal 
advancement, hardly any of them did anything major for the benefit of the country 
and its people, unlike Ratu Mara and Patel, who both achieved a lot for the benefit 
of the common people.  
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The Fiji experience proves the important role leaders play in determining the fate 
of a nation and its people. A country needs enlightened and statesmanlike leaders 
who put the national interest before their personal ambitions to make democracy 
work in a small, developing, multiethnic country in the Pacific. How  do we 
produce such leaders is the question that remains.  Judging from the example of 
Fiji, we can conclude that it is a very difficult task.   
 
Helu’s suggestion that aspiring leaders should give up some of their other 
privileges maybe a good starting point. In this connection the appointment of Ratu 
Joni Madraiwiwi as the Vice President seemed to augur well for Fiji. On his 
appointment, he gave up his law practice to give undivided attention to his duties 
as the Vice President although it meant a personal financial loss. On taking office 
Ratu Joni promised to uphold the dignity of the Great Council of Chiefs and fulfil 
the wishes of the indigenous Fijians while at the same time protecting the rights of 
other people living in Fiji (fijilive, 10 January, 2005). 
 
Ratu Joni’s appointment generated some optimism that the dream of multiracial 
harmony in Fiji might not be as elusive as it had appeared from time to time and 
that Fiji might still become a shining example to the rest of the world in ethnic 
harmony with the people of Fiji able to hold their heads up once again with 
justifiable pride. 
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The 2006 general elections, however, proved that the Fiji population is ethnically 
polarized as ever. While the majority of the ethnic Fijians wanted a government 
led by an indigenous Fijian (Laisenia Qarase) the Indo-Fijians gave their support 
to the FLP led by an Indo-Fijian. The multiracial National Alliance Party was 
rejected by both the major ethnic groups. 
 
Qarase has invited Chaudhry to form a multiparty government which the latter has 
accepted. If the multiparty government proves successful there may be stability in 
the country. The multiparty system, however,  stifles opposition.  
 
Besides the country seemed to have taken a backward step and gone back to the 
situation of the 1960s when it was a plural society replacing the ‘multiracialism’ 
that was in dominance in the 1970s and 1980s.  This was evident in the ethnic 
polarization of voters in the 2006 May elections. The political situation now is 
similar to that of the 1960s when parties were communally divided even when 
their ideologies were different. The FLP and SDL have different policies but each 
is overwhelmingly supported by one ethnic group. This was true of the NFP and 
the Alliance in the 1960s.  
 
The country may remain peaceful and harmonious but it would not be a country 
where all the ethnic groups enjoy equal rights and status. The country may also 
become a sanctuary for coup plotters and traitors as Prime Minister Qarase wants 
to introduce a bill in Parliament that gives amnesty to all those who were behind 
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the crisis and mutiny of 2000. The future may seem more stable than it has been 
for a long time but it will be a place where political crimes are condoned judging 
from the Prime Minister’s eagerness to pardon all those who took part in the 
uprising in 2000. Rabuka can feel relaxed37 even though he is charged with 
treason, because he has nothing to fear under such a government. In such 
circumstances, even if there is stability, Fiji can no longer claim to be the way the 
world should be.  
 
Post Script 
 
In December 2006 the Qarase government was overthrown by Commodore 
Bainimarama, the Commander of the Fiji Military Forces, who disagreed with 
Qarase’s plans to give amnesty to those who were involved in the 2000 Crisis. 
The stated aim of the army is to ‘clean up’ the government of corruption and other 
problems which affect the interests of the nation as a whole. It remains to be seen 
if the army will succeed in its aims. 
 
 
                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Michael Field noted that Rabuka seemed relaxed even though he was charged with treason (see 
Field, Michael, fijilive, 25 May, 2006) 
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